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Essays on Global Firms
Paul Piveteau
The field of International Trade aims to study the consequences of the spatial disconnection between
the activities of production and consumption, which has been allowed by the increasing opening of
the economies. However, while most of the history of the field has focused on the role played by
production in shaping trade patterns, only recently researchers have emphasized the importance of
demand characteristics. This dissertation follows these recent works by containing three essays that
specifically study the importance of demand characteristics on export patterns at the microeconomic
level.
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I explore the importance of the dynamic aspects of de-
mand on the export decisions made by firms. Standard dynamic models of trade identify sunk entry
costs as the main export barrier faced by firms. However, these large entry costs are inconsistent
with the existence of many small new exporters with low survival rates in foreign markets. In this
chapter, I study the role of destination-specific demand dynamics by introducing, in a dynamic
model of trade, the idea that firms gradually accumulate consumers in foreign markets. Estimat-
ing the model using export data from individual French firms, I show that this consumer margin
is consistent with the dynamics of sales, prices and survival of exporters, but also leads to much
lower estimates of the entry costs of exporting - about one third of those estimated in the standard
model. Moreover, this change in the nature of trade barriers has important implications at the
aggregate level. In contrast to the standard model, this model correctly replicates the slow response
of trade to shocks and the increasing contribution of the extensive margin in this response. Finally,
I demonstrate using out-of-sample predictions that the model better predicts actual trade responses
to an observed shock than the standard model.
The second chapter presents a novel instrumental variable strategy to estimate product qual-
ity at the micro level using trade data. Written with Gabriel Smagghue from University Carlos
III of Madrid, this work develops a new firm-specific instrument, based on variations in exchange
rates combined with firm-specific import shares, that delivers, under weak assumptions, consistent
estimates of demand elasticity and firm product quality. Implementing our method using French
customs data, we document the reliability of these measures through correlations with firm charac-
teristics and alternative measures of quality. Finally, we use our estimates to document the quality
response of French firms when facing low-wage competition on foreign markets.
Finally, in the third chapter of this dissertation, I document the positive correlation between
the size of a firm and its advertising intensity - measured by the amount spent in advertising as
percentages of sales. Taking advantage of firm-level information about advertising expenditures
from the Chilean manufacturing census, I show that this correlation holds between firms operating
within a similar industry, and is stronger in industries with a larger scope for vertical differentiation.
Building on these findings, I develop a model of advertising with heterogeneous firms, based on
Arkolakis (2010). In addition to using advertising to inform consumers about the existence of their
good, firms can use advertising to affect consumers’ valuation of their products. Consistent with the
empirical findings, this latter feature of advertising leads to a positive link between the advertising
intensity of a firm and its size. Moreover, this link is amplified by a parameter describing the degree
of vertical differentiation of the product.
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1.1 Introduction
The decision by individual firms to enter into an export market is responsible for most of the
variations in aggregate trade flow across destinations and time. For instance, Bernard et al. (2007)
estimate that around 80 percent of the decline of international trade with geographical distance
is due to a reduction in the number of exporting firms (extensive margin) rather than changes in
exports within the firm (intensive margin). Therefore, understanding the determinants of export
decisions and the barriers that firms face in foreign markets is critical.
Standard dynamic models of trade that quantify the nature of these trade costs, such as Das,
Roberts, and Tybout (2007), highlight the prevalence of large sunk entry costs as barriers to trade.
These large entry costs are necessary to explain the persistence in export decisions, the so-called
hysteresis of exporters. However, the prevalence of these entry costs is incompatible with important
characteristics of new exporters’ dynamics that have been recently documented in the literature:
most new exporters start small and only a small fraction survives and expands in these foreign
markets.
This paper introduces inertia in consumers’ choices into a dynamic empirical model of trade to
reconcile the observed hysteresis in exporting decisions and the dynamic features of new exporters. I
introduce this inertia through the existence of a stock of consumers that firms accumulate throughout
their experience in foreign markets. To assess the importance of this accumulation of consumers
on exporters’ dynamics, I develop a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimator that allows
me to include other sources of persistent heterogeneity at the firm level such as productivity and
product appeal, and estimate the model using export data from individual French firms. The
estimated model correctly predicts lower survival rates for new exporters, but also estimates low
sunk entry costs of exporting - on average, entry costs are about one third of those estimated in
a model without consumer accumulation. These results have important implications regarding the
aggregate predictions of the model: aggregate trade responds slowly to shocks and the contribution
of the extensive margin is larger in the long run than the short run. Both of these patterns have
been recently documented in the literature; however, they are inconsistent with the standard model.
I start by presenting three stylized facts about exporters that highlight the importance of growth
in demand in these exporters’ dynamics. Consistent with recent studies, sales and survival rates
2
of young exporters are low upon entry, but grow at a fast rate during the first years of exporting.
Moreover, this growth is not due to variations in prices during the life of an exporter, but instead,
prices tend to also increase on average with export experience. This result suggests that the growth
in sales observed in the years following entry into a foreign market is mainly driven by an increase
in the demand shifts received by exporters.2
Based on these findings, I develop an empirical dynamic model of trade in which consumers only
buy from a limited set of firms, which generates inertia in their consumption choice.3 Therefore,
each firm will have a different stock of consumers, depending on its history in the foreign market;
this will shape its profit, expectations, and decisions in each market. This addition to the model
has two important consequences on the dynamics of exporters: first, it implies that new exporters
will start with low levels of sales and profits when entering a new destination. As they survive and
accumulate consumers, their sales and profits will increase, inducing increasing survival rates with
their experience in a destination. Second, because current sales are a source of customer acquisition,
firms have incentives to reduce their price to foster the accumulation of new consumers.4
In order to study the importance of this mechanism on exporters dynamics, I structurally esti-
mate this model using customs data from France. I perform this estimation on the wine industry,
which has the double advantage of being an important exporting industry in France, while also
being composed of single-good producers. The dataset provides sales and quantities exported by
individual firms on each destination market, which allows me to account for several sources of per-
sistent heterogeneity across firms and destinations. In addition to heterogeneity in demand across
destinations, the model identifies three types of heterogeneity at the firm-level: product appeal,
defined as a demand shifter that is common across destinations;5 productivity, acting as a cost
shifter; and the firm’s consumer base, which is identified from within-firm demand variations across
destinations. Because this large number of persistent unobservables complicates the estimation of
2This finding is consistent with recent papers that show the importance of demand characteristics as source firm
heterogeneity (Hottman, Redding, and Weinstein, 2016; Roberts, Xu, Fan, and Zhang, 2012).
3This extends to a dynamic setting the consumer margin first introduced in international trade by Arkolakis
(2010). This inertia could be alternatively modeled with habits formation or other sources of state-dependence in
demand.
4Recent empirical evidence for this type of mechanism on domestic market was found by Foster et al. (2016) who
studied the behavior of new firms producing homogeneous goods.
5Khandelwal (2010) at the product level or Hottman, Redding, and Weinstein (2016) at the micro level, also define
appeal or quality as the demand shifter after controlling for prices in a demand equation. However, I assume that
appeal does not vary across destinations.
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the model, I employ a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimator that will account for this
unobserved heterogeneity, and facilitates the solution of the dynamic problem of the firm. There-
fore, this estimator will allow me to obtain value estimates of the entry and per-period fixed costs of
exporting, which will be identified by rationalizing the actual entry and exit patterns of exporters
on the different export markets.
The results of the estimation demonstrate the importance of the accumulation of consumers to
replicate exporters’ dynamics. The introduction of state dependence in demand improves the ability
of the model to fit the dynamics of young exporters: the model can rationalize lower survival rates for
young exporters, as well as the growth of sales and survival as exporters become more experienced.
Moreover, estimated entry costs of exporting are small relative to existing estimates. The average
cost to start exporting to a foreign European destination for a wine exporters is around 33 000
euros, around 78 percent of the average revenue in these destinations.6 Because the accumulation
of consumers accounts for an important part of the dependence in export decisions, large entry
costs become unnecessary to rationalize the hysteresis in export markets. To confirm this finding,
I estimate a version of the model without consumer accumulation and obtain an estimate of the
average entry cost to European destinations of 98 000 euros, roughly three times the estimates of
the full model.
These results have important implications at the aggregate level. In particular, the model
will generate aggregate adjustments in response to trade shocks that are consistent with patterns
documented in the literature. First, the model predicts a slow increase in trade as a response
to a permanent positive trade shock: because of the slow accumulation of consumers, it takes
time for existing and new exporters to expand and reach their new optimal stock of consumers.
As a consequence of these adjustment frictions, the trade response will be larger in the long-run
than the short-run. In my simulations, the ratio between the long and the short-run elasticities
is around three, a value that is consistent with the ratio of elasticities used in the international
trade and international macroeconomics literature. Second, the model can predict the increasing
contribution of the extensive margin during a trade expansion. Recent papers, Kehoe and Ruhl
(2013) and Alessandria et al. (2013) in particular, document how the extensive margin tends to have
a small contribution in the short-run but plays a significant role in the long run in explaining trade
6Or equivalently 2.7 times the median yearly revenue on these destinations.
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growth. The model with consumer accumulation generates a relative contribution of the extensive
margin two to three times larger in the long-run than in the short-run. Because the technology for
accumulating consumers displays decreasing returns, new exporters will record larger growth than
established exporters in the years following the shock, hence increasing their contribution to trade
relative to older exporters throughout these years.
Finally, I employ out-of-sample predictions to further confirm the importance of this consumer
accumulation in explaining firms’ response to shocks. During the sample period, large variations in
exchange rates led to a decrease of the exported values and market shares of French wine on the
Brazilian market.7 Based on these variations in exchange rates that affected the relative price of
French wine, I construct variations in aggregate demand for French wine from Brazilian consumers.
This aggregate demand, in conjunction with outcomes from the model estimated on other desti-
nations, allows me to generate predictions on entry, sales and prices in the Brazilian market, and
compare them to the actual realizations of these variables. The model with consumer accumulation
is able to replicate, unlike the standard model, the decrease in total trade and in the number of
exporters. The decrease in estimated entry costs between the two models, reduces the option value
of exporting. Therefore, as economic conditions fluctuate, the model with consumer accumulation
(and low entry costs) will predict larger inflows and outflows of exporting firms, and therefore larger
variations in total trade.
This paper is closely related to the literature investigating exporters and firms dynamics. Das,
Roberts, and Tybout (2007) is the first study to quantify entry and per-period fixed costs of export-
ing by estimating an entry model of trade. Their estimation emphasizes the importance of entry
sunk costs to explain the hysteresis of export decisions.8 My paper builds on their contribution by
capturing this hysteresis through state dependence in demand rather than sunk entry costs, and
demonstrating the importance of this extension for a number of micro and macro-level facts. Many
recent studies have documented and studied the specific dynamics of new exporters. Nguyen (2012),
Albornoz et al. (2012), Berman et al. (2015) and Timoshenko (2015) emphasize the role of demand
uncertainty and experimentations to explain exporters dynamics, while Rauch and Watson (2003)
7The Brazilian devaluation in 1999 and the depreciation of the Argentinian peso in 2002, that fostered Argentina
exports to Brazil, have increased the relative price of French wines.
8Lincoln and McCallum (2015) similarly shows the prevalence of entry costs when estimating fixed costs of ex-
porting for US firms.
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and Aeberhardt et al. (2014) develop models where exporters need to match with foreign customers
in order to trade. Foster et al. (2016) and Fitzgerald et al. (2016) introduce consumer accumulation
to explain the post-entry growth of firms in domestic and foreign markets respectively.9 However,
they do not study the participation decision in these markets. Similar to my paper, Eaton et al.
(2014) also develop an entry model with accumulation of customers: they use an importer-exporter
matched dataset to estimate an empirical model in which exporters grow through the search of for-
eign distributors and the learning of their own ability.10 However, while they do not allow for other
margins of firms’ growth on foreign markets, my model will feature other sources of time-varying
heterogeneity at the firm level, such as productivity and product appeal. Therefore, I am able to
investigate the importance of this new margin on exporters’ dynamics, and its consequences on the
estimation of trade costs and the predictions of aggregate trade movements.
This article is also related to macroeconomic papers that similarly introduce a consumer margin,
or study aggregate trade dynamics. Arkolakis (2010, 2016) develops a static framework in which a
consumer margin at the firm level generates convex costs of participation to foreign markets and
heterogeneous elasticities of trade in the cross section of firms. I extend this consumer margin to
a dynamic setting to empirically investigate its consequences on exporters’ dynamics. Drozd and
Nosal (2012) and Gourio and Rudanko (2014) show how convex adjustment costs of market shares
can explain several puzzles in international macroeconomics and adjustments of important variables
along the business cycle. Moreover, several recent papers have investigated the reasons for the slow
response to trade, and the discrepancy between short and long-run elasticities of trade.11 This series
of papers develops macroeconomics models to explain this discrepancy between elasticities through
the role of entry and exit of firms, the importance of establishment heterogeneity or the existence of
export-specific investment (Alessandria and Choi, 2007, 2014; Alessandria, Choi, and Ruhl, 2014).
My paper also explains this discrepancy by combining the role of consumer accumulation at the
firm-level, and the entry of new exporters. However, whereas I do not develop a calibrated gen-
eral equilibrium model, I estimate an entry model using micro-data to discipline the role of this
mechanism and investigate its consequences on aggregate trade dynamics.
9See also Rodrigue and Tan (2015) that describes demand-side explanations to understand exporters dynamics.
10See also Akhmetova and Mitaritonna (2012) and Li (2014) that show the importance of demand uncertainty, and
Aw et al. (2011) looking at the impact of R&D activities on exporter decisions.
11See Ruhl (2008) for a review on the discrepancy between trade elasticities in the international macro and inter-
national trade literature.
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Finally, this study heavily builds on the literature related to the estimation of dynamic discrete
choice models (DDCM). These models display a high level of nonlinearity and therefore require the
development of specific techniques to facilitate their estimation. Rust (1987) and Hotz and Miller
(1993) can be cited as seminal papers in the development of these techniques. More specifically, I
employ a MCMC estimator recently developed by Imai et al. (2009) and Norets (2009), that allows
me to account for the existence of persistent unobservables, as well as solve the full solution of the
DDCM.12
The outline of the paper is the following: in the next section, I will present stylized facts about
the trajectories of exporters, that will emphasize the importance of demand in exporters’ dynamics.
In section 1.3, I build an empirical model of export entry that is consistent with these facts. I present
the estimation method in section 1.4, and show the results of the estimation on a set of French wine
makers in 1.5. Finally, section 1.6 will inspect the aggregate implications of the estimated results
through simulations and out-of-sample predictions, and section 1.7 will conclude.
1.2 Stylized facts about exporters dynamics
In this section, I present three important facts about exporters’ dynamics using French customs
data. First, new exporters have low survival rates upon entry, but survival increases quickly with
experience. Second, exported values grow with age in foreign markets, even after controlling for
survival. Third, prices also increase with exporters’ age.
These facts are consistent with the empirical model I will present in the next section: first,
the high level of attrition across age will require the model to account for endogenous selection.
Moreover, the rise in sales, while prices increase on average, indicates that this growth is driven by
a positive shift in the demand schedule of the firm: the consumer margin introduced in the model
will be able to replicate this increase as exporters will start small, and will accumulate consumers
with experience. Finally, the low mark-up charged by young firms to foster this accumulation will
explain the observed increase in prices with age.
12An application of this estimation method in Industrial Organization can be found in Osborne (2011).
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1.2.1 Data
The dataset I used in this paper is provided by the French customs services. These data record
yearly values and quantities exported by French firms from 1995 to 2010.13 Yearly trade flows are
disaggregated at the firm, country and eight-digit product category of the combined nomenclature
(CN). This dataset will be used to present stylized facts about new exporters in this section, and a
restricted sample from the wine industry will be used to conduct the structural estimation described
in the next sections.
I perform a number of procedures to improve the reliability of the data. In particular, I correct
for the existence of a partial-year bias, and improve the reliability of the unit values. The partial-
year bias comes from the mismatch between calendar years and exporting years: because trade data
are based on calendar years, the first year of activity of a new exporter will report lower sales on
average, since this exporter potentially entered anytime during that year.14 These partial years will
imply an overestimation of the growth rate between the first and second year of export. To correct
for this bias, I readjust the dataset using information available at the monthly level. For each new
entry by a firm on a new destination, I readjust the month of entry, and adjust accordingly the
dates of the subsequent exporting flows for that firm. Aggregating this adjusted dataset at the
yearly level, I obtained a transformed dataset that does not display this bias. Second, in order to
improve the reliability of the unit values, I drop all the product categories that use weight as unit
of measure. Even though the weight of a product is sometimes the relevant unit for that product,
it appears that it is used as unit when the type of product in a category is not homogeneous, and
therefore casts some doubt on the use of these quantities to create unit values.15 In addition to
these two important adjustments, Appendix A.1 describes additional procedures implemented on
the dataset to improve its reliability.
Table 1.1 provides some information on the distributions of the number of observations along
different dimensions. Similarly to what have been documented in the literature, trade flows from
13This dataset records most of the exporting and importing flows of Metropolitan French firms: there exists
thresholds under which a firm does not need to report its exporting activity (In 2001 these thresholds were 1,000
euros for exports to countries outside of the European union, and 100,000 for the total trade within the EU.)
14See Berthou and Vicard (2015) and Bernard, Massari, Reyes, and Taglioni (2014) for papers investigating the
extent and consequences of this bias.
15The main patterns displayed in the next subsection, in particular the one related to prices, appears to hold when
using the products that use weights as units.
8
France are sparse across firms and destinations. This is true for firms across destinations or product
categories in a given year, since the median exporting firm records two flows per year, usually
concentrated within one product category or one destination. But this sparsity also appears across
time as shown in the second panel of Table 1.1: contrary to the idea that exporting is a long-lasting
activity, we can see that the median exporting spell lasts one year.16 This is true even when exports
are aggregated across product categories and exporting flows defined at the firm-destination level.
Table 1.1: Description of the data
Statistics mean p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 N
# observations
by firm-year 8.49 1 1 2 5 28 671 403
by firm-CN8-year 2.21 1 1 1 2 8 2 581 098
by firm-dest-year 2.60 1 1 1 2 8 2 189 506
Exporting spells duration (years)
firm-dest-CN8 level 1.67 1 1 1 2 5 3 413 456
firm-dest level 2.01 1 1 1 2 7 1 091 995
Notes: CN8 denotes an eight-digit category from the Combined nomenclature, after normalization fol-
lowing Pierce and Schott (2012). An exporting spell is defined as a set of consecutive yearly exporting
flows.
These statistics provide an overview of the prevalence of short and frequent export flows in the
the export data. In order to further investigate this aspect and understand the evolution of the
other characteristics of these exporting flows, I specifically look at their trajectories across ages in
the next subsections.
1.2.2 Specifications
To describe the trajectories of exporters upon entry, I look at the variation of their survival rates,
sales and prices across different ages on foreign markets. I define the age of a firm-product-
destination triplet as the number of years this firm has been successively exporting this product
category to a market, a market being defined as a 8-digit product category-country pair. I regress the
variables of interest (dummy for survival, logarithm of sales or prices) on a full set of age dummies.
16An exporting spell is defined as a set of consecutive yearly exporting flows between a domestic firm and a foreign
destination, or a 8-digit product category - firm pair and a foreign destination.
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The specification will be augmented with fixed effects that will control for the large heterogeneity
that exists across industries, destinations and years. Formally, indexing a firm by f, a destination




δτ1(agefpdt = τ) + µpdt + εfdt, (1.1)
where agefpdt is defined as the number of consecutive years a firm f has been selling the good p to
destination d. Yfpdt will be the logarithm of export sales, the logarithm of prices (unit values),17 or
a dummy equal to one if the firm is still exporting to the market the following year. µpdt will be
a market×year-specific fixed effect such that the variations that identify the coefficients δτ comes
from variations across firms of different ages, within a given destination×product category×year
pair.
Trade data at the firm-product level are known to have a very large level of attrition. These
low levels of survival, especially in the early years of exporting, imply that firms surviving 10 years
differ substantially from firms who recently started to export. Consequently, the variations that
the regressions will capture when comparing old and new firms will mostly come from a selection
effect comparing different set of firms, rather than changes across ages for a given set of firms. In
order to partially account for this dynamic selection, I also present the results when only looking at
firm-product-destination triplets that survive 10 years in their specific markets. Even though this
only partially accounts for selection, since surviving firms are also firms with specific trajectories,
it will show that the observed relationships are not only due to dynamic selection, but also appear
within a constant set of firms.
Another possibility to partially account for this dynamic selection would be to use firm-product
fixed effects, or first difference transformations. These transformations would control for the het-
erogeneity across firms, and only capture variation within a firm-product-destination triplet across
ages. However, the identification of a trend with age is not possible using variations within a given
triplet because the increase of age is a treatment that applies to all firms, and therefore cannot be
separately identified from a cohort effect. I discuss related specifications at the end of the section.
17I use the terms unit values and prices interchangeably throughout the paper. As usual with this type of dataset,
prices are obtained by dividing export values by export quantities.
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1.2.3 Results
Here I present three important facts about exporters, namely the growths of the survival rates,
exported values, and prices with export experience on foreign markets. Regarding the growth
of sales and survival rates, these facts have been extensively documented and discussed in the
literature in international trade and macroeconomics.18 However, I show that these facts still hold
after controlling for the partial-year bias highlighted by Berthou and Vicard (2015) and Bernard,
Massari, Reyes, and Taglioni (2014). Moreover, the increase of prices has not been documented, to
my knowledge, using a comprehensive trade dataset, even though Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson
(2016) documents similar patterns for the domestic prices of homogeneous goods, and Macchiavello
(2010) show evidence of similar trajectories for prices of Chilean wine in the UK market.19
Fact 1: Survival rates are low for new exporters, and strongly increase with their age
First of all, the probability to survive on a market, i.e. to export on this market the following year,
is very low for the average exporter. Figure 1.1 displays the average survival rate for a firm-product
pair on a foreign market, for different age or experience levels. For an exporter in its first year, the
probability to export the following year is roughly 35 percent. However, this survival probability
rapidly increases once exporters have survived several years: this rate is larger than 50 percent at
age 2, and close to 75 percent at age 6. This result reflects the same idea highlighted in the previous
section that most export spells are short lived.
These low, yet increasing, survival rates will have theoretical and methodological consequences.
On the theoretical side, it will be important to have a model of export entry that can replicate and
explain these low survival rates: a model in which entry costs are prevalent will have difficulties
explaining why so many firms exit the export market so rapidly. On the methodological side, these
very low survival rates imply it will be necessary to account for this large attrition when interpreting
differences across firms in a reduced form exercise, and to model this entry decision in the design
of the structural model.
18See for instance Ruhl and Willis (2008) for a presentation of these facts and the associated puzzles.
19See also Eizenberg and Salvo (2015) which shows evidence of prices cut in the Soda Brazilian market that are
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Figure 1.1: Survival rates across export ages
Notes: The figure reports the average survival rate of a firm-product category pair on a destination at different ages.
The estimates are obtained from the regression (1.1) that uses as dependent variable a dummy equal to one when
the firm-product pair exports to the destination the following year, and includes product category×destination×year
fixed effects. The age on a destination is defined as the number of years a firm-product pair has been successively
exporting to this country. 95 percent confidence intervals are constructed using standard errors estimates clustered
at the firm-product-destination level.
Fact 2: Exported values increase with firm age in a destination, even more so in the
first years of exporting
Turning to the variation of sales across ages, Figure 1.2 documents the large growth rates of ex-
ported values across ages. This figure is obtained by plotting the results from regression (1.1),
after normalizing the average log sales at age one to be zero. When comparing exported values,
exporters which are in their third year of exporting will export more than twice as much compared
to a new exporter. This difference reaches an order of 7 when comparing an exporter with 10 years
of experience to a new exporter. However, it is important to note that these differences are mostly
due to a strong selection across exporters: old exporters, who by definition managed to survive on
foreign markets, were initially larger than the average new exporter. The right panel in Figure 1.2
emphasizes this point by looking at the relationship when restricting the set of exporters to those
surviving 10 years. Accounting for survival, the growth rate of sales with export age is strongly
reduced. Nevertheless, surviving exporters still record an average growth rate of 25 percent be-
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tween ages one and two. Moreover, this growth appears to continue the first six years: at this age,
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Figure 1.2: Sales across export ages
Notes: The figure reports the cumulative growth of sales, relative to age one, of a firm-product category pair in a
destination at different ages. The estimates are obtained from the regression (1.1) that uses logarithm of sales as
dependent variable, and includes product category×destination×year fixed effects. The left panel reports the results
of this regression on the entire sample, while the right panel reports the result from an estimation using only the
sample of firms that reach age 10. The age on a destination is defined as the number of years a firm-product pair
has been successively exporting to this country. 95 percent confidence intervals are constructed using standard errors
estimates clustered at the firm-product-destination level.
In conclusion, we observe substantial growth rates of sales during the first years of exports. These
growth rates are large but appear to be lower than previously described in the literature because
of the correction for the partial-year effect highlighted in Berthou and Vicard (2015) and Bernard,
Massari, Reyes, and Taglioni (2014). Moreover, this positive relationship appears to be robust
across product categories and destinations. However, it is important to emphasize that this growth
could be generated by the stochastic nature of the exporting process: by focusing on surviving
firms, we are looking at the “winners” of the exporting game, which could explain unusually large
growth rates. Accounting for this potential mechanism will be one of the roles of the structural
13
model introduced in the next section.
Fact 3: Export prices increase with firm age in a destination, even more so when
controlling for survival.
One possible explanation for the growth in sales could be productivity improvements that lead to a
reduction in the prices of the good exported, and therefore an increase in its sales. On the contrary,
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Figure 1.3: Prices across export ages
Notes: The figure reports the cumulative growth of prices, relative to age one, of a firm-product category pair in
a destination at different ages. The estimates are obtained from the regression (1.1) that uses logarithm of unit
values as dependent variable, and includes product category×destination×year fixed effects. The left panel reports
the results of this regression on the entire sample, while the right panel reports the result from an estimation using
only the sample of firms that reach age 10. The age on a destination is defined as the number of years a firm-product
pair has been successively exporting to this country. 95 percent confidence intervals are constructed using standard
errors estimates clustered at the firm-product-destination level.
Figure 1.3 reports the estimated parameters of regression (1.1) in which the average price at
age one is normalized to zero. The left figure shows that the price of an exporter with 10 years of
experience is on average 9 percent higher than the price of a new exporter. Similar to sales, this
effect could come from a selection effect of the exporting activity: a selection process driven by the
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quality of the product for instance, would imply that older firms which managed to survive, have
higher prices than young exporters. However, when controlling for selection by looking at surviving
firms (Right panel of Figure 1.3), it appears that the growth of prices is even larger compared to
the regression using the full sample: the price after 10 years appears to be in average 12 percent
larger than the price charged by the same firm at age one.
Observing a larger growth of prices when looking at a constant sample of firms has two important
implications. First of all, it means that costs are the main driver of the selection process: high price
firms tend to disappear more in the first years such that the positive correlation between prices and
age is weakened when using the full sample. Second, it implies that this positive correlation cannot
be only driven by dynamic selection. Therefore, an additional mechanism is necessary to explain
why firms tend to increase their price during their exporting life. The structural model presented
in the following section will introduce such a mechanism, through the dynamic pricing of the firms.
There exists other methods that can partially account for the endogenous selection across ages.
However, within variations cannot be used in this context as it is not possible to separately identify
the role of experience, cohort and trend effects. In appendix A.2, I describe results from two
specifications that use related sources of identification. The first one includes a set of firm-product-
destination fixed effects, such that the identification only comes triplets that exit the market and
reenter a few years later.20 This specification documents a decreasing trend for prices and a hump
shape of sales, which confirms that high price products tend to survive less on average. The second
specification introduces a set of firm-product fixed effects such that the variation is obtained from the
same firm-product pair which is selling to different destinations, with different ages. A potential issue
with this specification comes from the endogenous sorting across destinations: older destinations are
also the ones to which the firm has decided to export first. The results appear consistent with this
mechanism: sales appear to grow faster with this specification, while growth in prices are smaller
but still positive. Detailed results are provided in appendix A.2.
This section introduced simple facts about exporters’ dynamics that will guide the empirical
model developed below. We can draw three conclusions from these figures. First, survival rates are
very low in export markets and grow with the age of the firm. This result has two consequences: it
implies that the entry decision needs to be accounted for when studying the dynamic problem of the
20They are the only triplets that go ‘backward’ in age, and therefore are the only sources of variation.
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firm. Moreover, this fact is contradictory with a world where the main barrier to export is made of
sunk entry costs: in such a world, exporters would tend to keep exporting once they have overcome
this important barrier. Second, sales of exporters grow rapidly in the first years of exporting. These
large growth rates are also present when accounting for dynamic selection across firms. Third, this
increase in sales is driven by a growth in the demand of the firm: price variations cannot explain this
large increase, implying the importance of demand characteristics as main drivers of this increase in
sales. On the contrary, it appears that prices tend to rise with age, even more so when controlling
for dynamic selection. This pattern could be explained by a dynamic behavior of the firms that
foster their growth in the early years by reducing their prices.
Despite these conclusions, it is difficult to make strong causal statements by comparing firms of
different ages. This brings to light a second benefit of developing and estimating a structural model
to study the entry and growth of exporters: in addition to understanding the dynamic decisions
of firms, it will allow the model to control for the endogenous sorting and attrition of firms, and
recover the different processes that drive the observables variables of the model. The next section
introduces this model.
1.3 Structural model of export entry
This section describes an empirical model of entry into foreign markets in which the accumulation
of consumers creates a new source of dependence in the dynamic problem of the firm. This model
aims to identify the different sources of firms’ profit in foreign markets in order to explain their
export decisions. Therefore, it is crucial to allow for heterogeneity across firms and destinations,
but also to allow this heterogeneity to be persistent over time. Indeed, persistent heterogeneity will
be the main competing hypothesis to sunk entry costs to explain the persistence in export decisions.
As a consequence, this model will feature two additional sources of persistence at the firm level -
productivity and product appeal - and one persistent characteristic specific to destinations - their
aggregate demand. Therefore, a potential profit for a firm-destination pair will depend on four
characteristics: productivity, product appeal, aggregate demand and consumer share.21
21Therefore, I will assume that entry decisions are independent across destinations, once controlling for firms’
characteristics, which will keep the state space of the dynamic problem relatively small. McCallum (2015) provides
support for this assumption by finding that entry costs of exporting are mostly country specific. See also Morales
et al. (2014) for a paper that use moments inequalities to maintain such a large state space.
16
The introduction of consumer accumulation will imply two deviations from the standard dynamic
model, which will be consistent with the stylized facts presented earlier: first, firms will start small
in a new market. Their sales and profit will rise in the following years as they accumulate more
consumers. Second, because part of this accumulation of consumers comes from sales, firms will
have dynamic incentives to lower their prices in the first years of exporting to foster their future
demand.
I start by describing the demand schedule of the firm and how the accumulation of consumers
affects the demand from foreign destinations. After introducing the costs associated with the pro-
duction process, I solve the dynamic problem of the firm to study the consequences of this consumer
margin on the entry and pricing decisions.22 In particular, the optimal price charged by the firm
will depart from a constant mark-up over marginal costs to take into account the dynamic impact
of prices on consumer accumulation.
1.3.1 Demand
There exists a wide range of mechanisms that can give rise to inertia in consumption and state
dependence in demand. A large literature in industrial organization has found empirical evidence
of this behavior and have studied their consequences on the market equilibria and the pricing be-
haviors of firms. This literature also points out the large number of mechanisms that can generate
this dependence in demand, as well as the difficulty to empirically disentangle these different chan-
nels. One can cite the existence of habits in consumption, the fact that searching new products is
costly, or the failure of perfect information for the consumers about goods as examples of economic
explanations that leads to state dependence in the demand formed by an agent (see for instance
Dubé, Hitsch, and Rossi (2010) for a paper distinguishing and measuring the contribution of these
different mechanisms).
In order to keep the model tractable, I will introduce state dependence in demand through the
existence of a firm-specific customer base on each destination. This customer base, denoted nfdt,
describes the share of consumers, on a destination d at time t, that includes the product f in its
consideration set. This representation follows the marketing literature that defines a consideration
22Note that I do not study the choices made by the firms for each product it could potentially export. Firms are
seen as single-good producers in this model, and will be considered as such in the empirical application using wine
producers.
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set as the set of products that consumers consider when making purchase decisions.23 It is also
consistent with the idea of customer margin introduced in the macroeconomic and international
trade literature.24 This consumer base is equivalent to introducing some frictions that can explain
that new exporters will start small in foreign markets and will only expand in the subsequent years.
Even though I can specifically identify that these frictions are destination-specific demand frictions,
one could imagine other theoretical foundations for why new exporters face little demand when they
start and slowly grow in export markets.25
Therefore, I will assume that a new exporter has an initial share of consumer n0 when it enters
a new foreign destination. In the subsequent years, the consumer awareness of the products will be
propagated through two mechanisms. First, the sales of a product will increase its awareness in the
next period. Specifically, an euro increase in the sales of a product will increase by η1 the potential
share of consumers in the next period. This acquisition of consumers can arise in a situation in which
consumers have imperfect information about product characteristics, and therefore use sales as a
signal for the expected utility gain obtained from consuming a good.26 Second, another source of
consumer accumulation will come from word-of-mouth: I will assume that each aware consumer will
share its awareness with η2 consumers. Both of these mechanisms will generate a potential growth
in the share of consumers for the firm. However, because some of these reached consumers are
already aware of the existence of the product, this acquisition of new consumers will be discounted
by a factor (1− n′)ψ with ψ > 0, such that the marginal effect of sales s and consumer share n on








This specification is largely inspired from the marketing literature as described in Arkolakis (2010):
the accumulation of consumers has decreasing returns such that it is more difficult for an established
firm to accumulate more consumers relatively to a firm with a small initial share. Indeed, for
23See for instance Shocker et al. (1991) for an article studying the importance of consideration sets in consumers’
decisions.
24See for instance Drozd and Nosal (2012) and Gourio and Rudanko (2014) for macroeconomic papers, and Arkolakis
(2010) in international trade.
25For instance, one could think of a Hotelling model in which firms are uncertain about the ideal variety asked by
consumers in a given market, and only comes closer to this variety as they sell and survive on this market.
26With CES preferences, the amount spent for a specific good is proportional to the utility gain obtained from the
consumption of this good.
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established firms, a significant share of these newly reached consumers will already be part of their
consumer share, hence not contributing to its growth. Therefore, the parameter ψ will describe
the importance of these decreasing returns, and the two parameters η1 and η2 will characterize the
importance of the two different sources of growth in the accumulation process.
These two different margins of growth will capture different mechanisms of consumer accumu-
lation, but more importantly will generate different optimal responses by the firm. In a world with
word-of-mouth, where consumers learn from their neighbors, the growth of this consumer share
could be seen as exogenous, only based on the past share of consumers. In this world, firms can-
not affect this accumulation with their pricing decisions.27 However, in a world where consumers
face uncertainty regarding product characteristics and sales are seen as a signal, firms will have
incentives to reduce its price in order to foster the accumulation of consumers. This distinction
between these two sources of growth brings back to the distinction between structural and spurious
structural dependences (Heckman, 1981), that generate different optimal responses by the firm.
Adding an initial condition to these differential equations, n(0, 0) = n, we obtain the following
law of motion for the consumer share of a firm f, at date t and destination d:
nfdt = 1−
[
(1− n)1−ψ − η1(1− ψ)sfdt−1 − η2(1− ψ)nfdt−1
] 1
1−ψ (1.3)
Therefore, the share of consumers today nfdt will depend on the sales sfdt−1 and the share of
consumers nfdt−1 in the previous period in this market.
This share of consumer will act as a demand shifter for the firm since it will scale the amount
of demand the firm will receive from each destination. To obtain the total demand of the firm, it
is necessary to solve the consumption problem of the consumers. Because not all consumers know
about all products, consumers will display CES preferences over a limited set of goods. Denoting
















27This model does not take into account advertising as a source of growth, even though this could be a natural
candidate to foster consumer accumulation. The inability to observe this type of expenditures in trade datasets makes
it difficult for an empirical model to account for this channel.
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where q(ω) is the quantity consumed and λ(ω) the appeal of the product. This consumer i will
maximize this utility function given a budget yi devoted to this set of goods, and prices p̃(ω). As a
solution of this optimization, the quantities qi(ω) demanded by consumer i for a good ω are
qi(ω) =
 exp(λ(ω))p̃(ω)
−σP σ−1yi if ω ∈ Ωi
0 if ω 6∈ Ωi
where P is the standard CES price index faced by the representative consumer.28 Aggregating the
demand from individual consumers, we obtain the demand received by the firm f from destination
d at time t:
qfdt = q(λft, Xdt, nfdt, pfdt, ε
D





where Xdt will capture all the aggregate variables of the demand shifter,29 pfdt is the factory price
of the good, and εDfdt is a random demand shock.
It is important to note that the appeal of the product λft does not vary across destinations.
Given the existence of an aggregate demand shifter, this implies that firms cannot vary the relative
quality or appeal of their good across destinations. Therefore, this specification can still explain that
firms will provide different product appeal in different destinations, as long as these differences are
common across firms. This assumption will be fundamental to explain the identification assumption
of the model: while λft and Xdt are respectively firm and destination specific, the customer share
nfdt will be identified through the sales of a firm in a specific destination.
After describing the demand faced by firms, I now turn to the costs associated with production
and international trade.
28Note that by having different sets of goods, each consumer would have a different price index. However, I follow
Arkolakis (2010) by assuming that each consumer has probabilistically an equivalent set of goods, such that all






29Xdt ≡ log Ydt − (1 − σ) logPdt + (1 − σ) log(τdtedt) where Ydt ≡ yNdt are total expenditures from a number of
consumers Ndt, and τdt and edt are respectively iceberg transportation costs and exchange rates that converts the
factory price to the consumer price.
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1.3.2 Technology and costs
The costs that are associated with production and international trade are similar to those tradi-
tionally assumed in the literature. I first describe the constant marginal costs of production, then
the fixed costs associated with the exporting activity.
First, I assume constant marginal costs of production. These marginal costs are a decreasing
function of the productivity of the firm φft, and will depend on the appeal of the good produced
through a parameter α that characterizes the cost elasticity of appeal. Moreover, I assume the
existence of non-persistent productivity shocks εSfdt, and I allow costs to vary with the destination
market by including a set of coefficients γd. Formally, the marginal cost function of the firm is
cfdt = c(φft, λft, ε
S
fdt) = exp(−φft + αλft + εSfdt + γd) (1.5)
In addition to these production costs, I will assume that firms need to pay entry and per-period
fixed cost for each destination they respectively enter or export to. These fixed costs are defined as
follows
FCd + νfdt =
 fd + νfdt if Ifdt−1 = 1fd + fed + νfdt if Ifdt−1 = 0
where Ifdt is a dummy that equals one if the firm f is active (records positive sales) in destination
d at time t, and νfdt is a random shock on fixed costs. I will assume that this shock νfdt will follow
a logistic distribution with variance parameter σν . The addition of this shock will allow the model
to rationalize all observed decisions made by the firms. Moreover, it is important to note that the
amplitude of these fixed costs will vary across destinations. However, I will restrict this variation
in the estimation, by allocating each foreign destination to specific groups sharing the same value
of fixed costs.30
This achieves the definition of the demand and supply characteristics of the firm. I now turn to
the definition of the profit and value functions associated to the exporting activity of firm.
30For instance I will assume that entry and per-period fixed costs will be similar for all European countries. Morales,
Sheu, and Zahler (2014) develop a specific empirical procedure that allows them to flexibly estimate entry and fixed
costs across destinations.
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1.3.3 Profit and value function
From the demand received by the firm, and the costs associated with production, I derive the
potential profit of the firm for each destination market. After defining the timing of a typical
period, I can define the entry problem of the firm, and the associated value functions. This dynamic
problem will depend on five variables that will define the state space of the problem: the exogenous
variables, that gathers product appeal λ, productivity φ and aggregate demand X, the share of
consumer n, and the presence on the market in the previous year I−1.
In this model, the decisions of the firms are limited. They can decide whether to be active on
the market, and the price they will charge if they decide to export. Consequently, the appeal of the
product, the productivity and the aggregate demand from each destination will be exogenous but
persistent variables that will potentially capture the hysteresis of the exporting decisions. For ease
of exposition, I will denote these variables ξ ≡ (λ, φ,X) such that, ignoring the subscripts and the
parameters of the model, the profit function of a firm is





= π(ξ, n, p, ε)− FC(I−1)− ν
where I−1 is a dummy equal to one if the firm was selling on the market in the previous year. This
profit function is made of a variable profit and fixed costs. Despite having CES preferences, this
variable profit could be negative because of the dynamic nature of the pricing decision of the firm:
some firms could set a price lower than their marginal costs to foster future demand. The second
part of the profit function comes from the fixed costs of exporting FC(I−1) that will depend on
the past presence of the firm on the market. Finally, the profit shock ν will allow the empirical
model to explain the entry and exit decisions of firms that cannot be rationalized by the values of
the variable profit and fixed costs.
However, this profit will only be obtained by the firm if it decides to be active on the market
at this period. In order to study the problem of the firm, it is necessary to define the timeline of
a typical period, which provides the timing at which decisions are made and the information sets
available to the firms when they make these decisions. Figure 1.4 displays the timeline of a period
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Figure 1.4: Timeline of one period
As described in figure 1.4, the firm observes at the beginning of the period its exogenous variables,
λ, φ, n and X. After realization of the profit shock ν, it decides whether to export in the market. If
the firm decides to export, it optimally chooses the mark-up to charge over their marginal costs.31
Finally, sales and prices will be obtained after observing the realization of the non-persistent shocks
ε.32
Therefore, denoting µ the multiplicative mark-up of the firm such that p = µc, the value function
of the firm can be defined as the following:
V (ξ, n, I−1) = Eνmax
{
VI(ξ, n)− FC(I−1)− ν ; VO(ξ)
}










EV ′(ξ, n′, I) =
∫
ξ′
V (ξ′, n′, I) dF (ξ′|ξ).
The first line describes the entry problem, in which the firm chooses between exporting VI(ξ, n)−
FC(I−1) and inactive VO(ξ). By being inactive, the firm makes no profit today but retains the
possibility to update its decision in the next period. In contrast, when exporting, it obtains a
present profit that will depend on the shocks ε and the mark-up chosen by the firm. Moreover, the
firm will have a continuation value, EV ′(ξ, n′(ξ, n, ε, µ), 1), characterized by a stock of consumer n’
31Choosing the mark-up rather the price facilitates the computation of the solution, while allowing for structural
shocks ε in demand and costs.
32The assumptions made regarding the timing of the shocks and decisions are mostly driven by the construction
of the empirical model. The realization of the shock ν before the entry decisions allow the model to rationalize entry
decisions that couldn’t be explained otherwise. Similarly, the realizations of the shocks ε after the markup decisions
generate structural errors in the sales and prices equations that can explain sales and prices variations.
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and lower fixed costs to pay in the next period. This continuation value will be constructed from
the transition of the exogenous variables F (ξ′|ξ), and the expected value of V (ξ, n′, I).
In order to solve this problem, it is necessary to proceed through backward induction by de-
scribing the pricing decision made by the firm once it enters. This optimal pricing decision leads to
the expected profit of the firm, and therefore solves for the entry decisions. I describe these optimal
decisions and the value functions of the problem in the next subsection.
1.3.4 Firms’ decisions: entry and pricing.
After defining the problem of the firm, I can now derive the optimal entry and pricing decisions of
the firm. Because the accumulation of consumers is based on the sales of the firm, the optimal price
charged by the firm will deviate from a standard constant mark-up. Instead, firms will optimally
reduce their mark-up to account for the accumulation of consumers. Because this pricing decision is
taken once the firm has decided to enter, I start by describing the optimal mark-up charged by the
firm. By backward induction, I will infer the expected profit of the firm conditional on this optimal
pricing decision, and therefore infer the value and probability of exporting.
Optimal price The choice of the mark-up of the firm involves solving a dynamic problem: by
affecting the sales of the firm today, the price charged by the firm affects the share of consumers to-
morrow. Therefore, the firm will have incentives to reduce its price today to foster the accumulation
of future consumers.
The choice of mark-up of the firm is made after entry, in order to maximize the sum of the present
profit and the continuation value of exporting. Formally, the problem and first-order conditions are
the following:





π(ξ, n, µ, ε) + βEV ′(ξ, n′(ξ, n, ε, µ), 1)
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Therefore, the optimal price of the firm is:
p(ξ, n) = µ(ξ, n)c(ξ, n) (1.6)




1 + βEw(ε){η1(1− n′)ψ
∂EV ′(ξ,n′,1)
∂n′ }
The optimal mark-up charged by the firm has two components. First, the firm will apply the
standard CES mark-up σσ−1 based on the price-elasticity of the demand. Second, the firm will
apply a discount factor based on the dynamic incentives it has to lower its price to attract more
consumers in the future. This factor will depend on two elements: first, how much this increase in
sales will increase its consumer share tomorrow, η1(1−n′)ψ; this element will induce lower mark-ups
for small or young firms that benefit from higher returns of accumulation. Second, the extent of
this discount will also depend on the impact of this increase in the future consumer share on the
continuation value ∂EV
′(ξ,n′,1)
∂n′ . This effect will not be linear but hump shaped with the profitability
of the firm:33 young firms that are unlikely to survive will not have incentives to invest in future
consumers. Firms that can use extra consumers to increase their probability of survival will get
the largest benefits from increasing their consumer share. However, because of the concavity of
the value function conditional on surviving, this effect will be smaller for high profit firms that are
likely to survive in the next period. Finally, note that this equation defines the unique optimal price
charged by the firm but only through an implicit function, since the future share n’ will depend on
the price charged.34
Consequently, the accumulation of consumers will imply heterogeneous mark-ups by the firms,
depending on their current share of consumers, and their expectations on future profits. Having
33This comes directly from the probability of exit that makes the value function of the firms increasing and convex











c(ξ, ε)q(ξ, n, µ, ε)∫
ε
c(ξ, ε)q(ξ, n, µ, ε)
η1(1− n′)ψ
∂EV ′(ξ, n′, 1)
∂n′
dF (ε)
To overcome the absence of closed form solution for the optimal price, I will use a grid to solve the optimal price of
the firm in the estimation procedure. Moreover, solving the dynamic problem of the firm will also be facilitated by
assuming that EεEV ′(ξ, n′(ξ, n, ε, µ), 1) = EV ′(ξ, n′(ξ, n, Eεε, µ), 1). This assumption will allow me to redefine the
problem such that










Eεπ(ξ, n, µ, ε) + βEV
′(ξ, n̄′(ξ, n, µ), 1)
}
for which Eεπ(ξ, n, µ, ε) admits a closed-form solution that will facilitate the evaluation of the model.
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described the optimal mark-up of the firm, it is possible to infer the expected profit of the firm in
case of entry. Therefore, I can evaluate the two options of the firm, and study its entry decision.
Entry condition Knowing the expected option values of being active or inactive, I can now study
the entry decision of the firm. The firm will pick the most profitable option, after observing the
shock ν that affects the fixed costs of being active on a market. The logistic assumption for this
shock will generate a closed-form solution for the probability of entry, but also for the expected value
function before observing this shock. Formally, the expected value of the firm before observing the
shock ν is
V (ξ, n, I−1) = Eνmax
{


















This equation closes the dynamic problem of the firm, by providing the fixed point that defines the
value function V (ξ, n, I−1). Moreover, the probability for a firm to be active, before the realization
of the fixed cost shock ν, is,




− 1σν (DV (ξ, n)− FC(I−1))
) (1.7)
with DV (ξ, n) = VI(ξ, n) − VO(ξ). This last equation predicts the probability of entry of a firm,
conditional on its current characteristics, described by ξ, n and I−1. While n and I−1 are en-
dogenous, ξ are exogenous and unobservables variables. Therefore, to finish the derivation of the
model, it is necessary to describe the evolutions of these exogenous variables across time. These
evolutions will be important to compute the expectation of the value functions, EV ′(ξ, n, I−1), as
well as disciplining the variations of sales and prices across times in the empirical application.
1.3.5 Evolution of exogenous variables
In order to close the definition of the dynamic problem of the firm, I need to specify the evolution
of the exogenous variables of the model. These exogenous variables will be important as they can
account for a large amount of the persistence in export decisions observed in the data. Most of
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the hysteresis in exporting decisions is likely to come from the persistence over time of fundamental
characteristics of the firm such as productivity or product appeal. Therefore, it is necessary to allow
these processes to be persistent. Moreover, to account for the important attrition rate across ages,
it is also necessary to let these processes vary across time, through random shocks. Consequently,
one wants to assume general processes that are time variant, and allow for important persistence
in their evolution. For these reasons, I will assume that these three variables will follow AR(1)
processes, with flexible parameters. Formally, I assume
λft = ρλλft−1 + σλε
λ
ft
φft = µφ + ρφφft−1 + σφε
φ
ft




where the ε shocks follow a normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance. Note that, by
normalization, λ is centered around zero: since both X and λ enters linearly in the demand function,
it is not possible to separately identify their respective means. Moreover, because Xdt describes the
aggregate demand from a destination d, I allow the mean µXd of this process to change across
destination. This will allow the model to capture different trends in aggregate demand across
different destinations.
Finally, I need to impose distributional assumptions on the initial conditions of these unobserv-
ables. I assume that the distributions of product appeal and productivity are stable over time such












However, I will assume that the variation in aggregate demand across destinations does not arise
from a stationary distribution. Therefore, I will assume a flexible distribution of initial conditions
for Xd0 such as
Xd0 ∼ N(µX0 , σX0). (1.10)
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Moreover, I will assume that the initial share of consumers, which will apply to firms that records
positive sales the year before the beginning of the model, follow a Beta distribution with parameters
1 and 5.35
This concludes the derivation of the model. Each firm observes exogenous variations in its
export profitability through variation in its productivity, product appeal and the demand in each
destination. Based on these variations, the firm decides to enter or exit various destinations where
it decides at which prices to sell its good. The more the firm sells on a market, the more consumers
will be ready to buy from it in the next period, fostering its demand and profit in the next period.
After describing the model, I now describe the restrictions I impose to obtain a model without
consumer accumulation, that will behave similarly to standard models used in the literature.
1.3.6 Restricted model
In order to assess the importance of consumer accumulation on estimated trade costs and aggregate
response to trade, I will estimate a restricted version of the model that does not feature this
mechanism. This restricted model is equivalent to assuming that exporters will have a consumer
share nfdt equal to one when they are active on the market. As a consequence, firms will not have
incentives to deviate from the CES pricing, and the mark-ups will be similar across all firms.
This restricted version of the model can be seen as the canonical model used in the literature. In
this model, firm-level heterogeneity and entry costs of exporting explain the hysteresis in exporting.
This model can be seen as a dynamic version of Melitz (2003), as estimated by Das, Roberts, and
Tybout (2007). Estimating this restricted model will be essential to assess the importance of the
accumulation of consumers on the outcomes of the estimation and the aggregate implications of the
model.
1.4 Estimation
In this section, I describe the procedure used to estimate the parameters of the model. The likelihood
is directly obtained from the three structural equations of the model. However, the evaluation of
35Given the number of firms in this case, and the length of the panel I will use (14 periods), this assumption has
no consequence on the estimation.
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this likelihood is made cumbersome by the number of persistent and unobservables variables and
the dynamic problem of the firm.
I start by describing the likelihood of the problem, based on the three structural equations
linked with the observable variables (sales, prices and participation to export). I then turn to the
algorithm to show the advantages of a MCMC estimator to facilitate the estimation of the model.
Finally, I provide the intuition behind the identification of the parameters and unobservables of the
model.
1.4.1 Likelihood
I start by presenting the likelihood that is obtained from the three main equations of the model:
the demand equation in which the stock of consumers of the firm appears, the pricing equation that
features the dynamic mark-up charged by the firm, and the entry probability that describes the
exporting decision on each destination.
First of all, the demand and price equations (1.4), (1.5) and (1.6) are taken in logarithm to
obtain
log sfdt = log nfdt + λft +Xdt + (1− σ) log pfdt + εDfdt
log pfdt = −φft + αλft + logµ(ξ, nfdt) + γd + εSfdt
This block will constitute the first part of the likelihood. Assuming that ε follows a bivariate normal
distribution with variance Σ, I define this likelihood block as Lε(sfdt, pfdt|ξfdt, nfdt; Θ),36 with Θ
being the full set of parameters, such that
Lε(sfdt, pfdt|ξfdt, nfdt; Θ) = GΣ
(
log sfdt − log nfdt − λft −Xdt − (1− σ) log pfdt ;
log pfdt + φft − αλft − logµ(ξ, n)− γd
) (1.11)
where GΣ is the density function of a bivariate normal distribution with means zero and variance
matrix Σ.
The second block of the likelihood will be based on the entry decision of the firm. Equation
36As previously defined, ξfdt gathers all the exogenous variables of the model - product appeal, productivity and
aggregate demand - such that ξfdt ≡ {λft, φft, Xdt}
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(1.7) defines the probability to enter for a firm, based on its set of unobservables ξ, its stock of
consumer n and its past exporting activity. I denote this function Lν(Ifdt|ξfdt, nfdt, Ifdt−1; Θ) that
is obtained from the binary choice made by the firm











DV (ξfdt, nfdt)− FC(Ifdt−1)
σν
)]Ifdt−1 (1.12)
where function DV (ξfdt, nfdt) and FC(Ifdt−1) are defined as previously. Therefore the total likeli-
hood for a given observation Dfdt ≡ {sfdt, pfdt, Ifdt} is
L(Dfdt|Dfdt−1, ξfdt, nfdt−1; Θ) = Lν(Ifdt|ξfdt, nfdt, Ifdt−1; Θ)× Lε(sfdt, pfdt|ξfdt, nfdt; Θ).
To obtain the unconditional likelihood, that does not depend on the unobservables of the model, it
is necessary to integrate out this set of unobservables. However, because these unobservables are
persistent over time, the likelihood of the entire dataset D is obtained by repeatedly integrating the











L(DfdT |DfdT−1, ξfdT ; Θ)× ...× L(Dfd0|Dfd−1, ξfd0, nfd−1; Θ)
dF (ξfdT |ξfdT−1)× ...× dF (ξfd0) dF (nfd−1)
where F (ξfd0) is defined by the density of the initial unobservables defined in equations (1.9) and
(1.10), and F (nfd−1) the beta distribution assumed for firms that were exporting the year before the
beginning of the estimation sample, and Dfd−1 the observables previous to the estimation sample.
After describing the likelihood of the problem, I now turn to the estimation procedure by describing
the algorithm aiming to find the posterior distribution of parameters Θ.
1.4.2 Algorithm
To estimate the model, I develop a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimator to account
for two important difficulties in evaluating the likelihood of this problem: the different sources of
persistent and unobservable heterogeneity and the dynamic problem of the firm. First, the persistent
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unobservable characteristics make it necessary to perform a large number of integration in order to
evaluate the likelihood. This is particularly cumbersome given the persistent nature of these sources
of heterogeneity. The second difficulty comes from the need to solve for the value functions in order
to obtain the objects DV () and µ() and evaluate the likelihood. The literature on dynamic discrete
choices model, starting from Rust (1987) is mostly devoted to this specific problem, which requires
obtaining the solution of the Bellman equation through value function iterations until reaching a
fixed point.37 Therefore, even in the absence of unobservables, the likelihood function is a highly
non-linear function of the parameter set Θ, increasing the difficulty, and the computing time, of
evaluating the likelihood.
In order to circumvent these difficulties, I employ a MCMC estimator, taking advantage of recent
Bayesian techniques to sample the posterior distribution of the parameter Θ, conditional on the data.
The choice of a Bayesian estimator relies on two recent findings from the Bayesian econometrics
literature. First, Arellano and Bonhomme (2009) show how Bayesian hierarchical models nest fixed
and random effects models: using a prior distribution of the unobservable of the model, the posterior
distribution of the unobservable term will be very precise when many observations are available (for
instance when one firm sells to many destinations), such that this posterior distribution will be
close to the fixed effects value. When the number of observations is limited (for instance when a
firm only sells to one country), the prior distribution of the unobservable variable, as specified by
the model, will constrain the value of this variable similar to the random-effect case. Moreover,
using MCMC in this context will allow one to perform the integration by updating unobservables as
latent variables of the model. Therefore, a Bayesian estimator offers a attractive way of integrating
these unobservables, while correcting for the first-order bias that exists in fixed and random-effects
models.38
Second, to overcome the computational burden of solving the value functions in the likelihood,
Imai, Jain, and Ching (2009) and Norets (2009) show how to take advantage of the iterative feature
of the MCMC estimator, by only updating the value functions in the Bellman equation once at each
37This problem can be largely simplified using the mapping between conditional choice probabilities and value
functions, as highlighted in Hotz and Miller (1993). However, in my application where state variables are mostly
unobserved, obtaining conditional choice probabilities in a first step is not trivial, and likely to be an imprecise
exercise.
38Roberts, Xu, Fan, and Zhang (2012) also use this type of estimator in a similar context. The main difference
being that the unobservables terms are time-invariant in their model while they vary in mine, making the integration
issue even more stringent in my setup.
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iteration. The intuition is that there is no need to fully solve for the fixed point of the value function
at each point of the parameter set. Instead, it is possible to only iterate the Bellman equations a
limited number of times at each iteration of the Markov chain, reusing these value functions as initial
values for the next iteration. As the Markov chain converges and explores the posterior distribution
of Θ, the value function will also converge toward the fixed point that solves the Bellman equation.
Overall, the MCMC estimator will explore the posterior distribution of the parameters Θ. This
distribution is proportional to the product of the likelihood and the prior distribution such that
P (Θ |D) ∝
∫
ξ
L(D | ξ,Θ) dF (ξ |Θ)P (Θ) (1.13)
where L(D |Θ) =
∫
ξ L(D | ξ,Θ) dF (ξ |Θ) is the likelihood of the problem and P (Θ) is the prior
distribution of the parameter set. Because I do not want these priors to influence the posterior
distribution of the parameters, I will assume that all the priors are flat, except for values of pa-
rameters that do not satisfy theoretical or stationarity constraints.39 Therefore, the goal of the
Markov Chain is to repeatedly sample from the posterior distribution according to (1.13). This will
be achieved by alternatively sampling parameters conditional on unobservables, and parameters
conditional on unobservables. In this specific application, an iteration in the Markov chain consists
of three different steps, summarized in the following iteration.
At an iteration s, the inputs of the Markov chain are Θ(s), ξ(s) and the history of value functions{
V (Θ(h))
}s




h=s−m for a given m ≥ 0. The steps
of a typical iteration are:
• Sample ξ(s+1) proportionally to L(D|ξ,Θ(s))f(ξ|Θ(s))






(s+1) and V (Θ(s+1)).
Two important points are worth noticing regarding this algorithm. First, the large size of the
parameter space requires updating the parameters sequentially rather than simultaneously. In total,
39I exclude from the support of Θ (or equivalently assigned a prior probability of zero for these values), negative
values for the variance parameters, as well as values beyond -1 and 1 for the autocorrelation parameters. Finally, I
also impose the average fixed cost and entry cost parameters (f , fe) to be positive. and the parameter ψ to be larger
than zero.
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30 parameters will be estimated in the model. Consequently, a Gibbs sampling is used in which
different parameters blocks are created and sequentially updated based on the different blocks of
the likelihood.40 Second, the value functions that allow the computation of the objects DV (.) and
µ(.) will be obtained on a grid that will be updated throughout the algorithm. The specific values
of DV (.) and µ(.) will then be obtained by interpolation to be evaluated at any point in the state
space. I provide extensive details in appendix A.3 about the implementation of the algorithm.
Due to the complexity of the estimation procedure, two parameters will not be estimated and
set to specific values from the literature. First of all, I do not estimate the value of β, the discount
rate of future periods. This parameter is difficult to identify in dynamic discrete choice models
and I therefore set its value to 0.9, following Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007).41 Second, I do not
estimate the elasticity of substitution of the CES utility function. Estimating the price-elasticity of
demand using trade data is not trivial given the absence of product characteristics, which implies
unobserved vertical differentiation across goods.42 Therefore, I will use the value obtained by Broda
and Weinstein (2006) for the corresponding industry; they estimate an elasticity of 2.2 for the wine
industry, which I will utilize and keep constant throughout the algorithm.
After describing the details of the estimation procedure, I provide, in the next section, intuition
about the sources of identification of the parameters and the unobservables.
1.4.3 Identification intuition
Despite the complexity of the algorithm, estimating this model using micro data and a full in-
formation estimator provides simple intuitions of the identification of the parameters. Moreover,
the alternative sampling of unobservables and parameters shed light on the separate sources of
identifications of each component of the likelihood.
To describe the sources of identification, it is important to distinguish the identification of un-
observables and parameters. Let’s assume first that the parameters of the model are known. In
this situation, the identification of the unobservables mostly come from a variance decomposition
40Despite the separation of the parameters in different sets, the existence of value functions in the likelihood creates
a dependence between most parameters of the parameter set and the different part of the posterior distribution.
Therefore, Metropolis-Hastings algorithms are used to sequentially update these different blocks.
41Magnac and Thesmar (2002) provides an extensive discussion of identification issues in DDCM.
42See Piveteau and Smagghue (2015) for a discussion on the estimation of this elasticity. In theory, prices in other
destinations could be used as instrument for the prices. However, this requires controlling for the impact of quality
on marginal costs, which is part of the model (through the parameter α).
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of the demand shifters and prices. Indeed, knowing sales and prices, the demand shifter is decom-
posed between a firm-year component (the product appeal λft), a destination-year component (the
aggregate demand Xft), and a firm-destination-year component (the consumer base nfdt). Once
the product appeal is known, the productivity φft is identified by price variations across firms.
Therefore, the identification of the unobservables mostly comes from a decomposition of observ-
ables variables, which is straightforward once the parameters of the model are known. Moreover,
the hierarchical structure and the entry decisions will bring additional information to identify the
posterior distribution of these unobservables. For instance, if a firm is not exporting one year, the
information from previous and future years will help identify the potential value of the unobserv-
ables. Similarly, the entry decisions in foreign destinations will bring additional information about
the posterior distribution of these unobservables: if a firm only exports to one destination at a given
year, the fact that it does not export somewhere else will provide information regarding the latent
value of its product appeal or productivity.
Let’s now turn to the identification of the parameters of the model, assuming that the unob-
servables are known. The 30 estimated parameters can be divided in three groups: 17 of them are
related to the laws of motion of the unobservables, 6 to the demand and supply equations, and 7
related to the dynamic problem of the firm. Knowing the unobservables of the problem, the iden-
tification of the parameters that describes their distribution and law of motions is straightforward.
Regarding the parameters that are linked to the demand and pricing functions, their identification
is similar to a regression of prices on destination dummies and the appeal of the product, while the
parameters of the variance matrix are obtained from the variance of the unexplained variation in
prices and sales. Finally, the parameters related to the entry problem of the firm are obtained by
comparing potential profits and firms’ observed decisions. Based on the characteristics of the firms
and destinations, the laws of motion of unobservables, and the parameters of the cost and demand
functions, it is possible to construct the potential profit of each firm on each market. Based on these
potential profits, the number of exporters will identify the per-period fixed costs, the persistence
in exporting the entry costs, and the remaining variance in exporting decisions will identify the
required variance of these fixed costs’ shocks.
Consequently, the identification of the unobservables conditional to the parameters, and of the
unobservables conditional to the unobservables are quite straightforward. The goal of the MCMC
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estimator is to repeatedly sample each component conditional to the other, in order to obtain their
joint distribution. After a necessary period of convergence, the Markov Chain will describe the
posterior distributions of the parameters.
1.5 Results
I implement my estimation on a set of wine exporters from France; the choice of the industry is
based on two criteria. First, wine producers only export wine. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume
that the entry decisions on foreign destinations are made at the firm level, and it is possible to
aggregate sales and prices at the level of the firm for each destination. Second, the wine industry
is a large industry in France and, therefore, I can obtain a large enough sample of exporters with a
relatively extended set of destinations. In appendix A.1.2, I describe the specific selection procedure
to obtain the estimation sample of 200 firms, and provide statistics to describe this sample.
In order to describe the results of the estimation, I start by describing the fit of the model
relative to the exporters’ dynamics presented earlier. Then I will present the estimated values of
the parameters, and in particular the decrease in entry costs induced by the introduction of the
consumer margin. Finally, I will describe the evolution of the consumer margin and the mark-ups
charged by firms at different export ages.
1.5.1 Fit of the model
I report in this section the fit of the model regarding the survival rates, sales and prices of the
firm-destination pair at different ages. Figure 1.5 reports the predictions of the model relative to
the data. I also report the results of the restricted version of the model, which does not contain a
consumer margin.
As reported in figure 1.5, the full model with consumer accumulation can reproduce most of
the growth in sales across ages (top left figure). The ability of the model to capture this growth
explains how the model can perform better in terms of survival rates (top right figure): as a firm
accumulates more consumers in a foreign destination, raising its sales, it also increases its future
profit, and therefore its survival rate. However, this growth in sales is not sufficient to fully explain
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Figure 1.5: Predictions of survival rates, sales and prices across ages.
with young exporters dynamics. In comparison, the restricted model cannot explain this rise in
sales and even less in survival rates: in the restricted model, the predicted survival rate is constant
across ages, between 75 and 80 percent, which is similar to the average survival rate in the sample.
However, the predictions on prices appear quite similar across models (bottom figures). Both of
them can reproduce the decrease in prices with age. When looking at firms surviving 10 years, we
can see that the full model can do slightly better in explaining the rise in price with the age of the
firm. Therefore, the heterogeneous mark-ups obtained from the dynamic problem of the firm seems
to help the model in predicting low prices at young ages.




The results of the estimation of the model are reported in table 1.2. I report for each parameter
the mean of its posterior distribution, as well as its 90 percent confidence interval.
Table 1.2: Estimated parameters
Parameter Estimate 90% Confidence Interval
Lower bound Upper bound
Per-period fixed costs Europe 7 994 6 761 9 194
(in 2000 euros) Americas 7 495 6 693 8 304
Asia/Oceania 8 019 7 080 8 930
Entry fixed costs Europe 33 730 30 303 37 078
(in 2000 euros) Americas 23 656 21 092 26 208
Asia/Oceania 28 619 25 387 31 928
Variance of entry shocks σν 9 656 8 589 10 620
Law of motion of n n0 0.033 0.031 0.034
n 0.015 0.014 0.016
η1(10
−5) 0.12 0.11 0.14
η2 0.27 0.23 0.29
ψ 0.44 0.00 0.93
Law of motion of appeal ρλ 0.98 0.98 0.98
σλ 0.19 0.18 0.20
Law of motion of productivity ρψ 0.93 0.91 0.94
σψ 0.09 0.08 0.09
µψ -0.12 -0.14 -0.10
Law of motion of agg. demand ρX 0.93 0.93 0.94
σX 0.09 0.09 0.09
µX1 0.98 0.91 1.03
µX2 0.88 0.74 0.97
µX3 0.89 0.77 0.97
µX0 14.58 14.31 14.83
σX0 0.46 0.32 0.65
Elasticity cost of appeal α 0.73 0.73 0.74
Cost dummies γ2 0.38 0.36 0.39
γ3 0.30 0.29 0.30
Variance matrix Σ11 1.25 1.25 1.26
Σ12 0.17 0.17 0.17
Σ22 0.56 0.54 0.57
First, looking at the law of motion of the consumer margin, we note that the initial share of
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consumers at entry (n0) is relatively small, equal to 3 percent, which leaves a large potential for
firms to grow through the accumulation of consumers. This growth is driven both by the past
sales of the firm (η1), as well as the past shares of consumers (η2), since the two coefficients are
significantly larger than zero. Moreover, we can see that the degree of concavity of this law of
motion is significant, with a mean of the posterior distribution of the coefficient ψ equal to 0.44.
Second, the other unobservables of the model - appeal, productivity and aggregate demand -
depict strong degrees of persistence. The coefficients of autocorrelation of the AR(1) processes are
estimated to be in average 0.98, 0.93 and 0.93, respectively for the product appeal, the productivity
of the firm, and the aggregate demand of the destination. Moreover, the appeal appears to have
a larger variance across firms ( 0.19√
1−0.982 = 0.95) than productivity (
0.09√
1−0.932 = 0.24). If this is not
surprising, given that sales have a larger variance than prices, it is interesting to look at the implied
contribution of these two unobservables variables to sales. With a parameter of the cost of appeal
α equal to 0.73, it means that an extra unit of appeal has an impact of 11 percent (1− 0.74× 1.2)
on sales, which is compared to an increase of 100 percent from productivity. Consequently, moving
from the average appeal to the 5th best percentile increases the sales by 17 percent, while the same
movement for productivity increases sales by 39 percent.
Finally, because I estimate a structural model of entry, the model is able to deliver euro estimates
of the sunk fixed costs of entry as well as the per-period fixed costs paid by an exporter.43 We see
that the obtained fixed costs are relatively low, with the entry cost to an European destination
being equal to 33 730 euros.44 In addition, a firm would have to pay 8 000 euros every year to keep
exporting to this destination. As an element of comparison, the average export value of a firm in
my sample to an European destination is 42 000 euros, while the median value is 13 000. One of the
reasons for these relatively low numbers is the small variance parameter of these fixed costs’ shocks,
whose the average of the posterior distribution is 9 656. This low number reflects the ability of the
model to correctly predict the entry and exit of firms, such that a large variance of these fixed costs’
shocks is not necessary to rationalize entry decisions.
In order to confirm the small magnitudes of these entry fixed costs relative to the literature,
43I separated my destinations into three groups such that each European destination will have similar fixed costs.
This does not imply that the firm do not need to pay these costs for each destination it enters. If a firm exports to
5 European destinations, it will have to pay 5 times these fixed costs.
44Prices are normalized across years using a national consumer price index, such that the values are expressed as
euros from the year 2000.
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I compare theses parameters with the ones I obtain when estimating the restricted version of the
model, which does not have a consumer margin. Results are displayed in table 1.3.
Table 1.3: Estimated parameters (comparison between models)
Full model Restricted model
Parameter Estimate 90% C.I. Estimate 90% C.I.
Lower Upper Lower Upper
Per-period fixed costs Europe 7 994 6 761 9 194 8 521 7 989 9 080
Americas 7 495 6 693 8 304 14 605 13 429 15 810
Asia/Oceania 8 019 7 080 8 930 16 133 14 531 17 997
Entry fixed costs Europe 33 730 30 303 37 078 98 286 87 044 110 368
Americas 23 656 21 092 26 208 72 073 63 372 81 393
Asia/Oceania 28 619 25 387 31 928 80 951 71 094 91 913
Elasticity cost of appeal α 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.39 0.37 0.41
Variance of entry shocks σν 9 656 8 589 10 620 25 789 23 121 28 703
The comparison between two models highlights that the entry costs, and more generally the
fixed costs of exporting, are much larger in the version without consumer margin. For instance, the
average entry costs to export to Europe jump from 33 730 to 98 286 euros. Part of this increase comes
from the change in the parameter of variance of the fixed costs from 9 656 to 25 789. This increase
is a reflection of the consumer margin improving the ability of the model to explain entry and exit
decisions. But this reduction in average entry costs, when introducing this consumer margin, is
not only due to this smaller variance, but also characterizes an important change in the relative
role played by entry and per-period costs: while the ratio between entry costs and per-period costs
is between 5 to 10 in the restricted model, it is only 3 to 5 in the full model. This reflects the
introduction of the consumer margin capturing an important amount of state dependence, reducing
the role played by entry costs in explaining the hysteresis in the export decision. This result will be
very important when looking at models’ predictions in response to shocks. Estimating large entry
costs to export implies that the option value of exporting is very large: the large average entry
costs make entering so difficult that firms will hesitate to exit this export market. I will study these
consequences in the next section when comparing the predictions of these models under simulated
and observed trade shocks.
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Another important difference between these two models emerges from the estimates of the cost
of appeal. In the full model with consumer margin, appeal is very costly, making high-appeal
products barely more profitable than low-appeal ones.45 However, the model without consumer
margin identifies product appeal with a low impact on prices, with an average estimate of 0.27.
This difference is interesting because it describes how the introduction of consumer margin, affects
the definition of appeal itself. When appeal is the unique demand shifter, it will capture the role of
distribution network for instance and other characteristics that raise the sales of the firm conditional
on prices. However, with the introduction of a consumer margin, part of this sales variation will be
captured by this new margin, such that what the full model will infer as appeal will be more related
to the type of good produced, and its characteristics. As a consequence, the appeal inferred in the
full model is closer to what one could describe as product quality, which would explain its larger
impact on the marginal costs of production.
1.5.3 Outcomes of the model
Finally, to conclude the description of the results, I discuss the evolution with export experience of
two important objects introduced in this model: the consumer shares and the mark-up charged by
firms. Figure 1.6 provides the distribution of consumer shares for each age of the firm. Remember
that when firms enter, they all have an initial share n0 ≈ 3%, which explains why the graphs
provides distributions from ages 2 to 10. Figure 1.6 illustrates that the distribution tends to shift
toward the right as age increases. One can see that most of the firms have a small consumer share at
age 2: only a small fraction of them are larger than 25 percent. However, as age increases, more and
more firms reach a larger size. Therefore, at age 10, a significant number of them has a consumer
share that is larger than 50 percent. However, there is still a large amount of heterogeneity across
ages. Some firms are large at ages 2 or 3, but a large fraction of them are still small in terms of
consumer shares when reaching years 9 or 10. As a result, the overall distributions appear to flatten
as age increases, rather than translate toward the left. This implies that the process of consumer
accumulation is not identical across firms, and relies very much on the individual sales of the firm
rather than an exogenous increase of consumers with age. Some firms will never reach a large
45In this model, appeal is exogenous and therefore could have a negative impact on sales and profit. This would
be the case if α > 1
σ−1 ≈ 0.83.
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Figure 1.6: Distribution of consumer shares by age
After describing the evolution of the distribution of consumer shares, I turn to the distributions
of the mark-ups charged by the firms. These mark-ups were the only tool for the firm to foster
accumulation. Figure 1.7 reports the distributions of mark-ups, separately for each age from 1 to 9.
Moreover, I report in red on these histograms, the CES mark-up in the absence of dynamic pricing
( σσ−1): because of the dynamic benefits of charging low-markups, firms optimally charge a mark-up
that is lower than the CES mark-up (as this is implied by the model). One can see that, similar to
the consumer shares, there is a large heterogeneity in mark-ups across ages, but also within ages:
the model does not imply a mechanical correlation between mark-ups and age. However, we can see
that firms tend to price more aggressively at a young age, in comparison to more established firms.
The reason is twofold: first, these firms are small and therefore benefit from large returns of higher
sales on consumer accumulation. Second, because these firms are small and young, they are likely
to not survive in the following years. Therefore, it is optimal to charge low prices because these new
consumers increase their probability of survival: indeed, survival rates tend to increase, especially
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in the early years of exports. Finally, we can see that these dynamic incentives are so large, that
some firms are willing to make negative profit during the current period, in order to invest in future






















Figure 1.7: Distribution of mark-ups by age
1.6 Aggregate implications
In this section, I use simulations and out-of-sample predictions to demonstrate the importance of
the model regarding the aggregate trade responses to shocks. The introduction of the consumer
margin generates a sluggish response of trade flows, as it will take time for firms to reach new
consumers. Moreover, low entry costs imply a stronger response of firms’ entry and exit to shocks.
As a consequence, the model can replicate two important facts regarding aggregate adjustments to
trade shocks: first, in response to a positive trade shock, it will take time for aggregate trade to
fully respond, generating a discrepancy between the short and long run trade elasticities. Second,
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the relative contribution of the extensive margin in this response will be increasing across time, as
it has been recently documented in the literature. Finally, I directly test the performance of the
model with an out-of-sample predictions exercise. I show that the model can better predict the
actual trade response to exchange rate movements that took place during the sample period in the
Brazilian market.
1.6.1 Sluggish trade response
The accumulation of consumers by the firms will generate frictions in growing on foreign markets.
As a consequence, the trade response to shocks will be slow at the microeconomic and aggregate
level. This pattern, which has been documented in the literature,46 can explain the discrepancy
that exists between the values of the trade elasticity at different horizons. International macro
economists use elasticities around 1 or 2 in order to match trade responses to price variations at a
high frequency. However, international trade economists use elasticities ranging from 6 to 8, in order
to explain variations in trade flows across countries, or trade responses after a trade liberalization
episode.47
In order to quantitatively evaluate the ability of the model to generate this discrepancy between
horizons, I simulate a decrease of 10 points on the tariff applied to export from French firms to
the US. I simulate the trajectories of the 200 firms from my sample following this tariff reduction,
and compare them to a counterfactual scenario without tariff decrease. I apply this experiment to
the full model, as well as the standard model that does not feature consumer accumulation. Figure
1.8 reports for each model, the log-deviation relative to the counterfactual scenario without tariff
change, of the total trade to the US.
As we can see from figure 1.8, the predictions of the two models are significantly different. In the
model without consumer margin, trade increases instantaneously as the shock occurs: with lower
tariffs, exporters prices decrease and trade increase. Moreover, new exporters enter the market such
that the trade response is larger than the only sales response to the price decrease. After these
first years, no further adjustment occurs. In comparison, the model with consumer margin depicts
a slower adjustment to trade as it takes up to 10 years to observe the full effect of the reduction
46See Alessandria et al. (2013) for instance
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Figure 1.8: Effect of permanent 10 points tariffs decrease.
in tariff. The reason for this slow adjustment is that it takes time for existing and new exporters
to reach their optimal number of consumers. As a consequence, we see a similar adjustment than
the restricted model in the first year, because firms also benefit from lower prices, but this effect
is magnified by the increase of the consumer shares of existing firms, as well as the entry of new
firms that will grow in the subsequent years. Consequently, the full effect of the tariff reduction
will be roughly 3 times the effect recorded after one year. Interestingly, this ratio between long-run
and short-run elasticities is roughly consistent with the ratio of elasticities used in the two distinct
literatures. As a conclusion, it appears that the model with consumer margin can generate this
discrepancy, unlike the standard model that does not feature this margin.
1.6.2 Contribution of the extensive margin
A second implication of the model with consumer margin relates to the contribution of the extensive
margin to the growth in trade throughout a trade liberalization episode. A number of recent papers
documents the increasing contribution of new exporters or new goods at different time horizons: the
contribution of the extensive margin is small right after a shock, but tend to increase in the following
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years to reach a significant contribution in the overall effect. For instance, Kehoe and Ruhl (2013)
document this pattern for the contribution of new goods to the trade expansion following the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Closer to my empirical application, Alessandria et al.
(2013) provide similar evidence when looking at the extensive margin defined at the firm-destination
level. In particular, they show that following a devaluation, the contribution of the extensive margin
is almost zero in the first quarters after the shock, but can reach 50 percent of the total trade growth
after 5 years.
I explore the predictions of my model, by decomposing the growth of trade following a decrease
in tariff. I implement a tariff reduction similar to the previous section, and decompose the total
growth in trade following the methodology by Hummels and Klenow (2005): this method allows
the measurement of the contribution of each variable entering the demand function of the firm
(intensive margin), and the contribution of new entrants (extensive margin). In this context, I am
able to obtain 5 sources of growth: product appeal, consumer margin, prices, aggregate demand that
constitute the intensive margin, and the extensive margin. In figure 1.9 I report the contribution
of the aggregate demand (that captures the decrease in tariff), the consumer and the extensive
margins along different time horizons.48
Figure 1.9 depicts the increasing contribution of the extensive margin. The first year after the
shock, this contribution is very small, around 10 percent of a small increase in trade. However, as
the horizon increases, this contribution is significantly larger, to reach up to 32 percent of the total
growth in trade.49 There are two important reasons to explain this increasing contribution. First,
because of small entry costs, the response of the extensive margin is large: a small decrease in tariff
leads to significant entry of new firms on the export market. However, even though the number of
these entrants is large, these exporters enter very small, and therefore do no contribute very much
to aggregate trade. But as they survive on the market, and increase their stock of consumers, they
become large exporters and significantly contribute to the growth in trade triggered by the tariff
reduction. Moreover, due to the concavity of the consumer accumulation technology, these new
entrants will grow faster than experienced firms, hence increasing their relative contribution across
years. We can see that the contribution at the end of the period is around 30 percent, which is
48The other margins being insignificant, I choose to not report them for clarity. The decomposition between all
the margins are displayed in figure A.8 in appendix A.4.
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Figure 1.9: Effect of permanent 10 points tariffs decrease.
roughly consistent with the numbers provided in Alessandria et al. (2013).50 In comparison, the
model without consumer margin does not feature this growth in the contribution of the extensive
margin.51
1.6.3 Out-of-sample predictions: export response to exchange rate variations
in Brazil.
In order to further demonstrate the relevance of the model with consumer margin, I compare its
predictions relative to the standard model in an out-of-sample predictions exercise. Because I study
the export decisions on a limited set of destinations, I can take advantage of additional destinations,
that have not been previously used in the estimation, to test the ability of the model to correctly
predict the exporting behavior of the French exporters contained in my sample. In particular, I
want to perform this exercise in a market that has recorded important and measurable trade shocks.
This will allow me to feed this shock into the model, and compare the predicted response of both
50They report a contribution of the extensive margin of 30 and 60 percent after 5 years, respectively in Uruguay
and Mexico.
51See figure A.10 in appendix A.4 for the prediction using the restricted version of the model.
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models to the actual behaviors of exporters.
I apply this methodology to the Brazilian wine market during my sample period.52 The choice
of the Brazilian market is based on two reasons: first, it is a large market such that a large enough
number of French wine producers export to Brazil. Second, the Brazilian wine market has recorded
during the sample period two important shocks that affected the Brazilian demand for French wine.
The first one is the devaluation of the Brazilian currency, the real, in 1999, that has been followed by
a strong depreciation of the currency in the following years, and an appreciation starting 2003. This
depreciation generated a strong increase in the price of French wines in local currency. The second
large shock arises from the Argentinian devaluation that took place in 2002. After the abandon of
the peso-dollar parity, the Argentinian currency recorded a strong depreciation that led to a strong
growth in wine export to Brazil. As a close neighbor and a massive wine producer, this decrease in
Argentinian prices caused an important drop of the price index on the Brazilian wine market.
Therefore, I take advantage of these variations in exchange rates, which can be arguably seen as
exogenous to French exporters behavior, as sources of variation in the aggregate demand received
by French firms. The model relies on five state variables that characterize the entry and sales of
exporters: the appeal λft and productivity φft of the firms, their consumer shares nfdt, the aggregate
demand from a destination Xdt and their previous export activity Ifdt−1. Because the quality and
productivity of the firms are common across destinations, I can use the estimated individual qualities
and productivities from the estimation procedure. Moreover, the variables nfdt and Ifdt−1 will be
obtained from the predictions of the model, such that only initial conditions are required for these
variables. Therefore, with the variable Xdt that describes the aggregate demand from Brazil, the
model is able to deliver predictions of entry, sales and prices on the Brazilian market for each of the
200 firms I used in the estimation.
I will construct this variable Xdt for Brazil by using variations in real exchange rates and the
Brazilian GDP. From the demand equation used in the model, Xdt is defined as:
Xdt = log Ydt − (1− σ) logPdt + (1− σ) log(τdtedt)
in which Ydt is the amount spent by Brazilian consumers in wine, Pdt is the price index for wine
52My sample period goes from 1997 to 2010. However, I will stop my predictions in 2007, since the great trade
collapse generated a strong decrease in trade that is difficult to account for in the model.
47
Table 1.4: Top market shares





Notes: Calculations made from BACI. Average market share is the
average market share among the Brazilian imports, over the period
1997-2007, for the 4-digit category 2204 ‘Wine of fresh grapes’.
in Brazil, and τdt and edt are transportation costs and exchange rates between French exporters
and Brazilian consumers. Therefore, I will proxy variations in log Ydt by variations in the log GDP
of Brazil, and variations in log(τdtedt) using variations in the BRA/FRA exchange rates. Finally,
to construct a proxy for the price index, I will use the variations in exchange rates of the main
exporters to Brazil as featured in table 1.4.53 Based on these data, I can construct variations in
XBRA,t from 1997 to 2007.54 To obtain the values in level of XBRA,t, I will set XBRA,t such that
the sales of the median prediction equals the realized sales on the market during the year before
the shock, 1998. Therefore, the focus of the exercise will be on variations in sales and entry after
this year.
The results of these predictions are displayed in figure 1.10 for the total trade, and figure 1.11
for the number of exporters. These figures display the realized data, as well as the predictions from
the full model with consumer margin and the standard model without consumer margin. Moreover,
I report confidence intervals at 90 percent: each prediction still requires the simulations of the
shocks ε and ν, to infer entry, sales and pricing behaviors, which explains the variability in the
predictions.55 Figure 1.10 reports the strong decrease in wine export to Brazil that occurs between
1998 to 2003. This decrease is explained by the Brazilian devaluation in 1999, and the growth in
Argentinian export led by their devaluation in 2002. However, total exports increase after 2003 as a
result of the improvement in economic conditions in Brazil at this period. Regarding the predictions
of the models, we can see that the model without consumer margin does not react very much to the
53These four countries account for 75 percent of the total wine import of Brazil. The fifth exporter (Portugal) has
a market share of less than 2 percent and therefore is not included in the construction of the price index.
54The obtained variations in XBRA,t are displayed in figure A.11 in appendix A.4
55For each model, I simulate 500 samples of these shocks, leading to 500 different predictions. I report the median
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Figure 1.10: Total exports of wine to Brazil from selected firms
changes in exchange rates. This variation in relative prices does reduce sales, but not in the same
magnitude as in the data. However, the model with consumer margin can predict the large drop in
trade, as well as the rebound starting in 2004. This difference in trade predictions arises because
the number of exporters reacts minimally to exchange rates in the model without consumer margin.
Figure 1.11 reports the prediction of the number of exporters in the two models. The model
with consumer margin, unlike the restricted model, can reproduce the decrease in the number of
exporters in 1999 and 2002. This decrease is the reason for the larger variation in total trade shown
in the previous figure. However, in the model without consumer accumulation, the large entry costs
of exporting cause the non exit of exporters: the option value of the exporting activity is so large
that no exporters will exit as it will be very hard to reenter in the future. They are willing to lose
money temporarily, in order to keep the option value of exporting in the next years. However, in
the model with consumer margin and low entry costs, firms are willing to leave the market as the
economic condition deteriorates. For similar reasons, as the perspectives on the market improve
after 2003, we observe a larger growth rate of the number of exporters in the model with consumer
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Figure 1.11: Number of wine exporters to Brazil from selected firms
years of the sample period. Two possible reasons could explain this overprediction. First, the model
does not account for specific expectations of exporters. Because the law of motion of the aggregate
demand term is similar across destinations, the model does not capture the likely low expectations
regarding the Brazilian market before the devaluation. Second, part of this overprediction arises
from the random nature of the sampling of firms. When looking at aggregate data of the variations
in the number of French wine exporters to Brazil, these variations look similar to the observed
variations in total trade displayed in figure 1.10, and to the predictions of the model.
Overall, it appears that the predictions of the model with consumer margin, unlike the standard
model, can quantitatively replicate the decrease in total trade during this period. This result mostly
comes from the larger response of firms entry and exit, due to the lower level of the entry costs of
exporting in this model.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I develop and estimate a dynamic empirical model of trade that features state de-
pendence in demand through the accumulation of consumers in foreign markets. Estimating the
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model using a set of French wine exporters, I show that accounting for this dependence is critical
to understand the entry and exit decisions of firms in foreign markets, but also for the estimation
of the costs of exporting: on average, estimated entry costs are a third of those estimated in the
standard model without consumer accumulation. Moreover, I demonstrate using simulations and
out-of-sample predictions that this consumer margin, and the associated fall in entry costs, matters
for aggregate predictions. First, I show that this model can generate a slow response of aggregate
trade to shocks. The trade elasticity in the long run is three times larger than the short run, which
is consistent with patterns documented in the literature. Second, the model can correctly replicate
the contribution of the extensive margin throughout a trade liberalization episode.
These results shed new light on the nature of the barriers to trade at the firm level. While
existing models emphasize the role of large sunk entry costs as the main barrier to trade to explain
the persistence in export markets, this paper shows that dependence in demand is responsible for
a significant share of this persistence. In fact, the ability to reach a large and stable demand for a
product appears to be one of the primary sources of success for firms in foreign markets. Therefore,
this study improves our understanding of the determinants of trade dynamics at the microeconomic
and aggregate levels. This result has important policy implications for countries designing policies
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Trade economists have long investigated the role played by product quality in shaping the pattern
of trade at the macroeconomic level.2 A more recent literature has emphasized the importance of
product quality at the microeconomic level: in addition to being one of the main sources of firm
heterogeneity,3 the quality supplied by firms impacts the relative demand for inputs, which makes it
decisive to understand the link between globalization and inequalities.4 These findings came with a
growing demand from trade economists for disaggregated data on product quality. In spite of that,
estimating firm-level quality on trade data remains an empirical challenge as traditional techniques
developed in Industrial Organization cannot be applied to datasets in which product characteristics
are not observed,5 which is typically the case with international trade data.6
In this paper, we propose and implement a new empirical methodology to estimate product
quality at the firm level. We create a new instrument for prices, based on exchange rate variations
interacted with firm-specific importing shares, that allows us to consistently estimate demand equa-
tions in the absence of observable product characteristics. Implementing this methodology using
customs data from France, we first document the reliability of our estimation, by comparing the
obtained measure of quality with alternative measures of quality and with other firm characteris-
tics. Then, we take advantage of these new measures to document the quality response of French
exporters to competition from low-cost countries.
The first contribution of this paper is to provide a new method to estimate quality using trade
data. We estimate quality from the demand side. The main challenge one faces when estimating
demand functions is to deal with the endogeneity of prices: prices are likely to be correlated to
demand shocks, because quality is costly to produce.7 Consequently, researchers have used unit
values or prices as proxies for quality, or have estimated demand equations in contexts where
2The oldest theory of product quality in international trade goes back to Linder (1961).
3See Roberts, Xu, Fan, and Zhang (2012) and Hottman, Redding, and Weinstein (2016) for empirical quantifica-
tions of the relative importance of different sources of heterogeneity at the firm level.
4Verhoogen (2008) and Brambilla et al. (2012) document the consequences of trade openness on wage inequality.
5Industrial Organization has developed strategies to back out quality by estimating a demand equation. In this
approach, the presence of omitted product characteristics challenges the identification as these characteristics are
likely to be correlated with the price of the product which induces an endogeneity bias.
6Exceptions include Crozet et al. (2012) and Garcia-Marin (2014) who use expert ratings of quality of Champagne
and wine, as quality measures.
7See, e.g., Hallak and Sivadasan (2013), Johnson (2012) and Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) for trade models where
quality is costly and endogenous at the firm-level.
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unobserved vertical differentiation is limited.8 To address this endogeneity issue, we construct a
novel instrument for prices, exploiting fluctuations in exchange rates. These fluctuations, interacted
with firm-specific import shares, shift a firm’s costs of importing goods. As the firm passes importing
cost variations on to its consumers, the instrument generates firm-specific export price and sales
variations. These variations are arguably exogenous to unobserved demand shocks (e.g., quality
shocks) and allow us to identify the price-elasticity of exports.9 Quality is then identified at the
firm, destination, product, year level, from the residual variations of demand once price variations
have been controlled for; a strategy that is present throughout the literature.
The implementation of this method using customs data from France, supports the validity of
the procedure. First, we find that the import-weighted exchange rate, our instrument, is strongly
and positively correlated to export prices charged by firms. This is consistent with the assumption
we make to motivate the instrumentation, namely that exchange rates shift a firm’s production
costs. Second, in order to evaluate the ability of our instrument to correct for the endogeneity
of prices, we estimate the demand equation both via ordinary least squares and two stages least
squares. Our instrumental variable procedure affects the estimates of price-elasticities consistently
with a correction of an omitted variable bias: while ordinary least squares estimates deliver a low
(in absolute value) price-elasticity (0.8), the instrumental variable approach produces estimates
consistent with the existing studies in the industrial organization literature, ranging from 1.8 to 2.4,
depending on the specification. In order to further assess the reasonableness of our price elasticity
estimates, we rely on cross-industry comparisons. In line with evidence at the country-product
level, we find that demand is significantly more elastic in more homogeneous sectors.10 Finally, we
investigate the properties of our quality estimates by running correlations with existing measures
of quality at the firm-level. A natural benchmark is provided by Crozet et al. (2012) who use
one of the very few “direct” measure of firm-specific quality present in the literature, by relying
on ratings attributed by an expert to a sample of French Champagne producers. We compare
8Broda and Weinstein (2010) and Handbury (2012) use barcode-level data, that features no quality variation
within barcode across time, whereas Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) restrict their analysis to homogeneous
products.
9The use of exchange rates as an instrument for prices connects our estimation to Berman et al. (2012) and Amiti
et al. (2014). These studies empirically analyze the firm-level pass-through from exchange rates to export prices.
However while both works are interested in the heterogeneity of the pass-through across firms, we only use the effect
of exchange rates on export prices as a first stage to a demand function estimation.
10See Broda and Weinstein (2006).
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these ratings with our estimated quality of exported Champagne and find a positive and strongly
significant correlation. Moreover, prices, the most popular proxy for quality in the literature, are
also positively and significantly correlated to quality, both in the cross-section of firms, as well as
over time within a firm. However, this correlation is significantly smaller for more homogeneous
sectors: using Sutton (2001)’s sectoral measure of vertical differentiation, we find that in the least
vertically differentiated product category, prices are approximately 3 times less elastic to quality
than in the most differentiated product category. In other words, prices are informative on quality,
but less so in more homogeneous sectors.
A second contribution of this paper is to exploit these new quality estimates to document the
quality response of French firms to low-cost competition. The recent increase in the participation
of low-wage countries in international trade has had a large impact on manufacturing industries in
developed economies. In this context, firms from developed countries may choose to innovate and
to upgrade the quality of their products as a way to escape competition.11 Our quality estimation is
especially relevant in this context as it allows us to look at the change in quality across time within
firms, in response to low-wage competition. Our identification strategy consists in correlating the
dynamics of low-cost competition in foreign markets with the dynamics of the product quality
supplied by French firms to these markets. In order to obtain variations in low-cost competition
across firms within a similar market, we first compute the penetration of low-wage countries at the
country-product-year level using the trade dataset BACI. Then, for each destination market and
each firm, we construct a measure of the low-cost competition faced by the firm in the rest of the
world. This measure varies across firms within a market since firms serve different destinations. We
identify the quality response to competition from the firm-specific dynamics in this rest-of-the-world
measure of competition. This identification strategy assumes that there is a positive correlation in
the quality of a good supplied by a firm across destinations. Intuitively, we assume that within the
firm, the quality adjustment due to competition in one destination spills over the quality served to
other destinations.
Using this identification strategy, our results suggest that low-cost competition induces qual-
ity upgrading within the firm. Interestingly, the response of quality takes time to occur. More
specifically, the quality of a firm raises by 2% four years after a 10 percentage point increase of the
11See Bloom et al. (2013) for a model of innovation in which higher competition fosters innovation within the firm.
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low-wage countries’ penetration rate. We find no significant response before three years. It suggests
that upgrading quality requires slow adjustments within the firm. In addition, we find that quality
upgrading is more pronounced in more vertically differentiated industries. These results contribute
to the literature on the relationship between firm-level quality and trade exposure. While exist-
ing studies mostly focus on firms from developing countries (see, e.g., Verhoogen 2008; Brambilla
et al. 2012; Khandelwal et al. 2013), our results suggest a new channel through which firms from
developed countries can mitigate the impact from low-wage competition.
This paper is directly related to the literature aiming to measure quality using trade data.
Most of the literature back up quality measures from the estimation of a demand system, follow-
ing the tradition in Industrial Organization.12 In particular, we can cite Hallak and Schott (2011)
and Khandelwal (2010) who rely on an instrumental variable approach to identify quality at the
country-product level using trade data. To be applied at the firm-product level, their methods
require an instrument for prices which varies across firms. We provide such an instrument. Gervais
(2015) and Roberts et al. (2012) also estimate quality at the firm level by instrumenting prices.
However, these studies use instruments, respectively physical productivity and wages, which are
questionable if quality varies over time, within the firm. By contrast, our instrument is robust to
time-varying quality. Because of the difficulty of estimating demand equations at the firm level,
in the absence of product characteristics, researchers have relied on alternative strategies: Khan-
delwal et al. (2013) construct quality by calibrating price-elasticity with estimates from Broda and
Weinstein (2006). The relevancy of these price-elasticities estimates is open to question as they are
obtained from country-level data. Alternatively, demand equations have been estimated in contexts
where unobserved vertical differentiation is limited: for instance, Broda and Weinstein (2010) and
Handbury (2012) use barcode-level data, whereas Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) restrict
their analysis to homogeneous products. Finally, as mentioned earlier, a number of papers have
used prices as proxy for quality: we can cite for instance Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) and Manova
and Zhang (2012) that document quality variations across firms, and within firm across destinations
12Most notable contributions in IO include Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Berry (1994). These papers
have contributed to the estimation of structural demand parameters by introducing demand systems exhibiting more
sophisticated substitution patterns. However, the structure included in these papers does not solve the issue that
prices are endogenous to quality in the demand equation. Therefore, these structural empirical models do not dispense
from finding an instrument for prices, but can usually rely on product characteristics that control for mosts of the
variation in quality across goods.
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using firm-level or customs data that features prices of good produced by firms.
Finally, our work is related to papers measuring the impact of competition from low-cost coun-
tries on developed economies. Autor et al. (2013) show how manufacturing workers in the United
States have been hurt by the increasing penetration of Chinese goods on the American market.
Relatedly, Khandelwal (2010) provides evidence that the impact of low-wage competition has been
significantly larger in industries with shorter quality ladders. Closer to our question, Martin and
Mejean (2014) show that low-cost competition induces a reallocation of market shares towards higher
quality firms which ultimately results in a rise of aggregate quality. Moreover, Bloom et al. (2016)
document that firms facing higher levels of competition from low-cost countries increase their effort
in innovation. We position our paper at the intersection of two previous papers by documenting a
within-firm response to low-wage competition, using a direct measure of quality.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we derive a simple model of demand
with vertically-differentiated goods. In section 2.3, we present our novel instrumental strategy,
implement it using French customs data and demonstrate its effectiveness. In section 2.4, we
describe the quality estimates we obtain through correlations to alternative measures. In section
2.5, we investigate the impact of low-cost competition on within-firm quality adjustments. Finally,
section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Quality Estimation Strategy
In this section, we present a novel strategy to estimate the quality of exports at the firm-product-
destination-year level, using customs data. Since we identify quality from the demand side, we
start this presentation by describing the demand system that we consider. In this demand system,
quality acts as a demand shifter. This implies that variations in the quality of exported goods over
time and across firms will be revealed from variations in sales controlling for prices.
In order to identify the demand system and pick up quality, we then present a novel instrument
for the price of firms’ exports. This instrument is obtained by interacting firm-specific importing
shares with real exchange rates. We make explicit the conditions of validity of this instrument and
explain why alternative instruments in the literature would not be valid in the context of this paper.
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2.2.1 An Empirical Model of Demand for Quality
Let us consider a global economy composed of a collection of destination markets d. In each market,
the representative consumer allocates its revenue over the different varieties of each product g. Our
definition of product categories follows the structure of French customs data. Namely, a product
corresponds to a 8 digit position of the Combined Nomenclature (CN). A variety is defined as a
unique combination of a destination market d, a producing firm f and a product g. Producing firms
are located in different countries. Hereafter we call “home” the country for which firm-level export
data are available to the econometrician (Home is France in the application) and we note Hgdt the
set of firms exporting good g from home to country d at year t.
Representative consumers have two tier preferences. The lower level of the utility function
aggregates consumptions of varieties by product. The upper level aggregates consumptions across
products. We assume that the lower part of the utility function is CES while we do not impose
any functional form on the upper level. It follows that an expression of the utility of representative
consumer in market d at year t is







 σσ−1 ∀ g = 1..G, (2.1)
with U(.) a well-behaved utility function, Cgdt the CES aggregate consumption of good g in des-
tination d at year t, Ωgdt the set of varieties of good g available to consumers, σ the elasticity of
substitution across varieties within a good and xfgdt and qfgdt respectively the aggregate physical
consumption and the quality of variety fgd at year t.13
Utility function (2.1) imposes no restriction on the patterns of substitutability across goods.14
Within goods, varieties are equally substitutable.15 In equation (2.1), quality is modeled as a utility
13We assume an unique elasticity of subtitution to present the model, but will be able partially relax this assumption
across industries in the empirical application.
14However, the nested structure of the utility function imposes that all varieties of a good are equally substitutable
to the varieties of another good. This means for instance that Peugeot cars may be a substitute or a complement
to Nike T-shirts. But provided that they are, say, substitutes, then any combination of a car variety and a T-shirt
variety are also substitutes.
15 This feature is shared by most estimations of demand systems with vertically differentiated goods based on
aggregate data. In the nested logit specification of Khandelwal (2010), for instance, the elasticity of substitution is
the same for any two varieties within a nest, irrespective of their quality. This feature also appears in the random
effect logit model of Berry et al. (1995) where the utility shifter ξ (the analogue of our quality q) is not multiplied by
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shifter, i.e. a number of units of utility per physical unit of good. This implicitly defines quality as
an index containing any characteristic of a variety which raises consumers’ valuation of it. These
characteristics may be tangible (e.g. size, color) as well as intangible (e.g. reputation, quality of
the customer service, brand name). This broad definition is consistent with most of the literature
in international trade and quality.16
The representative consumer allocates its total expenditure, Edt, across goods and varieties, in
order to maximize its utility (2.1). This behavior results in the following aggregate residual demand







with rfgdt the sales of variety fgd in value and Egdt the expenditure optimally allocated to good g.
p∗fgdt is the price of variety fgd faced by consumers of market m. Namely, p
∗
fgdt is the CIF (Cost
Insurance Freight) price labeled in market d’s currency. Pgdt is the price index of good g in market
d at year t.17
In order to properly grasp the properties of demand function (2.2), it is worth noting that −σ is
not the own price elasticity of variety fgd’s demand. It is the own price elasticity keeping constant
the price index Pgdt and the aggregate expenditure Egdt. In a monopolistic competition setting, firms
are atomistic and their individual decisions do not influence these aggregate variables. However,
with non-atomistic firms, the own price elasticity may differ from −σ and be heterogeneous across
firms.18
We assume that exporting involves iceberg trade costs. In particular, domestic firms need to
a random coefficient.
16Because of the wide range of product attributes potentially captured by our concept of “quality”, some papers
have adopted a more conservative terminology. For instance, Roberts et al. (2012) refer to the variety-specific utility
shifter as a “demand index”, Foster et al. (2008) to “demand fundamental” and Hottman et al. (2016) to “product
appeal”.








18This point is made simple by observing that our framework nests a quality-version of Atkeson and Burstein
(2008). This corresponds to the special case where the upper tier utility function U(.) is CES with an elasticity of
substitution η < σ, and firms compete a la Cournot. Atkeson and Burstein (2008) show that in that configuration,
firm own price elasticity tends to σ when their market share tends to zero while it tends to η when their nest-specific
market share tends to one.
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ship τgdt ≥ 1 units of good g for one unit to reach the consumer in market d at year t. So for
varieties exported from home to market d, the CIF price in d currency (p∗fgdt) is linked to the FOB





with edt the direct nominal exchange rate from home currency (Euro in the application) to market
d’s, i.e. that one unit of d currency buys edt units of home currency. Plugging (2.3) and log-
linearizing, we can re-express demand function (2.2) for domestic firms as follows:
log rfgdt = (1− σ) log pfgdt + λfgdt + µgdt (2.4)
with

λfgdt ≡ (σ − 1)
(







+ logPgdt + logEgdt + (σ − 1)log qgdt
and log qgdt ≡ 1Hgdt
∑
f∈Hgdt log qfgdt the average log-quality of good g supplied by domestic firms
to market d at year t.
Equation (2.4) is the one that we bring to the data. In (2.4), log rfgdt and log pfgdt are observable
to the econometrician while (1 − σ), λfgdt and µgdt have to be estimated. One can see from
(2.4) that the demand shifter of a firm contains a variety-specific as well as a nest-specific term
(respectively λfgdt and µgdt). The latter term will be estimated by including a destination-product-
year fixed effect in the regression. This term is not informative on quality as it conflates the average
quality of domestic exports with other aggregate variables. Thus, the estimation developed in this
paper identifies quality from λfgdt, the variety-specific part of the demand shifter. Incidentally,
the presence of quality in the demand shifter also causes the potential endogeneity of prices as we
discuss further below.
From the structural expression of λfgdt in (2.4), one can see that our strategy does not deliver
an absolute measure of quality. Instead we obtain a measure of quality which is relative to the
average quality supplied by domestic firms to a market. A corollary is that λfgdt will not be suited
to analyze variations in the aggregate quality of home exports, but rather how firms move relative
to each other along the quality ladder across markets and over time. Moreover, because we assume
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that all firms will have the same elasticity, and therefore mark-ups, within a category, any deviation
from this markup will be attributed to our quality measure. Therefore, this quality measure will
also capture the additional market power that some firms have, allowing them to receive a demand
less elastic to their price.
As a final remark on the demand system, it is interesting to note that a discrete choice model with
nested-logit preferences a la Khandelwal (2010) would also deliver an aggregate demand function
(2.4). The exact structural interpretation of parameters 1 − σ, µgdt, λfgdt slightly changes in the
nested-logit set-up. However, our parameter of interest, λfgdt, is still a measure of relative quality
across domestic firms serving a same good to a same destination. This is an important point as it
implies that our quality estimation is robust to relaxing the representative consumer assumption.19
The next subsection describes the estimation of demand function (2.4) with a focus on our
treatment of the endogeneity of prices.
2.2.2 Dealing with Price Endogeneity
In our setup, the endogeneity of prices comes from two mechanisms. First, we face a well-known
simultaneity problem as prices are likely to be correlated to quality which is in the residual of the
demand function. Assuming that high quality varieties are more costly to produce, this correlation
would result from firms passing on the cost of quality to consumers. This endogeneity channel
leads ordinary least squares to underestimate the price-elasticity of demand, σ. Indeed, when a firm
increases the quality of its products, the effect of prices on demand is compensated with the greater
appeal of the good to consumers.
A second source of endogeneity, more specific to international trade data, comes from the con-
struction of prices. Because prices are not directly observed, we follow the standard practice and
use unit values as a proxy for prices. Unit values are obtained by dividing the value of a shipment
by the physical quantity shipped. The use of this proxy may generate an attenuation bias due to
the measurement error contained in the price variable.20
19This similarity between our demand system and the nested-logit system echoes Anderson et al. (1987) who show
that a discrete choice model with heterogeneous consumers may deliver a CES demand system at the aggregate level.
20This attenuation bias will certainly be magnified by the flow fixed effects we use in our estimation. In fact, in the
time series of a trade flow, the measurement error may represent a larger share of the variation of unit values than
in the cross-section.
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Existing Methods Existing literature has used different empirical strategies to deal with price
endogeneity. In particular, the literature in Industrial Organization has developed estimation pro-
cedures with instruments for prices. For instance, Berry et al. (1995) use competitors’ product
characteristics, Hausman (1996) and Nevo (2000) use product’s price on other markets, while Fos-
ter et al. (2008) rely on estimated physical productivities. However, these instruments are not valid
in the presence of unobserved vertical differentiation.21 As a consequence, these instruments are not
usable in our context. Indeed, trade data contain no product characteristic, except for the category
in the product classification. Despite a narrow definition of these categories (8-digit CN classifica-
tion present in our data has around 8,000 positions), there is still a wide scope for (unobserved)
vertical differentiation within each category.
Some strategies for demand estimation with trade data exist at the country level. Khandelwal
(2010) and Hallak and Schott (2011) use IV approaches. Their strategy are not suited to firm-level
demand estimation as their instruments vary at the market level, not across firms within a market.
Feenstra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2010) respectively develop and refine a very influential
demand estimation using country-level trade data. Their identification exploits the heteroskedas-
ticity of supply and demand shocks. Although there strategy could be applied to firm-level trade
data, it involves an orthogonality assumption between demand and supply shocks which is likely to
be violated in the presence of vertical differentiation (e.g., if quality is costly).
Literature on demand estimation with trade data is scarcer at the firm-level. Roberts et al.
(2012) and Gervais (2015) use firms’ wages and physical productivities as instruments for prices.
These instruments are only valid if product quality is constant over time within the firm. For
instance, if a firm upgrades its quality, it might need more workers per physical unit of output. In
that case physical productivity is (negatively) correlated to quality and OLS estimate of σ is biased
downward. The assumption that product quality is time-invariant is not sustainable in the present
paper as our goal is precisely to identify within-firm quality variations induced by low-wage countries
competition. Khandelwal et al. (2013) construct a firm-level quality measure by calibrating a CES
demand system with price-elasticity estimates from Broda and Weinstein (2006). Conceptually,
21Berry et al. (1995), Hausman (1996) and Nevo (2000) all study specific markets, for which they clearly observe
different varieties of a good, as well as their characteristics, reducing the possibility for unobserved quality differences.
In a different setup, Foster et al. (2008) and Handbury (2012) estimate demand functions for a wide range of products,
but either restrict their analysis to homogeneous products or use barcode-level data, which rule out the possibility of
unobserved quality differences.
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this approach raises two concerns. First, it implicitly inherits the identifying assumptions from
Broda and Weinstein (2006). We explained above that these assumptions are problematic in the
presence of vertical differentiation. Second, Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimates are obtained
from country-level data. Elasticity may differ at the micro and the macro level,22 which would
generate biases in estimated firm-level quality.
Because existing methods do not lend themselves to our exercise, we develop a new instrumental
strategy, robust to unobserved and time-varying quality differences within product categories.
A Novel Instrument for Prices at the Firm-level The approach developed in this paper
takes advantage of the information coming from the importing activity of exporters. We use real
exchange rates fluctuations faced by importing firms to instrument prices of exported goods. The
basic idea is that real exchange rate shocks on a firm’s imports are cost shocks. As the firm passes
these cost shocks through to its export prices, sales adjust and the demand function is identified.
Appendix B.1 formalizes this mechanism. In order to generate firm-specific exchange rate shocks,
we take advantage of the fact that the spatial structure of imports varies across firms
To gain insight into the identification, let us study the example of two firms selling in a same
market. One firm imports from the United States, while the other imports from Europe. An appre-
ciation of the dollar would induce an increase of the export price of the former, leaving unchanged
the price of the latter. The response of these firms’ relative sales to the change in their relative
prices identifies the price-elasticity of demand. This example also conveys the intuition of our main
identifying assumption: relative real exchange rate shocks across firms should be exogenous to rel-
ative demand shocks. Next subsection discusses this assumption. It acknowledges situations where
it is likely to be violated and adjusts the econometric specification accordingly.




ω0sf × log(rerst), (2.5)
with ω0sf the share of goods imported from source country s, in the total imports of firm f at
the initial year of the sample,23 and with rerst the real exchange rate from home (France in our
22See Imbs and Méjean (2015) or Chetty (2012) for instances where the price elasticity depends on the level of
aggregation considered.
23In next section, we come back on the importance of using initial weights to compute the import-weighted exchange
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application) to country s at time t. The exchange rate rerst is defined using direct quotation, such
that an increase of this variable implies larger costs for a firm. Moreover, the real term is computed





The pass-through from our instrument to export prices may vary across firms as a function
of the extend to which a firm hedges against currency risk. To illustrate this point, consider two
French firms exporting to the US: firm A imports from China while firm B simultaneously imports
and exports to China. We expect that firm B will not pass through an appreciation of the Yuan as
much as firm A, since she is naturally hedged against Yuan fluctuations because of her exporting
activity in China. Consequently, we create a second instrument taking into account the degree of
hedging of a firm. The idea is to interact importing and exporting weights for a same country by






ω0sf × ωexp0sf × log(rerst), (2.6)
with ωexp0sf the exporting weight of a firm toward destination s. We expect the pass-through from
the RER on imports to export prices to be decreasing with RERhft. The inclusion of this second
instrument will improve the strength of our first stage and therefore generate more accurately
estimated exogenous price variations.
We conclude the presentation of the instruments with three remarks. First, the instrument is
orthogonal to measurement errors on unit values as its construction does not involve information on
exports. Therefore, our instrumental strategy deals with the measurement errors problem existing
when estimating demand functions using unit values.
Second, similar instruments have been used in a series of recent international trade contributions
(see Brambilla et al. (2012) or Bastos et al. (2014)). In these papers, the export-weighted exchange
rate generates exogenous change in firms’ destination portfolio. In our case, the import-weighted
average exchange rate creates exogenous firm-specific cost shifters due to the mechanical increase
of the price of imported inputs.
rate.
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Lastly, we are not the first paper looking at the pass-through from the cost of imported input
to export prices. Amiti et al. (2014) and Berman et al. (2012) run the same type of regression
using respectively Belgian and French customs data. However, the motivation for their analysis
differs greatly from ours. While, they are interested in the heterogeneity of the pass-through across
firms, we only use the effect of exchange rates on export prices as a first stage to a demand function
estimation. Moreover, their analysis of the pass-through from exchange rates to export prices
conflates two effects: a cost shifting effect (exchange rate fluctuations impact importing costs) and
a competitiveness effect. By contrast, our first stage includes a destination-year fixed effect which
controls for the competitiveness effect so that the pass-through that we estimate only captures the
cost shifting effect.
2.2.3 Discussion of the Identification
There are a few mechanisms that could affect the exogeneity of the instrument. First of all, the
instrument is constructed from import shares, which are potentially endogenous to quality. Put
simply, higher quality firms most likely import from countries with a stronger currency, from where
they can source higher quality inputs (In appendix B.1, we derive a model in which the spatial
structure of a firm’s imports depends on the quality it produces). So we expect the instrument to
be positively correlated to quality in the cross-section of firms. If not controlled for, this correlation
would induce the price elasticity of demand (which is negative) to be biased upward.24 To fix
this problem, we add variety-specific fixed effects (as defined above, a variety is a firm × product
category × destination combination) to our demand estimation. As a result, identification is in the
time series of a variety. Since the instrument is constructed using initial import shares, its time
series variations are fully driven by (firm-specific) exchange rates dynamics and not contaminated
by (endogenous) import share dynamics.
Another potential problem comes from the dual impact of exchange rates variations on firm
performances. While a change in exchange rates can increase input prices, it can also affect the
competitiveness of firms on foreign markets. This is a concern to us as it suggests that our instrument
could be correlated to a firm’s demand shifter. In reality, this is not an issue with the structural
24In the cross-section of firms, the instrument is likely to be positively correlated to quality. So, provided that
higher quality goods are more expensive, an increase in the value of the instrument is associated to an increase in
both prices and the demand shifter. Hence the upward bias.
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demand equation we consider. As one can see from the demand function (2.4), the competitiveness
effect will be fully captured by destination-product-year fixed effect µgdt.
In order to make sure that the innocuous of this problem does not fully rely on our functional
assumptions, we proceed to a robustness check whereby we exclude export flows of firms that contem-
poraneously import from and export to a same market (see appendix B.6, table B.3). The chances
that this instrument is correlated to the demand residual through the competitiveness channel is
higher for these firms. Price elasticity estimates exhibit little sensitivity to sample variations along
this dimension. This is suggestive that the “competitiveness” mechanism does not drive our results.
A last threat to the identification could arise from the fact that exchange rate variations directly
cause quality adjustments. Bastos et al. (2014) show that an exchange rate shock may induce a firm
to upgrade its quality if it improves its competitiveness in rich destination markets. In appendix
B.1, we propose a model which predicts a symmetric effect on the import side. This import side
effect is based on the premise that source countries produce inputs of different qualities. When an
exchange rate shock makes imports from high (low) input quality countries more affordable, a firm
upgrades (downgrades) the quality of its imported inputs, and output quality adjusts accordingly.
Remark that even if firm-level quality adjustments actually arise as the real exchange rate
fluctuates and firms re-balance their export and imports; it is not clear what the resulting correlation
between quality and our instrument would be. An increase in RERft can equally result from the
appreciation of the currency of a rich source country as of the currency of a poor source country. So
the sign of the bias on price-elasticity, if any, is unclear. However, we take a conservative approach
and neutralize the effect of exchange rates on quality by adding controls to the estimation. Namely,
we incorporate the import weighted average GDP per capita of the firm as well as the export

















These terms aim to capture quality adjustments following changes in the set of countries the
firm imports from and exports to. The implicit assumption here is that GDP per Capita proxies
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the quality of inputs supplied by a country.25 In the mechanism described above, exchange rates
are suspected to affect quality only through an impact on a firm’s spatial structure of imports.
Controlling for that structure of exports thus makes the instrument orthogonal to the demand
residual. The model presented in appendix B.1 provides a theoretical foundation to these controls.
Consistently with the above discussion, our econometric specification will proceed in two steps.
In a first step, we regress the exported price of the firm on the sets of instruments, including variety
and market-year fixed effects, and the controls defined in equation (2.7). Formally, the first stage is
log pfgdt = η1RERft + η2RER
h
ft + βgdpcft + δfgd + δgdt + ufgdt (2.8)
with gdpcft a vector containing the two controls defined in equation (2.7), δfgd and δgdt are respec-
tively variety and market-year fixed effects, and u is the residual term. Using the predicted values
of exporting prices from this first stage, we can then estimate the structural equation (2.4) in a
second stage:
log rfgdt = (1− σ)̂log pfgdt + αgdpcft + γfgd + γgdt + εfgdt (2.9)
in which γfgd and γgdt are variety and market-year fixed effects. The estimation of this equation
will be consistent if the structural error ε is orthogonal to our set of instruments. As we argue in
the previous paragraphs, we believe this condition is reasonable with our specification. In equation
(2.9), demand equation is identical to structural demand equation (2.4) except that we now impose
our measure of quality, λfgdt, to take following form:
λfgdt = α̂gdpcft + γ̂fgd + ε̂fgdt. (2.10)
In the next section, we implement this methodology using French customs data. Then, we assess
its effectiveness by comparing our estimates of the elasticity of demand, and the product quality to
existing measures.
25In line with this assumption, Schott (2004) shows evidence that richer countries specialize in the export of higher
quality goods.
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2.3 Data and Demand Estimation Results
In this section, we apply the procedure to French exporting firms using French customs data. We
start by describing the data we use, and provide descriptive statistics showing that they suit our
exercise. Then, we report results on price elasticity. The estimates obtained from our empirical
procedure are systematically larger, in absolute values, than corresponding OLS estimates. This
is strongly suggestive that the use of our IV estimation corrects endogeneity biases described in
section 2.2.2. Finally, we estimate product quality by separately estimating demand function (2.4)
for different categories of goods. We document the relevancy of our quality estimates through
correlations with firm-level characteristics and existing measures of quality.
2.3.1 Data
We exploit firm-level trade data collected by French customs administration. These data provide
a comprehensive record of the yearly values and quantities exported and imported by French firms
from 1995 to 2010. Trade flows are disaggregated at the firm, country and eight-digit product
category of the combined nomenclature.26 Imports and exports are reported separately.
Information on quantities in trade data is known to be noisy. In order to mitigate this issue,
we clean the data along various dimensions. First, we drop quantities equal to one or two, since
we suspect them to be subject to rounding errors or to be poorly reported by firms. Secondly, we
drop prices which variations are “suspiciously” large between years, destinations, and relatively to
competing products.27 Finally, because of changes in the HS classification across years, we apply the
algorithm described in Pierce and Schott (2012) in order to obtain well-defined and time invariant
product categories.
Size of the Dataset As reported in the first column of table 2.1, the size of the dataset remains
large after this cleaning procedure, with more than 2 million flows recorded every year. Yet, the
number of observations actually used to estimate the demand system is smaller as our instrument
can only be constructed for firms which have reported imports at the customs office in 1995. Third
26Only annual values which exceeds a legal threshold are included in the dataset. For instance, in 2002, this
threshold was 100,000 euros. This cutoff is unlikely to affect our study since, this same year, the total values of flows
contained in the dataset represented roughly 98 percents of the aggregated estimates of French international trade.
27Appendix B.3 provides the details of the cleaning procedure.
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column in table 2.1 shows the size of the final sample. It appears that restricting the sample to
1995 importers induces a large loss of observations as we are left with approximately 45 percents
of the total number of observations. On the positive side, the exports present in the final sample
stand for two-third of total exports reported in customs data. Second column reports the size of the
sample when limited to importing firms. Any firm-product-destination-year export flow for which
at least one corresponding import flow can be found in the customs data for the same year and the
same firm is included in this sample. Successively comparing column 1 to column 2 and column
2 to column 3 makes it possible to decompose the loss of observations. It appears that a reason
why the final sample still covers a large share of total exports is that (i) exporter-importer are
larger than the average exporter and (ii) exporters importing in 1995 are larger that the average
exporter-importer.28







# Obs. 29,102,408 25,583,171 13,257,803
# Varieties 5,144,897 4,074,342 1,799,738
# Firms 419,624 167,692 68,255
% Exports 100% 98% 67.5%
Notes: An observation is an export flow at the firm, nc8 product, destination, year
level. First column contains the number of observations in all the customs data.
Second column reports the number of exporting flows for which importing flows are
also reported for the same firm and the same year. Third column reports the number
of exporting flows for which importing flows are also reported for the same firm in
1995. A variety is a firm-product combination.
The estimation of demand functions requires variations along multiple dimensions in the data.
Firstly, due to the presence of market fixed effects, we need the instrument to vary across firms
exporting to a given product-destination market. This implies that the set of source countries must
differ between different firms supplying a same market. Secondly, because both flow-specific and
market-specific fixed effects are included in the estimated equations, we respectively need (i) firms to
28The reader interested in applying our estimation strategy to customs data from other countries might be concerned
with the fact that restricting the sample to the set of importers at the beginning of the sample period may result in a
larger loss of information than in the French case. On the contrary, because exports are consistently skewed towards
importing firms throughout countries, we suspect that this sample restriction will lead to a loss of information of a
comparable order of magnitude in other countries. See for instance Amiti et al. (2014) for facts on the substantial
skewness of exports towards importing firms in Belgium.
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serve a given product-destination for many years and (ii) product-destination markets to be served
by many firms simultaneously. Table 2.2 provides information about the distribution of the number
of observations along these different dimensions of the data. In this table, we provide statistics
for the exports of the set of firms used to identify demand equations: firms being simultaneously
importers in 1995 and exporters. The median importing-exporting firm sells in four different product
category, to three different destinations, and imports from four different countries. The median flow
(a firm-product-destination combination) is present for three years in the sample which means that
flow fixed effects are identified for more than half the observations. Symmetrically, the median
market is served by two firms so the market fixed effect is identified for at least half the sample.
Table 2.2: Number of Observations along Multiple Dimensions
p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 Mean
# Products by firm-year 1 1 3 9 29 7.4
# Destinations by firm-year 1 1 4 9 36 9.7
# Sources by firm-year 1 2 4 7 15 5.3
# Products by firm-dest-year 1 1 1 3 10 3.3
# Destinations by firm-prod-year 1 1 1 2 9 2.5
# Years by flow 1 1 3 7 14 4.8
# Flows by market 1 1 2 4 15 4.2
Notes: These statistics are from firms being exporters and importers in 1995. A ‘flow’ is
a combination of a firm, a product and a destination. A ‘market’ is a combination of a
product, a destination and a year.
Descriptive Statistics on the Instrument The instrument crosses two informational sources:
import shares and real exchange rates. Figure 2.1 reports the 1995-2010 evolution of real exchange
rates for the top 5 countries regarding their total imports of French goods. After 1999, real exchange
rate movements of Euro zone countries are solely due to inflation.
The instrument is constructed from 1995 import shares and intend to proxy a firm’s exchange
rate shocks over the period. One concern is that if import shares vary a lot over time, then the
instrument is a bad proxy for real exchange rate shocks faced by firms towards the end of the period.
This might generate a weak instrument issue. Table B.2 in appendix B.5 shows that autocorrelation


















Figure 2.1: RER 1995-2010-Top Source Countries
Notes: Real exchange rates are calculated as eEuro,st× CPIstCPIFrance,t where eEuro,st is the direct nominal exchange rate
from Euro to j’s currency at date t. CPI is the consumer price index. After 1999, Real-exchange-rate movements of
Euro zone countries are solely due to inflation. 1995 real exchange rates are normalized to one.
much statistical power over time.
2.3.2 Estimation Algorithm
Estimation of linear equations with two sets of high-dimensional fixed effects and unbalanced panel,
as is the case in our estimation, is cumbersome. Because the panel is unbalanced along these two
dimensions, the two sets of fixed effects are not orthogonal. Consequently, variables included in
the regression need to be simultaneously projected on these two sets of fixed effects, as one cannot
rely on successive projections. In order to do so, we rely on the algorithm developed in Guimaraes
and Portugal (2010). This algorithm first demeans the variables along the two sets of fixed effects.
Parameters of interest are then estimated using demeaned variables.
2.3.3 Pooled Industries Results
In order to describe the effectiveness of the instrumental strategy, we will first present results when
estimating a single price-elasticity. The first stage of the estimation procedure shows that the in-
struments employed are strong enough, and impact export prices in a way consistent with economic
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theory. Then, we report the results of the second stage. Instrumentation corrects estimated coeffi-
cients as expected which provides support for the relevancy of our instrumental variable strategy.
First stage To build the instrument, we theorized that (i) exchange rate variations impact the
price of imported inputs and (ii) that input prices impact output prices. As a preliminary test to
our instrumental strategy, we test the first part of this causal chain. To do this, we regress the unit
value of imports over the real exchange rates. A price is defined at the most disaggregate level:
it corresponds to a firm, source country, CN 8 product category, year import flow. Firm-source-
product fixed effects are added to the regression. Results are reported in table 2.3. As expected,
real exchange rates significantly and positively impact input prices.
Table 2.3: Pass-through from




N 22 595 549
partial R2 0.001
Notes: Prod×Source country×Year fixed
effects are included in the regression. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the source country
level in parentheses. *** p<0.01
We now turn to the first stage per se. Table 2.4 shows that our instruments are strongly
correlated with export prices, the endogenous variable. It presents the results of the first stage for
four different specifications. Columns (1) and (2) only use the contemporaneous average exchange
rate, RERft, as a predictor of export prices. The difference between these two columns lies in
the inclusion of the variables controlling the potential quality adjustments following changes in the
GDP per capita of the average source and destination of the firm: gdpcexpft and gdpc
imp
ft . In columns
(3) and (4) the specification is augmented with the second instrument that takes into account the
degree of hedging, RERhft.
Three main results emerge from table 2.4. First of all, the sign of the instruments’ coefficients
is consistent with the theoretical predictions. An increase in the average exchange rate faced by
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Table 2.4: First stage results
log price export
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RERft 0.087*** 0.092*** 0.11*** 0.12***













N 9 336 602 9 124 226 9 336 602 9 124 226
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 326.5 341.4 267.53 273.6
Notes: Dependent variable is the logarithm of the price of the exported good, at
the firm×nc8×destination×year level. RERft is the import-weighted exchange rate
for a firm, based on its importing shares in the first year of the sample. RERhft is
the import×export weighted exchange rate for a firm, based on its importing and
exporting shares in the first year of the sample. gdpc
exp
ft is the average GDP per
capita of the destinations of the firm. gdpc
imp
ft is the average GDP per capita of the
sources countries of the firm. Partial F-statistics are computed excluding the average
GDPs per capita. Firm×Prod×Dest and Prod×Dest×Year fixed effects included in
all regressions. Market-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
the firm is positively correlated with the price of its exported output. As an average effect, we
find an elasticity of 0.1 between imported exchange rates and output prices. Moreover, we see
that our second instrument is also consistent with the theory. Firms whose exporting shares are
correlated with importing shares are less affected by exchange rate changes. Secondly, the coefficients
on the GDP per capita are also consistent with theory. As predicted in Bastos et al. (2014),
following an increase in the average GDP per capita of its destinations, a firm should upgrade its
product, generating a positive impact on prices. Similarly, the average gdp per capita of source
countries is positively correlated with output prices, suggesting that gdpcimpft actually proxy for the
quality of imported inputs. One can notice that the introduction of these two terms does not affect
the relationship between the instrument and output prices. This suggests that the bias from not
controlling for the quality response to exchange rate fluctuations is small. As mentioned earlier,
there is no reason to think that the cost shifter generated by exchange rates variations should induce
systematic changes in the quality choices made by firms. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that
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these two controls do not affect the strength of our instruments. Finally, we also observe that our set
of instruments display a strong correlation with exported prices. With partial F-statistics ranging
from 267 to 341, weak instruments are not an issue here.
Second stage After checking the validity of the first step, we use prices predicted by our set of
instruments as an exogenous variable in the demand equation. We estimate the demand equation
using the four different specifications displayed in table 2.4. Moreover, in order to assess the effec-
tiveness of our instrumental strategy, we compare our result to a specification using OLS, that does
not address the endogeneity problem. Results are displayed in table 2.5. We number columns so
that second stage specifications have the same number as corresponding first stage specification in
table 2.4. In addition, column (0) presents the results of the OLS specification.
Table 2.5: Second stage results
Log Export Sales
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV IV IV IV
Log price (1− σ̂) 0.17*** -1.38*** -1.35*** -0.86*** -0.82***









Instrument . Single Single Hedg. Hedg.
N 9 336 602 9 336 602 9 124 226 9 336 602 9 124 226
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of export sales, at the
firm×nc8×destination×year level. Log price is the prediction from the first
stage. gdpc
exp
ft is the average GDP per capita of the destinations of the firm.
gdpc
imp
ft is the average GDP per capita of the sources countries of the firm.
Firm×Prod×Dest and Prod×Dest×Year fixed effects included in all regressions.
Market-level clustered standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for the two stages
estimation procedure. *** p<0.01
Table 2.5 contains several indicators of the good performance of our instrumental strategy. The
coefficient for the OLS regression in column (0) is biased due to simultaneity and measurement
errors problems. Whereas measurement errors drive the estimate toward zero, the simultaneity
problem generates a positive bias on the estimation of the elasticity. These predictions are confirmed
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with a positive coefficient of 0.17 for the OLS specification. By contrast, when using our sets of
instrumental variables, the estimates for the price coefficient is lower, ranging from -0.82 to -1.38.
This implies estimates of the price-elasticity of demand (−σ̂) ranging from -1.82 to -2.38, which are
consistent with recent findings in the literature.29 Moreover, coefficients on variables gdpcexpft and
gdpc
imp
ft are also consistent with the theory, since they reveal that products sourced and supplied
to richer countries are of better quality (i.e. they are more sold, conditional on price). Finally, it
is noteworthy that the estimates are consistent across specifications, even tough the specifications
with two instruments seem to generate a slightly smaller magnitude of the coefficients.30
Estimating a single coefficient for all industries shows that instrumenting affects price elasticity
estimates in a direction consistent with a correction of the simultaneity bias. However, in order to
infer quality measures from these demand equations, we separately apply this method to different
product categories.
2.3.4 Demand Estimation by Industry
In this section, we describe the results obtained by replicating the instrumentation strategy sepa-
rately for fifteen product categories.31 We use the set of instruments displayed in column (4) of table
2.4. As a way to make our first stage as strong as possible, this specification includes the instrument
taking into account the degree of hedging, as well as the GDP per capita control variables.
Product-specific price-elasticity estimates The results of this procedure are displayed in
table 2.6. For each product category, we report the IV and OLS estimates of the price-elasticities
of demand, as well as the F-statistics of the first stage of the instrumental variable procedure.
As reported in table 2.6 the IV estimated coefficient is more negative than its OLS analogue in
most industries. This is consistent with our instrument correcting the simultaneity bias that links
quality and prices in demand equation. While some OLS estimates are positive (which is possible
29Recent papers estimating firm-level demand functions include Nevo (2000), who finds estimates between -2.2 and
-4.2 in the cereal industry, Dubé (2004) who gets estimates between -2.11 and -3.61 in the soft drinks industry. Some
recent studies estimate firm-level price-elasticities for several industries. Foster et al. (2008) obtains a mean estimate
of -2.41 with eleven homogeneous industries, Handbury (2012) finds a mean of -1.97 with 149 industries, and Gervais
(2015) a median of -2.11 with 504 products.
30Appendix B.6 provides robustness checks about the procedure, excluding sensible years, as well as using first and
longer differences. These variations do not affect the effectiveness of the instrumentation.
31Unfortunately, when estimating at a more disaggregated level of the product classification, the number of ob-
servations per product category decreases and our instruments becomes weak in an important subset of product
categories.
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Table 2.6: Price-elasticity estimates (−σ) for different product cate-
gories
Product categories OLS IV
Coef (−σ̂) SE Coef (−σ̂) SE F-stat
Animal Products -0.83 (0.015) 13.3 (20.3) 1.17
Textiles -0.69 (0.004) -0.80*** (0.14) 331.9
Metals -0.81 (0.006) -0.87* (0.46) 22.3
Vegetable Products -0.81 (0.011) -0.93 (2.27) 1.91
Foodstuffs -0.95 (0.007) -0.97 (0.81) 11.8
Machinery, Electrical -0.85 (0.004) -1.23*** (0.29) 40.8
Wood, Wood products -0.79 (0.007) -1.27 (1.08) 2.93
Chemicals and Allied -0.90 (0.006) -1.51*** (0.63) 12.9
Plastics, Rubbers -0.86 (0.008) -2.27*** (0.68) 12.6
Miscellaneous -0.76 (0.005) -2.72*** (0.57) 9.75
Transportation -0.71 (0.012) -3.20*** (0.56) 23.85
Stone, Glass -0.82 (0.009) -4.55*** (1.03) 4.93
Mineral Products -0.81 (0.022) -4.75*** (1.80) 2.30
Footwear, Headgear -0.72 (0.013) -4.84*** (1.36) 3.6
Raw Hides, Skins, Leather -0.77 (0.010) -5.98*** (0.86) 8.08
Notes: Each row corresponds to a product category for which the demand equa-
tion is estimated. The IV specifications use the average exchange rates as in-
struments RERft, in addition to the hedging term, RER
h





ft . Last column provides the value of the par-
tial F-statistic of the first stage of the 2SLS procedure. Firm×Prod×Dest and
Prod×Dest×Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors are
clustered at the market level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
if both sales and prices go up as quality increases) our IV estimates are almost all negative, and in
a range consistent with the existing literature in Industrial Organization. As an outlier, the first
product category, related to Animal Products, records a very large, positive and imprecise price
elasticity estimate.32 Because of this, we will not use this category to construct quality estimates
for the rest of the paper. Excluding this industry, our estimates range from -0.80 to -5.98.
As a way to assess the reasonableness of our price elasticity estimates, we correlate them to
Sutton (2001)’s measure of vertical differentiation. Our expectation is that in vertically differen-
tiated sectors, consumers are more sensitive to quality and less to prices. The reason being that
there is a positive correlation between the degree of vertical correlation and the degree of horizontal
differentiation across industries. As shown by figure 2.2, the demand faced by exporters of vertically
32It is intuitive to understand why this empirical strategy fails in the case of “Animal products”, since this industry
is likely to have a very small share of imported goods among its input. Similarly, we can notice that the category
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t−stat=2.44, weight=t−stat of price elast. estimates
Figure 2.2: Price Elasticity Versus Vertical Differentiation
Notes: Each circle corresponds to a product category, i.e. a 1-digit position of the HS classification. The size of
a circle is proportional to the absolute value of the t-statistics on 1 − σ. The x-axis is Sutton (2001)’s measure of
vertical differentiation, i.e. the share of R&D and advertising expenditures in a sector’s total sales. The y-axis is
equal to estimated price-elasticity. The line is the predicted value of a weighted OLS regression of price-elasticity
over Sutton’s measure. Weights are the absolute value of the t-statistics on 1− σ. “Animal Products” excluded from
the regression.
differentiated products is significantly more elastic, which is consistent with our prediction.
2.4 Analysis of Estimated Quality
Once demand functions have been estimated, we can obtain measures of quality by applying equa-
tion (2.10). As a first way to describe our quality estimates of quality, we provide a variance
decomposition in table 2.7. Here, it is important to remember that the quality measure is obtained
at the firm × product category × destination × year level. Moreover, quality is defined relatively
to the average quality in the market. Therefore, it defines a position over the quality ladder in a
market, rather than an absolute quality which can be compared across markets. One can see from
table 2.7 that the dispersion of quality is well predicted by variety-specific effects. Indeed, half of
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this quality dispersion is captured by time-invariant variety-specific effects, and two thirds by time-
variant variety fixed effect. From this table, it seems that the quality level of a product is strongly
correlated across destinations for a specific good. We will rely on this evidence that quality choices
are made at the variety level, when identifying quality upgrading in a destination from competition
shocks in other destinations served by a variety.
Table 2.7: Variance Decomposition of the quality measure
Quality λfpdt
Firm FE X
Firm×Product category FE X
Firm×Year FE X
Firm×Product category×Year FE X
R2 0.17 0.51 0.23 0.69
Notes: Each column corresponds to the regression of our quality measure
from table 2.6 on a different set of fixed effects. Measures from “Animal
products” are excluded. Product category are defined at the 8-digit level.
Interestingly, there is substantial quality variation within varieties across destinations. Control-
ling for Firm×Product category×Year FE, we can predict 69 percents of the variation of our quality
measure. This is suggestive of the presence of market-specific tastes, or of the fact that firms adjust
the quality to their product depending on the country they serve.
2.4.1 Consistency tests
In order to assess the relevancy of our measure, we compare it to several existing measures.
Comparison with expert assessed quality First, we relate it to one of the only objective
product quality measure existing in the literature. Crozet et al. (2012) take advantage of expert
ratings for Champagne to analyze the importance of quality in explaining international trade flows
at the firm level. These expert assessed ratings (initially from Juhlin (2008)) are expressed in
number of stars ranging from 1 to 5, one being the lowest quality. We non-parametrically regress
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our revealed measure of quality for Champagne exports over the number of stars.33
Table 2.8: Correlation with Rat-










Notes: Champagne ratings from Juhlin
(2008). A larger number of star means
a higher expert assessed quality. We
drop non-Champagne exports of Cham-
pagne producers. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. *** p < 0.01
From table 2.8 it appears that our measure of quality is monotonically increasing with the
number of stars assigned by Juhlin (2008). Even though Champagne is a specific good in many
dimensions, and cannot assess the overall quality of our measure, this is convincing of the relevancy
of our measure of quality.
Correlation with firms’ characteristics In order to further improve our understanding of the
characteristics of our quality measure, we relate its estimated value to firms’ characteristics. We
merge our estimated qualities with firm-level data from France.34 Therefore, we are able to inspect
how our quality measure is able to explain firm characteristics such as the average wage. Table
B.4 displayed in appendix B.7.1 inspects these correlations using the number of employees of the
firm, its average wage, and our estimates of quality. It documents a strong and positive correlation
between our quality measures and the average wage paid by the firm. Moreover, this significant
33We thank the authors for sharing their data
34We use the dataset BRN, that covers all French firms with revenue larger than 763 Keuros, and is constructed
from reports of French firms to the tax administration.This dataset has been widely used in the literature (see Eaton
et al. 2011 or Berman et al. 2012 for instance).
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correlation is robust to the inclusion of the number of employees as regressor explaining the wage of
the firm. These results provide more evidence that our measure captures heterogeneity across firms
that is related to product quality differences.
Length of quality ladders and vertical differentiation As a final test of our quality esti-
mation, we construct a market specific measure of the “length” of the quality ladder. Following
Khandelwal (2010), for any product, destination, year combination, this length is obtained by tak-
ing the difference between the 95th and the 5th percentile of the quality distribution. This measure
may be interpreted as a revealed measure of the degree of vertical differentiation of a market. As
such, it should be positively correlated to Sutton (2001)’s alternative measure of vertical differen-
tiation. Table B.5, displayed in the appendix B.7.2, confirms this conjecture as it shows that both
measures are positively and significantly correlated.
2.4.2 How well do Prices proxy for Quality?
As a last way to analyze the properties of our measure of quality, we look at the relationship
between estimated quality and export prices. This is an important point since prices have been
extensively used in the literature as a proxy for quality. The problem is that prices are supposedly
also a function of a firm’s production cost. Therefore in sector with little vertical differentiation,
prices should poorly capture differences in demand fundamentals, whether across firms or over time.
To test this intuition, we regress (log) prices over estimated quality and we allow the slope of the
relationship to depend on Sutton’s measure of vertical differentiation.
Results for this exercise are reported in table 2.9. A first finding is that there is a positive rela-
tionship between estimated quality and prices in all sectors. However, the slope of that relationship
is significantly steeper in more vertically differentiated industries, consistently with the intuition
presented above. This is true whether we look in the cross-section of a market (column (1)) or in
the dynamics of a flow (column (2)). To get a sense of the magnitude of the differences in slope
across sectors, let us compare the quality-elasticity of prices between “mineral products” and “chem-
ical and allied”, respectively the least and the most vertically differentiated product categories. In
“mineral products”, the quality-elasticity of prices is approximately 0.035 when it is about 0.11 in
“chemical and allied”. This means that prices are three time less informative on quality for “mineral
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Table 2.9: Prices and Quality across Sectors
logExport Pricefpdt
(1) (2)
Quality λfpdt 0.033*** 0.025***
(0.000) (0.001)
Qualityfpdt × Suttonp 1.260*** 1.048***
(0.005) (0.018)
Market Effects YES YES
Flow Effects NO YES
N 13 542 905 13 542 905
R-squared 0.845 0.983
Notes: Dependent variable is the logarithm of exports unit
value at the firm×nc8×destination×year level. ‘Sutton’ is
the share of advertising and R&D expenditures in a US
sector’s sales. It is computed at the 4 digit level of ISIC-
rev 4 classification by Kugler and Verhoogen (2012). A
flow is a firm×nc8×destination combination. A market is
a nc8×destination×year combination. Market-level clus-
tered standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01
products” than for “chemical and allied”.
2.5 Quality Response to Low-Cost Competition
In this section, we exploit our measure of quality to document the quality response of French firms
to low-cost competition. We start by describing this identification strategy. We then report the
results of the estimation.
2.5.1 Identification strategy
Following Bernard et al. (2006), we define low-wage countries’ competition (LWC) as the share of
imports from countries with a GDP per capita inferior to 5% of French GDP per capita. More






where I lowidt is country d’s imports of 6-digit HS product i from low-wage countries at date t. Re-
spectively, Iidt is country d’s total imports of product i at date t. In equation (2.11), p is an 8-digit
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CN product position which belongs to 6-digit HS category i.35
A natural way to identify the within-firm quality response to LWC would be to regress the
dynamics of the quality measure, λfpdt, over the dynamics of LWCpdt. Since LWC does not vary
across firms within a market, this approach would amount to looking at the impact of LWC over
the mean quality of exports in a market. The problem is that our measure of quality is defined
relatively to the average quality in a market. So its market-level mean is normalized to zero and
is constant over time. As a consequence, identification requires variation in low-cost competition
across firms, within a market.
In order to generate such variation, we make use of the information on multi-destinations ex-
porters. Within a market, firms differ in the other markets they serve simultaneously. Therefore,
for any given market, we can construct a measure of the competition faced by a firm-product variety
in the rest of the world. Let LWCROWfpdt be that measure and let t0fp be the first year when variety
fp is observed in the sample. LWCROWfpdt verifies:
LWCROWfpdt =
∑
d′ 6=d r0fpd′ × LWCpd′t∑
d′ 6=d r0fpd′
,
with r0fpd the sales of variety fp in destination d, at initial date t0fp.
In the cross-section of a market, a variety with a higher LWCROW faces a fiercer low-wage
competition in the rest of the world. Our identification strategy consists in correlating the dynamics
of LWCROWfpdt with the dynamics of λfpdt. Since the competition shocks that we exploit occur in
a market different from the quality adjustments we intend to identify, our identifying assumption
is that quality variations are correlated across destinations within a variety. In the extreme case
where a variety is served with a same quality in all destinations, our strategy would capture the
exact impact of a local competition shock on local quality. In general, the effect we estimate will be







fpd,t−τ + FEfpd + FEpdt + ufpdt (2.12)
35Documentation about BACI can be found in Gaulier and Zignago (2010)
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with FEfpd a set of flow fixed effects and FEpdt a set of market fixed effects. Model (2.12) identifies
the effect of competition on quality, up to a five years lag. FEpdt controls for the fact that competi-
tion in the rest of the world could be correlated to local competition shocks. Flow fixed effect FEfpd
controls for the average quality of a flow over the period. Flow fixed effects are included because in
the cross-section of a market, quality might be correlated to LWCROWfidt through the self-selection
of firms into export markets over quality. For instance, high quality firms might self-select into
markets with stronger low-wage competition. The inclusion of flow-fixed places the estimation in
the dynamics of a trade flow. As we use initial export shares to construct LWCROW , its dynamics
is not driven by some (endogenous) reallocation of exports.36
Given our fixed effect specification, our identifying assumption is that the relative dynamics
of LWCROW across firm-product-destination trade flows, within a product-destination market are
exogenous to relative dynamics in quality shock ufpdt. Next subsection presents our results.
2.5.2 Results
In this subsection, we show the results obtained by estimating variants of equation (2.12). In par-
ticular, specifications differ in the number of lags we estimate. Results from our main specification
are reported in table 2.10: we run specification (2.12) first by including each lag of rest-of-the-world
competition separately and then by including all lags together. In order to make regressions com-
parable, we use a same sample of firms for which we observe at least five lags of rest-of-the-world
competition.37 Overall, table 2.10 suggests quality upgrading triggered by low-cost competition,
but only after a few years. In facts, low-cost competition appears to only have an effect on quality
upgrading after three years. A coefficient 0.196 associated to LWCROWt−4 means that a 10 percentage
point increase in the competition faced by a firm in the rest of the world causes four years later a 2%
point increase in the quality supplied by the firm to the market under consideration. The fact that
the effect of competition takes time to occur is a reasonable result. Indeed, our measure of quality
is revealed from the demand faced by a firm. No matter the way the firm upgrades the quality of
its products, it seems sensible to think that it does not instantaneously result into larger sales as
36In Appendix B.8, figure B.1 describes the penetration of low-wage countries by year in the top five largest
destination countries for French exporters.
37A potential concern is the endogenous attrition of exporters due to low-cost competition. Keeping a constant set
of exporters avoid this mechanism to drive the results.
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consumers need time to become aware of the upgrade and to adjust their demand accordingly.
Table 2.10: Low-wage Competition and Quality Upgrading.
Dep. variable: Quality λf,p,d,t













Observations 850 051 850 051 850 051 850 051 850 051 850 051 850 051
R2 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
Notes: Quality measures are obtained from table 2.6, excluding “Animal products”. Flow and Market
fixed effects included in all regressions. Market-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01.
In order to gain confidence into the fact that the effect we capture in table 2.10 is indeed a
quality upgrading response to competition, we now interact our measure of competition with a
sectoral measure of the vertical differentiation. Our prediction is that the effect of competition
should be larger for more vertically differentiated sectors as firms from homogeneous sectors can
not adjust their quality. This prediction is confirmed in table 2.11. More specifically, we see that
the interaction term is significant for the third and fourth lag, in addition to the contemporaneous
level of competition. This confirms the fact that the effect we identified in 2.10 is driven by firms
from vertically differentiated sectors.
Overall, these results are very suggestive that firms upgrade their quality when the penetration
of low-wage countries go up. However, this response appears to take a few years to be effectively
transmitted to sales, and therefore profits.
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Table 2.11: Is Quality Upgrading more Significant in more Vertically Differentiated Sectors?
Dep. variable: Quality λf,p,d,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LWCROWt -0.115 -0.112
(0.096) (0.097)




















LWCROWt−5 × Sutton 0.971 -2.179
(2.756) (2.835)
Observations 679,342 679,342 679,342 679,342 679,342 679,342 679,342
R2 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
Notes: Quality measures are obtained from table 2.6, excluding “Animal products”. Flow and Market fixed
effects included in all regressions. Market-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
2.6 Conclusion
A recent literature has evidenced that product quality has implications for key economic outcomes
such as firms’ profitability or welfare inequalities. These findings make it crucial to understand the
determinants of quality at the firm-level. In this paper, we have provided a necessary tool to pursue
this research agenda. Namely, we have proposed a novel strategy to estimate time-varying quality
at the firm-level. Our strategy is robust to unobserved vertical differentiation. It only requires
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firm-product level information on prices, sales and imports by country.
We identify quality by estimating a demand function at the firm-product level. Quality is
obtained as a residual of demand, once prices have been controlled for. In order to deal with the
endogeneity of prices in the demand function, we construct a new firm-specific instrument. This
instrument interacts variations in exchange rates with firm-specific importing shares. We implement
our estimation on French customs data and get a number of elements supporting the reliability of
our approach.
As a first application to our method, we compare (export) prices, a widely used proxy for quality,
with our export quality estimates. We find a positive and significant relationship between quality
and prices, however, this relationship is weaker in more homogeneous sectors. These results hold in
the cross-section as well as in the dynamics of a firm. Our findings calls for a cautious use of prices
to measure quality.
Finally, we use estimated quality, along with information on low-wage countries penetration rates
to identify the quality response of firms’ exports to low-wage countries’ competition. Our results
suggest that firms upgrade their quality when competition intensifies. This result is important for








1I would like to thank Eric Verhoogen and Jonathan Vogel for comments and guidance.
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3.1 Introduction
In 2007, expenditures in advertising accounted for 2% of the GDP in the United States. Yet,
advertising has only recently been integrated in macroeconomics and international trade models.
Recent and important examples are Arkolakis (2010, 2016) and Drozd and Nosal (2012). In these
models, advertising is introduced in order to create friction when firms wish to extend their market
shares, and, therefore, can explain heterogeneous or slow responses of firms following a change in
the market conditions.
In this paper, I conduct an empirical study about the use of advertising at the plant level, taking
advantage of information about advertising expenditures in the manufacturing census from Chile.
In particular, I show that, within a defined industry, the advertising intensity of a firm - measured
by the advertising expenditures as a share of sales - is positively correlated with its size. Moreover,
this pattern appears to be even stronger in industries with a large scope for vertical differentiation.
This pattern is consistent with an extension of a model of advertising with heterogeneous firms from
Arkolakis (2010) in which firms can use advertising to affect the perceived quality of their product.
In the next section, I present the justification of this paper by describing the positive correlation
between advertising intensity, measured by the advertising expenditures as percentages of the total
sales, and the size of the firm, measured by the log of the number of employees. This correlation
appears between firms producing simultaneously within the same industry, such that this correlation
cannot be explained by industry or time characteristics. Moreover, I show that this correlation is
stronger in vertically differentiated industries. Indeed, when regressing separately highly vertically
differentiated industries, the slope between advertising intensity and size appears to be steeper than
when looking at industries with a small scope for vertical differentiation.
In section 3.3, I develop a model of advertising at the firm-level, following Arkolakis (2010).
In addition to selecting their number of potential consumers, firms can also affect the aggregate
perceived quality of their products by using a costly marketing technology. This model is derived
in a framework where firms are heterogeneous. However, this heterogeneity is defined in terms of
quality rather than productivity.2 This additional feature of advertising, which is not featured in
Arkolakis (2010), allows me to predict an increasing advertising intensity when the size of the firm
2I therefore follow a quality-version of the heterogeneous firms model presented by Melitz (2003), as described in
Baldwin and Harrigan (2011)
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increases. The intuition is the following: when only considering an extensive margin of consumers,
the marginal benefit of advertising is constant (equal to a new customer) while the advertising costs
are increasing (because each new customer is more costly to reach than the previous one). However,
affecting perceived quality generates increasing returns of advertising with the size of the firm. This
explains why larger firms will spend relatively more in advertising when they are able to affect the
quality of their product, as perceived by the consumer. Moreover, the slope of this relationship
between size and advertising intensity will be increasing with the ability of the firm to vertically
differentiate its product.
Finally, in section 3.4, I return to the data. I test the theory by showing that the positive
correlation between size and advertising intensity presented in section 3.2 cannot be explained by
alternative mechanisms that could predict this same correlation. Moreover, using two measures
of vertical differentiation from Sutton (2001) and Khandelwal (2010), I confirm that this positive
correlation is stronger in industries where the scope for vertical differentiation is large. This brings
support to the idea that the positive correlation observed in the data is explained by this ability for
a firm to affect the valuation of their product through advertising.
This paper draws from the extensive literature about advertising in Industrial Organization.
For many years, researchers have identified two features of advertising. Chamberlin (1933) already
distinguished an advertising that aims to inform consumers, from one that affects consumers’ val-
uation of the good. The former has been subsequently named “informative” advertising, while the
latter is characterized as “persuasive”. Butters (1977) was the first to develop a formal model of
informative advertising, featuring increasing marginal costs of advertising, while Stigler and Becker
(1977) is often described as the first model of persuasive advertising. More recently, Rauch (2013)
inserts these two features in a single model of advertising, in order to show how these two types
have opposite predictions of welfare. In addition to this theoretical literature, empirical studies
have investigated the importance of economies of scale in advertising. For instance, Brown (1978)
finds evidence of such economies in the cigarette industry, while Seldon, Jewell, and O’Brien (2000)
suggest the presence of diseconomies of scale in advertising for the beer industry. Overall, Bagwell
(2005) summarizes that advertising seems to display increasing returns up to a threshold, after
which returns appear to decrease.
This paper is also closely related to recent literature in international trade. Numerous papers
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have recently focused on the role played by product quality as a result or a determinant of the
exporting activity (see Verhoogen (2008) or Hallak and Sivadasan (2013) for example). In these
papers, a product needs to satisfy quality requirements to fit the needs of foreign consumers, and
therefore be able to reach foreign markets. This can be done by upgrading the quality of your
product, or simply by creating a good reputation for the good you produce. With this view, per-
suasive advertising could spur the export of high-quality products, but also be a determinant of the
exporting activity by itself. Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) develops such a framework where quality
and a fixed investment (that can be interpreted as advertising) are complementary in generating the
reputation of a product. In my paper, the model does not emphasize this link with the exporting
activity; it precisely describes how advertising expenditures are determined by the quality of the
product. Therefore, it draws a similar complementarity between the use of advertising of a firm and
the product quality.
Finally, this model of persuasive advertising has a second advantage in terms of empirical predic-
tions over a standard model of informative advertising. By allowing the firm to affect the perceived
quality of its product, it gives the advertising activity the ability to affect the market power of
producers. Numerous papers have documented the existence of prices heterogeneity across des-
tinations (see Bastos and Silva (2010) or Manova and Zhang (2012) for instance). This type of
heterogeneity cannot be explained by the firm productivity alone since it features differences for a
similar good produced by a single firm. However, the existence of a destination-specific reputation
for this good could explain this price heterogeneity. The persuasive advertising model developed in
this paper can be seen as a first step toward a model explaining prices and quantity heterogeneity
across destinations.
The next section illustrates the motivation of this paper, by displaying the main empirical
finding, namely the positive correlation between advertising intensity and size.
3.2 Empirical motivations
To my knowledge, no empirical study has specifically looked at the link between advertising inten-
sity and size at the firm-level. This is likely due to the scarcity of large firm level datasets providing
information about advertising expenditures. In this section, I aim to rectify this gap by taking
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advantage of the census of manufacturing firms from Chile. This plant-level dataset provides infor-
mation about the amount spent in advertising by all Chilean manufacturing firms that are larger
than 10 employees. I will therefore be able to estimate the relationship between the advertising
intensity (measured by advertising expenditures as a share of total sales) and the size of a plant.
I start this section by describing the dataset, and then I will turn to the empirical analysis.
3.2.1 Dataset
The Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (ENIA) provides firm and product-level data from Chilean
plants extracted from the industrial survey conducted by the Statistical National Institute of Chile.
The sample covers approximatively 5000 plants after cleaning,3 from 1995 to 2007. This dataset
contains common information at the firm level such as sales, productive factors and exporting
activity. However, as a notable feature, this dataset provides information about the amount spent
by the firm in “advertising and promotional activities”. It is important to note that we only observe
a single number at the plant level. Consequently, it is impossible to allocate this amount across
the products of the plant or the markets it is serving. Therefore, I will neither be able to pursue
this analysis at the product level, neither to relate these expenditures to product or market-level
variables.
In order to provide a first look at the data, I provide, in the table 3.1 summary statistics for
the year 1996, describing the distribution of advertising intensities among different subcategories of
plants. While the average advertising intensity is 0.54% this year, we can notice that more than half
of the plants (54 %) report no spending in advertising. More interestingly, the average advertising
intensity, conditional on using advertising, reaches 1.17%. These numbers may seem small at first
glance. However, the dataset only consists of manufacturing plants. This could explain why these
numbers are lower than statistics usually mentioned to describe the importance of advertising.4
The existence of this heterogeneity is likely to be explained by the industry and firm hetero-
geneity. As an example, I provide in this table the average spending in advertising, as percentages
of sales, separately for exporters and non exporters, and according to the degree of differentiation
3In order to avoid the role of outliers in predicting empirical patterns, the cleaning procedure consists of excluding
plants whose employment levels and advertising intensities are doubtful. Therefore, I drop establishments whose
employment is lower than 10 as well as those whose advertising intensity is above the 99th percentile of the industry-
year distribution.
4In the US for instance, advertising expenditures account for 2% of the GDP
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of the industry.5 We can therefore see that exporters and plants in differentiated industries appear
to have higher shares of sales spent in advertising.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics for Advertising Intensity (year 1996)
Sample Mean Mean SD. Max N
Total All 0.54 0.029 70.68 5417
Only advertising firms 1.17 0.060 70.68 2488
Exporters No 0.41 0.029 70.68 4269
Yes 1.01 0.078 27.16 1148
Diff. industries No 0.37 0.019 13.86 2753
Yes 0.96 0.088 70.68 1627
Mult. Products No 0.32 0.026 21.79 2023
Yes 0.66 0.043 70.68 3394
Notes: Summary statistics for advertising intensity defined by the amount spent in advertising as
percentages of total sales. Numbers are only from the year 1996.
Therefore, it appears necessary, when trying to explain the heterogeneity existing between firms,
to consider industry, but also firms characteristics. Before looking at heterogeneity between plants in
a similar industry, it is useful to first look at heterogeneity in terms of advertising between industries.
This will help to have a sense of which industries are spending large amounts in advertising. The
following table 3.2 aims to do so by providing the ranking of industries according to the average
advertising intensity of their firms.
We observe a large heterogeneity across industries. This is not surprising since the products
described above are different in many dimensions. This table also enables us to distinguish which
kind of industries will intensively use advertising. It thus appears that products at the top of the
ranking are mainly final goods, directly purchased by the consumer. Inversely, industries recording
low advertising intensities are intermediate producers, whose products are destined for other firms.
However, the goal of this paper is to look at the heterogeneity existing between plants within
a same industry. Literature in Industrial Organization has widely studied the effects of industry
5I use a differentiation measure from Sutton (2001) in order to classify these industries. The median of this
measure is the threshold between non-differentiated and differentiated industries
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Table 3.2: Advertising rankings of industries
All firms Advertising firms
Isic code Isic label Rank Mean Rank Mean
2423 Pharmaceuticals, medicinal 1 8.56 1 9.84
chemicals and botanical products
2424 Soap and detergents, cleaning 2 6.77 3 8.12
and polishing preparations
1532 Starches and starch products 3 3.72 2 8.21
1554 Soft drinks; Mineral waters 4 3.21 5 4.61
1552 Wines 5 3.05 7 4.25
2813 Steam generators 89 0 .060 84 0.26
1911 Tanning and dressing of leather 90 0.051 91 0.10
2023 Wooden containers 91 0.041 89 0.16
3130 Insulated wire and cable 92 0.027 92 0.084
2412 Fertilizers and nitrogen compounds 93 0.013 93 0.036
Notes: Average are computed among all firms first, and only among firms with positive advertising
expenditures secondly. Only industries with at least five operating firms in 1996 are reported.
characteristics on advertising (see Bagwell (2005) for a survey). However, the main advantage of
this dataset is to provide information on advertising at the plant level, which allows me to relate
these expenditures to plant characteristics. Therefore, I will move to an analysis that focuses on
within-industry heterogeneity, by comparing advertising intensities of firms operating in the same
industry. I will return to industry-level characteristics in section 4, when trying to characterize the
nature of this heterogeneity.
3.2.2 Stylized facts
Recent literature in international trade has emphasized the importance of within-industry het-
erogeneity to predict trade flows across nations. This is also true for recent models introducing
advertising. Arkolakis (2010) predicts a larger growth rate for small exporters because they spend
intensively more in advertising than large firms. However, Arkolakis (2010) does not have micro-
level data on advertising in order to test his theory. The goal of this section is to look at this
heterogeneity between small and large firms.
95
Heterogeneity across firm size Therefore, as a first test, we want to look at the link between
the advertising intensity of a firm and its size in terms of number of employees. To avoid to make
parametric restrictions on the econometric specification, we start by running nonparametric regres-
sions6 between these two variables: the advertising intensity, measured by the ratio in percentage of
advertising expenditures over total sales, and the logarithm of the number of employees in the plant.
Because we want to look at within-industry heterogeneity, we start by demeaning these two variables
by the annual mean of the industry (ISIC Rev.3 at the 4 digit level). This will take into account
industry and year effects. In figure 3.1(a), we present the results for a nonparametric regression
between these two demeaned variables. We add, on the same figure, the confidence interval of the
nonparametric regression in order to emphasize significant differences across firm size. Moreover,
given the large number of plants that do not report any spending in advertising, we repeat this
procedure for the sample of firms that report positive spendings in advertising.7 The results for this






























































(b) Only advertising firms.
Figure 3.1: Nonparametric regressions between advertising intensity and employment.
Notes: Advertising intensity is defined as the ratio of advertising expenditures over sales, expressed in percentages.
Employment is measured by the number of employees. Both variables are demeaned using industry × year fixed
effects. The Kernel function used is of type Epanechnikov and the bandwidth is set at 0.25.
6The Kernel function is Epanechnikov and the bandwidth equals 0.25
7Because we are using two different samples of firms, we demean our observations using each time the relevant
sample. Therefore, deviations from zero with the sample of firms using advertising has to be seen as deviations from
the average of this specific set of firms.
96
Figure 3.1 shows a strong positive correlation between the size of the firm and its advertising
intensity. This is true when including all firms but also when only looking at firms using advertising.
Therefore, when a firms gets larger, it will be more likely to use advertising, but will also spend a
larger share of its sales in advertising. I will return later to the extent of this relationship, when
using parametric regressions to quantify the elasticity between these two variables.
The role of vertical differentiation After showing a positive correlation between size and
advertising intensity, I document the role played by the degree of vertical differentiation of the
industry. To characterize this latter, we use a measure from Sutton (2001). This measure describes
the degree of differentiation within an industry based on the levels of spendings, at the level of the
industry, in advertising and R&D. I proceed as previously: I nonparametrically regress advertising
intensity on the logarithm of the employment, but I do this separately for industries depending on
their degree of vertical differentiation.8 Results are presented in figure 3.2 for two samples: one using
all firms (figure 3.2(a)) and one using only firms with strictly positive expenditures in advertising
(figure 3.2(b)).
Figure 3.2 brings to light an interesting pattern: industries with a larger scope for differentiation
also exhibits a stronger slope between advertising intensity and size. This does not strongly appear
when considering all firms, but more explicitly when only considering plants with positive amount
spent in advertising.
Therefore, the positive correlation between these two variables seems to be driven, at least
partially, by the degree of vertical differentiation of the product. These two empirical facts cannot
be predict by existing models of advertising with heterogeneous firms. Therefore, we want a model
of advertising that generates a positive correlation between advertising intensity and size. We also
want this correlation to be driven by the degree of differentiation of the product. In the section, I
extend the model of Arkolakis (2010) in the following way: in addition to use advertising to inform
new customers, I allow firms to use advertising to affect the perceived quality of their products. This
view of advertising will generate the two empirical patterns presented above. In the next section,
we describe this model and its empirical predictions.
8Industries with “low vertical differentiation” are those whose the Sutton index is below the 30th percentile.
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(b) Only advertising firms.
Figure 3.2: Nonparametric regressions for high and low degree of differentiation.
Notes: Advertising intensity is defined as the ratio of advertising expenditures over sales, expressed in percentages.
Employment is measured by the number of employees. Both variables are demeaned using industry × year fixed
effects. Differentiation is defined by the Sutton index (low differentiation for industries below the 30th percentile,
high differentiation for those above the 70th. The Kernel function used is of type Epanechnikov and the bandwidth
is set at 0.25.
3.3 The model
Firms use advertising in order to increase their market shares. It is a good way to inform consumers
about the existence or the characteristics of their products, but also to affect their preferences by
creating a reputation or an image for their goods. Researchers in Industrial Organization have
studied for a long time these specific features of advertising. As early as Chamberlin (1933) is
made a distinction between advertising as a way to convey information to consumers, and the use of
advertising to alter consumers’ taste. This led the literature to name “informative” advertising this
first feature, which aims to bring information to consumers, versus “persuasive” advertising where
marketing is used to affect potential consumers’ will.
In this section, I describe a model where firms can invest in a type of advertising called “per-
suasive”. I extend the model of Arkolakis (2010) which only focuses on informative advertising. In
the latter, firms can adjust their extensive margin of consumers, the numbers of consumers aware
of the existence of the product. In this model, they can, in addition, adjust their intensive margin
by affecting the perceived quality of their own good. Consequently, the consumers preferences are
a crucial part of this model and are defined in the following section.
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3.3.1 Preferences
The demand system follows Verhoogen (2008) which describes, in a framework with international
trade, the choice of the consumer as a discrete choice model: the problem of a given consumer i is to
pick a specific variety for a good, among a set of different varieties. Among a set Ji, each variety is
defined by its price pj and its quality perceived by the consumer j qij . I assume each consumer has
an indirect utility function where price and quality enter linearly. Formally, a consumer i picking
the variety j will generate the following indirect utility function.
Uij = qij − σpj + εij (3.1)
where σ is a demand parameter describing the price elasticity of the demand. Following the discrete
choice literature, I add a variety specific error term εij in order to generate some heterogeneity in
the consumer’s choices.
Assuming that the idiosyncratic shock εij is distributed according to an extreme value distribution,




s=1 exp(qis − σps)
(3.2)
From this equation that describes the individual demand from a consumer i for each variety,
we are interested in obtaining the aggregate demand each firm faces. First of all, I denote Lj the
number of consumers that are aware of the existence of the product j, such that it is part of their
set of available products Ji.
Moreover, in order to keep the problem simple, we need two assumptions. First, instead of
keeping track of all the individual perceived quality, I assume that each consumer has the same
perceived quality qj for a given good j. Therefore, the quality qj of a product can be seen as the
average valuation of the product among consumers. Secondly, I need to assume that the number of
available varieties is constant among consumers. I will return later to the mechanisms generating
this set of available varieties for each consumer. But this condition will be satisfied when assuming
that consumers are equally reachable by firms.9
9Moreover, I will show later that monopolistic competition will make this variable irrelevant in the choices of firms,
and the individual decisions
99
Assuming these aggregate values of qj and J , the aggregate demand function for a variety j can
be written as follows:
D(qj , pj , Lj) = Lj
exp(qj − σpj)∑J
s=1 exp(qs − σps)
(3.3)
Given this demand function, I can now look at the decisions of the producers, introducing in
particular the use of advertising by firms.
3.3.2 Supply side
Given the demand function previously described, the operating profit from a product j will be :
π(qj , pj , Lj , cj) = D(qj , pj , Lj)(pj − cj) = Lj
exp(qj − σpj)∑J
s=1 exp(qs − σps)
(pj − cj) (3.4)
The profit of a firm will therefore depend on these four variables : the average perceived quality
of its product qj , its price pj , the number of consumers who can potentially buy the product Lj
and its marginal cost cj . In order to define the problem of a firm, I need to specify which of these
variables are endogenous and result from the choice of the firm. I will assume for simplicity that each
variety is produced by a single firm and that marginal costs are identical across firms regardless of
the quality of their product. Consequently, heterogeneity across firms is only characterized by their
quality. This is a version of the Melitz (2003) framework where quality is the source of heterogeneity
across firms, as described in Baldwin and Harrigan (2011). However, a producer will be able to
decide the price pj of its product, as well as its number of potential customers Lj and its average
perceived quality qj .
As it is often assumed in frameworks with monopolistic competition, firms will not take into
account their impact on the aggregate objects in their profit function (the denominator of the
demand function in my case). As a consequence, the optimal price charged by a firm will only
depend on the marginal cost of the firm, and the parameters of the demand functions. Indeed,
the optimal price charged by a producer will be pj = c + 1σ : firms will charge a mark-up over
their marginal cost, this mark-up being decreasing with the elasticity of demand. I can therefore
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substitute this equation in the profit function, such that we have:






The choice of qj and Lj by the producer will occur through the existence of a marketing tech-
nology, allowing the firm to affect the number of consumers aware of the existence of their products
Lj , but also the average perceived quality of their good qj . We describe this technology in the next
section.
3.3.3 Informative and Persuasive Advertising
In this section, we extend the idea of Arkolakis (2010) which introduces informative advertising as
a new margin for the firm. He inserts, in a framework with heterogeneous firms, the possibility for
firms to adjust their set of potential consumers by spending in an advertising technology described
as informative. In my model, I allow the firms to also affect the perceived quality of their product.
Therefore, in addition to spending money in informative advertising, they can also use a persua-
sive advertising technology to affect the valuation of their products by consumer. Formally, while
Arkolakis (2010) allows firms to endogenously choose Lj , I assume they can also affect qj through
advertising.
The use of advertising by the firms will occur through the existence of two types of advertisements
the firm can randomly send on the market. A first type of ad will make the consumer aware of the
existence of the product. A second type will increase its valuation of the product, in the case that
the consumer is already aware of its existence. We denote γ the valuation increase, such that aware
consumers receiving this ad will end up with a valuation q′j = qj +γ of the product j. Consequently,
this parameter γ will reflect the degree of differentiation of this product by advertising.
Therefore, I need to introduce some notations to describe how the firms can affect Lj and qj .
First of all, following Arkolakis (2010) again, I define as n1j the share of consumers aware of the
existence of the product j. Obviously, n1j will be between 0 and 1 such that I directly obtain
Lj = n1jL, L as being the size of the population in the economy. Secondly, I define as n2j as the
share of aware consumers for which their valuation of the products j will increase. Consequently,
the population of the economy can be divided into three categories. A share 1− n1j will not know
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the product j, a share n1j(1 − n2j) will know the product but will evaluate it as the valuation
qj . Finally, a share n1jn2j will be aware of its existence and will consider its quality as qj + γ.
These two variables n1j and n2j will summarize the choice of advertising by firms, n1 describing the
informative component and n2 the persuasive one.
Once setting the endogenous variables of the model, we need to rewrite the profit functions
according to these variables. As previously emphasized, I assume that the firm makes decisions
according to a single aggregated quality of its product. Because only a share n1j of the population
is aware of the product, the average valuation q̄j of the product j on the market, conditional on




(n1j(1− n2j)qj + n1jn2j(qj + γ)) = qj + γn2j (3.6)
Consequently, I can rewrite the profit function defined in equation (3.5) to introduce these endoge-
nous variables:






Naturally, the profit function will be increasing in both variables n1 and n2. It is also important to
notice that whereas n1 enters linearly in the profit function, it will not be the case of n2 whose impact
will depend on the quality-elasticity of the profit function. This difference will allow us to obtain
different predictions for the correlation between size and advertising intensity: while the informative
function of advertising can only enter linearly in the profit function, the perceived quality of the
product will enter in a convex way in the profit of the firm. This will become significant when we
will look at the empirical predictions of this model.
Advertising costs The use of this advertising technology is not free. I therefore need to introduce
cost functions related to the numbers of advertisements produced in order to reach the corresponding
shares n1 and n2 of consumers. Because we have two types of advertising, and consequently two
types of ads, I will define separate cost functions for each purpose : F1(n1, L) will be the cost of
reaching a fraction n1 of consumers, while F2(n1, n2, L) will be the cost associated with upgrading
the valuation of a fraction n2 when the share of informed consumers is n1. These cost functions
can be seen as the costs generated by sending a large enough number of ads to inform a fraction n1
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of consumers of the existence of the product, and increase the valuation of a fraction n2 of these
informed consumers. Based on this advertising technology, I can make several restrictions on the
functional form of these costs functions.
First of all, I will assume that the cost functions are homogeneous relative to the size of the
economy L. Therefore, it will be twice as expensive to reach shares n1 and n2 of customers in an
economy that is twice the size. An easy way to see this is to consider an advertisement as a flyer,
that can only reach one person or a given number of persons.
Secondly, the cost function for persuasive advertising will be independent from n1, even though
n2 is a fraction of n1. To understand this, we must imagine the firm is willing to reach a given share
n2 by randomly sending ads in the population. The impact of n1 will be double: first, a large n1 will
increase the probability to reach a consumer who is already aware of the existence of the product.
Secondly, because n2 is a fraction of n1, a large n1 will increase the number of ads that have to
be sent to persuade a fraction n2. Formally, for a given n1 and n2, the probability to increase the
valuation of a consumer is n1× (1−n2). Because the generated increase in n2 will be equal to 1/n1,
the marginal increase in n2 by an additional ad will be n1× (1−n2)× 1n1 = (1−n2). Consequently,
the cost function for persuasive advertising F2(n1, n2, L) will be independent from n1.
Finally, I will assume that these costs are increasing and convex in n1 and n2. This assumption
is both supported by the data and economic intuition. Bagwell (2005), in an article surveying the
literature, cites several papers finding empirical evidences of diminishing returns of advertising. But
this assumption is also motivated by economic intuition; therefore, it is not surprising that first mod-
els of advertising entail diminishing returns. Butters (1977) for example, describes a model where
ads are randomly sent to mailboxes. In this setup, the probability to inform a previously unaware
consumers is decreasing with the share of consumers already aware of the existence of the product.
Similarly, in a model where the firms could target specific consumers, marginal cost associated with
advertising should be increasing since firms will start by targeting the closest customers.10
10A simple illustration would be a geographical model where consumers are located throughout space. If advertising
costs depend on the distance to the consumers, firms will start by informing close consumers and will later go further,
such that marginal advertising costs are increasing.
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Consequently, the characteristics of these costs functions can be summarized as follows :
F1(n1, L) ≡ L× F1(n1) with F ′1() > 0 and F ′′1 () > 0
F2(n1, n2, L) ≡ L× F2(n2) with F ′2() > 0 and F ′′2 () > 0
(3.8)
In order to obtain closed form solutions for the model, I will set F1(n1) = ca 1αn
α





2 , with α and β larger than 2, and ca as the cost parameter for advertising. I will come
back to the importance of these functional forms when describing the empirical predictions of this
model. Moreover, I will assume that β is larger than γ + 1, γ being the parameter of vertical
differentiation. This will allow me to reject corner solutions when the firms endogenously set their
effort in advertising.
Optimal advertising The overall profit of the firms, including advertising costs, will therefore
be:

































For analytical simplicity, n2 also appears in the right hand side of these equations. This is convenient
because the entire object exp(qj+γn2j−c)∑J
s=1 exp(q̄s−c)
describes the market shares of the firms on its set of aware
consumer. Moreover, I can show that the solutions n1 and n2 for this system are unique.11 Also,
11Looking at the equation defining the optimal choice of n2j , both sides are strictly increasing in n2j . Because
n2 is defined between 0 and 1, we can show that the right-hand side is larger than 0 at n2 = 0. Moreover, for a
large enough value of ca, the right hand side is lower than one at n2 = 1. A sufficient condition is therefore that the
derivative of the left-hand side is larger than the one of the right-hand side. A sufficient condition for this is that,
if these derivatives are equal et some point n2, they can be so only at an unique point. This can be easily shown










(α−1)(β−1)−1) is monotonic in n2 and
the derivative of the left-hand side is 1. This proves the uniqueness of the solution.
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I carefully describe in the appendix C.1 the optimization problem of the firms leading to these
solutions. In particular, I emphasize the role of the constraint imposed on the parameters when
setting γ < β − 1.
Following these optimal choices of n1 and n2, two main characteristics emerge. First, both are
increasing with the quality of the product, and decreasing with the cost of the firms. More generally,
they are increasing with the average profit of the firm. Therefore, in a framework with heterogeneous
firms, most productive firms - defined in a general way - will spend more on advertising. The intuition
is straightforward: since these firms have higher marginal revenue, they are, consequently, willing
to reach a higher marginal cost of advertising. However, we will show later than the advertising
intensity - the share of sales spent on advertising - is more difficult to link with the size and the
productivity of the firm.
Secondly, we can note that the elasticity of advertising expenditures relatively to the average profit
of the firm is higher for n2 than n1. Indeed, when looking at the amount spent in advertising, nα1
will grow at a rate αα−1 while n
β
2 will grow at a rate
αβ
(α−1)(β−1) . This is a crucial point that explains
why the use of persuasive advertising will generate the positive correlation between advertising
intensity and size. This effect comes from the fact that informative advertising only allows a firm
to increase the set of potential consumers. Therefore, when a firm gets bigger, the marginal benefit
of advertising is constant - equal to a new potential consumer, while advertising marginal costs
increase, because this new consumer is more difficult to reach. However, this will not be the case for
persuasive advertising. Indeed, the marginal return of persuasive advertising will be also increasing
with the size of the firm - because a change in the perceived quality is exponential. That is why the
introduction of an advertising of type persuasive will generate an increasing advertising intensity
with the size of the firm.12
3.3.4 Empirical predictions
I extended the model from Arkolakis (2010) in order to match the empirical patterns presented in
the previous section. The advertising intensity of a firm is increasing with its size, and this positive
12In his theoretical appendix, Arkolakis (2010) introduces persuasive advertising. However, he shows that this
feature of advertising is homothetic to his initial version with informative advertising. The reason is that he normalizes
the quality of the product such that it enters linearly in the profit function of the firm. In my situation, persuasive
advertising affects the outcome of my model because the quality of the product enters in a convex way in the profit
function.
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correlation is stronger in industries with a large scope for vertical differentiation. Because I added
a persuasive component of advertising, I can now look at the empirical predictions of this type of
advertising, but also the predictions from the informative component of advertising.
The two components of advertising, informative and persuasive, will indeed generate opposite
predictions about the link between advertising intensity and size at the firm-level. To describe
















L. We therefore obtain the following expressions for the advertising

















































This result shows different patterns for each type of advertising. Advertising intensity from the
expenditures in informative advertising appears to be only dependent from structural parameters of
the model. Moreover, these parameters are industry-specific and consequently, do not vary across
firms. Therefore, this would predict a constant intensity of advertising between firms within a same
industry. However, we can see that the advertising intensity coming from the persuasive type of
advertising is directly related with the sales of the firms. More precisely, a firm would increase its
advertising intensity with its size at a rate 1β−1 . As emphasized in the previous section, this effect
comes from the argument that while a saturation effect shows up when we only consider advertising
as informative, this is not true with persuasive advertising. The marginal returns of persuasive
advertising increase with the size of the firms, such that they compensate for the increasing marginal
costs of advertising.
Moreover, the coefficient of vertical differentiation γ has a positive impact on the advertising
intensity heterogeneity within an industry. Therefore, goods with a high degree of vertical differ-
entiation will imply a steeper link between the size of a firm and its advertising intensity. Indeed,
13Details for these computations are in the appendix C.2
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In the appendix C.3, I show how this result is dependent from the demand system used. I show that
the existence of a correlation between revenue and advertising intensity requires persuasive adver-
tising. When we only consider informative advertising, we obtain a constant advertising intensity
regardless of the demand system specified.14 Moreover, only a few assumptions are required in or-
der to obtain a positive relationship between advertising intensity and size when adding persuasive
advertising.
In addition to the type of demand system used, another important assumption has been made
when specifying the cost functions of advertising. In my model, I chose a specific type of cost
functions in order to obtain closed-form solutions for the link between advertising intensity and
size. However, this choice has important implications on the predictions of my model. Moreover,
they are different from cost functions previously used in Arkolakis (2010) for instance. In the next
section, I show how the conclusions of my model are not affected by alternative choices of cost
functions.
The importance of the cost function In order to describe the role played by the functional
form used for the cost function of advertising, we describe a similar problem without putting any
restriction on the cost function. Therefore, we will be able to derive sufficient and necessary condi-
tions on the cost functions, to predict the positive correlation between the advertising intensity of












− LF ′2(n2j) = 0
(3.13)
14As long as this demand system generates constant mark-up between firms
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F ′2(n2j)(1 + σc)
(3.14)
Since we can show that the optimal choices for n1j and n2j are strictly increasing with the size
of the firm, we can easily derive conditions for which the advertising intensity of a firm will be

























Looking at these two conditions, what is important is that the relative slope of the cost function is
large enough in comparison with its degree of convexity. Intuitively, if marginal costs of advertising
increase too fast, then large firms will not invest as much in advertising, and therefore we will
observe a decreasing level of advertising intensity with its size. Importantly, the previous condition
will be more likely to hold when looking at expenditures in persuasive advertising. Since 1n1 > 1,
equation (3.16) is more likely to hold in comparison with equation (3.15). Therefore, a positive
correlation between size and advertising intensity is more likely to be predicted in a model of
persuasive advertising rather than one of informative advertising.
Previously in this paper, we chose a specific functional form for the cost function in order to
obtain a closed form solution for the advertising intensity. However, because we have derived equiv-
alent conditions, we are now able to predict a theoretical relationship between size and advertising
intensity for any type of function - as long as it is increasing and convex. In particular, we are
interested in the specific function derived in Arkolakis (2010). As previously mentioned, this paper
describes a model of informative advertising with heterogeneous firms. More interestingly, Arko-
lakis (2010), using a formulation from Butters (1977), derives a cost function of advertising based
on micro-foundations. Even if this functional form doesn’t allow us to obtain a closed form solution
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for the advertising problem, we can look at its prediction in terms of the advertising intensity / size




1−δ if δ 6= 1
−log(1− n) if δ = 1
(3.17)
Using this functional form, we can show that equation (3.15) does not hold, while equation (3.16)
holds for certain values of parameters. Details of these proofs are in appendix C.4. This means that
using this functional form, we would predict a negative correlation between size and advertising
intensity in a model of informative advertising,16 and an undetermined relationship in a model of
persuasive advertising.17
More generally, this emphasizes the fact that a model of informative advertising with heteroge-
neous firms would predict a negative or null correlation between the size of the firm and its adver-
tising intensity. The functional form of Arkolakis (2010) is an example of this. At my knowledge, I
could not find a convex and increasing function that satisfies the constraint (3.15).18 Consequently,
the assumptions made in our model regarding the cost function appears to be an extreme case,
since it generates an absence of correlation between advertising intensity and size.19 In a different
framework, Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) derives the optimal amount spent in advertising by a
firm. The context is however different because it assumes a strict complementarity between the
price of the input used and the amount invested in advertising. Nevertheless, their model predicts
a constant advertising intensity across heterogeneous firms.
Therefore, introducing persuasive advertising in a model with heterogeneous firms is a method
to generate an increasing advertising intensity with the size of the firm, a prediction that could not
be obtained when limiting the model to informative advertising. Moreover, I have shown that, when
driven by persuasive advertising, this positive correlation is emphasized by a parameter describing
15We refer to Arkolakis (2010) to obtain details on the construction of the function
16This explains why the model developed in Arkolakis (2010) predict a larger elasticity of sales for small firms
following a reduction in marginal costs: the growth rate is larger in small firms in this model because they spend a
larger share of their sales in advertising.
17Using an alternative function from Arkolakis (2010), F (n) = 1
1−n − 1, we can show that equation (3.15) will
never old, while equation (3.16) is equivalent to n < 1
2
18However, I did not manage to establish a proof for a contradiction between an increasing and convex function
defined on [0, 1] and equation (3.15)
19Using the cost functions from the previous section, we can check that equation (3.16) holds while (3.15) holds
with an equality.
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the scope for vertical differentiation of the product. In the next section, I return to the data in
order to precisely test my theory.
3.4 Testing the theory
The model presented in section 3 of this paper, shows that a model of informative advertising
cannot, under few assumptions, predict a positive correlation between a firm’s advertising intensity
and its size. It then showed that introducing persuasive advertising could generate this positive
relationship. However, this argument is not exclusive. In this section, we will show that the data
first provides specific support to a model of persuasive advertising, and secondly rejects alternative
mechanisms. In order to do so, we rely on the facts that our dataset provides information about
firms that operate within different industries. Using cross-sectional variations between industries, we
can identify the industries for which the theory predicts a stronger correlation between advertising
intensity and size.
3.4.1 Correlation between Advertising Intensity and Size
We start this section by examining more precisely the empirical pattern exposed in section 2.
We have shown that, within a defined industry, larger firms report larger advertising intensity
than smaller firms. Overall, it appears that this positive correlation brings support to a model of
persuasive advertising that would predict a positive link. It is important to note that I developed
my theoretical model in a framework where firms can only serve one market, and therefore optimally
choose to invest in advertising according to this unique market. In order to be certain that this
correlation holds when looking at firms operating within a single market, I reproduce the similar
procedure, but distinguish between exporting and non exporting firms. We know from recent trade
literature that exporters are on average larger than other firms (see Bernard, Jensen, and Lawrence
(1995) for instance). If, for reasons that we explore below, exporters spend larger shares of their sales
in advertising, they could generate the observed positive correlation between size and advertising
intensity.
Figure 3.3 aims to explore this possibility. We regress non parametrically the advertising inten-
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sity of the firm on its size.20 Figure 3.3(a) provides this for all plants whereas figure 3.3(b) only































































(b) Only advertising firms.
Figure 3.3: Nonparametric regressions for exporters and non exporters.
Notes: Advertising intensity is defined as the ratio of advertising expenditures over sales, expressed in percentages.
Employment is measured by the number of employees. Both variables are demeaned using industry × year fixed
effects. Exporters are defined as plant selling to at least one foreign country. The Kernel function used is of type
Epanechnikov and the bandwidth is set at 0.25.
We can see from figure 3.3 that the overall pattern is unchanged. Exporters and non exporters
both record a larger advertising intensity when their size increases. It appears that exporters are
more intensive in advertising - as it was observed in the summary statistics. But this higher intensity
does not appear to be consistently larger for all exporters, since very small and very large exporters
have similar level of advertising as non exporters.
In order to measure more precisely this link between advertising intensity and size, we reproduce
these regressions using parametric assumptions. Table 3.3 presents several parametric specifications
summarizing the findings from the previous nonparametric regressions. Regression (1) uses the
entire sample of plants while regression (2) only uses plants with positive advertising expenditures.
Finally, specifications (3)-(4) are similar to the first two, but add a alternate set of coefficients for
exporting firms.
20The demeaning of the variables is not done separately for exporters versus non exporters. Only the two different
samples (all firms and only advertising firms) are demeaned separately.
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Table 3.3: Regressions between advertising intensity and size
Advertising intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Employment) 0.35∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.041) (0.018) (0.030) (0.037) (0.046)








N 59398 29095 59398 29095 59398 29095
R2 0.298 0.333 0.299 0.335 0.298 0.333
Restrict. Sample No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, are clustered at the industry× year level. All regressions
include industry×year fixed effects. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
These results are consistent with the figures previously shown. The advertising intensity of a
firm increases with its size. Because specifications (1) and (2) provide similar results, this positive
correlation holds if we only consider an intensive increase of the advertising effort. Indeed, specifica-
tion (2) only considers firms with a positive effort in advertising. Quantitatively, using specification
(1), we can say that when doubling its size, a firm will observe an increase of its advertising intensity
of 0.35 percentage points.
Moreover, if exporters have a higher correlation between size and advertising intensity, this does
not explain the entire correlation between these two variables. Specifications (3) and (4) show this
because the result is robust when we allow a specific set of coefficients for exporting firms. However,
It might seem surprising that the dummy for exporters is negative. This implies that small exporters
spend less in advertising than small non exporters. However, This result is consistent with the theory.
If you assume that an exporter is equivalent to two smaller firms, with similar cost and product
but selling to two different markets, then it should behave similarly to smaller firms in terms of
advertising. Therefore, the exporter should select a smaller advertising intensity, consistent with its
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average revenue on a market. What the theory does not explain however, is why exporters increase
their advertising intensity at an higher rate than non exporters. The purpose of this paper is not
to explain this pattern, but we can still provide some intuitions. Recent literature in trade has
emphasized the role of quality to reach foreign markets. In particular, Verhoogen (2008) shows how
Mexican producers upgrade their product following a trade liberalization. The situation of Chilean
producers is probably similar to that of Mexican firms. Exporters may have a higher product
quality, explaining their activity abroad, and explaining a larger advertising intensity. Because we
see that only middle-size exporters have larger advertising intensities, this could describe plants,
whose production is mainly destined for abroad. This would explain a high quality and therefore a
high advertising intensity, in a medium-sized firm. Another potential explanation would come from
specific demand characteristics of exporters. If foreign consumers have a lower price-elasticity of
their demand, or are more receptive to persuasive advertising, my model predicts a steeper slope
between advertising intensity and size.
3.4.2 The role of vertical differentiation
In the previous section, I have shown that the correlation between size and advertising intensity






















We can see that this derivative is increasing in γ, a parameter describing the ability for a firm to
vertically differentiate its product through advertising. Therefore, the theory predicts that industries
with goods with a high ability of vertical differentiation should generate an higher heterogeneity
in terms of advertising intensity and therefore a larger correlation between size and advertising
intensity in this industry. I will test this theory by exploiting variations across industries.
Therefore, a first step consists of estimating, separately for each industry, the correlation between
advertising intensity and size. I do this by estimating, for each industry separately, the specifications
(1) and (2) in Table 3.3. I use both the entire sample of plants and the restricted sample, only
containing firms who report positive expenditures of advertising. I therefore obtain coefficients δ̂1i
and δ̂2i for each industry - related to specifications (1) and (2) in Table 3.3 - that estimates the
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derivative ∂Aj∂logRj .
A second step will aim to relate these estimates with the degree of vertical differentiation of
the industry. In order to do so, we rely on the recent literature in International Trade and Indus-
trial Organization to measure the potential for vertical differentiation at the industry-level. Sutton
(2001) provides such a measure that has been recently exploited in order to characterize the degree
of vertical differentiation of industries (see Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) in particular). This index
describes the scope for vertical differentiation, based on measures of R&D and advertising expendi-
tures at the industry level in the US. Because this measure is using information about advertising,
we need to be careful about the possibility for this variable to be mechanically related with our
advertising/size relationship measured at the industry-level. However, our estimates of ∂Aj∂logRj de-
scribe the slope of the relationship between advertising intensity and size. By definition, they will
be orthogonal to the intercepts in our regressions, this intercept being the parameter describing the
importance of advertising expenditures in the industry.
A more recent measure of vertical differentiation is from Khandelwal (2010). By setting a
structural model of demand at the product level, Khandelwal (2010) is able to estimate a quality
measure of the imports to the US, depending on their country of origins. Once this quality is
inferred, he can measure the quality ladder for a specific product, by comparing the highest quality
with the lowest quality. Therefore, this gap between these qualities arguably is a good proxy for
the vertical differentiation at the product-level.
Figure 3.4 presents the results of this procedure. The left axis displays the estimated δs while
the bottom axis describes our measure of vertical differentiation. The top panels used the Sutton
index as a measure of vertical differentiation, while the bottom ones describe the same figure using
the quality ladder measure. I show results that use estimates from the entire sample (panels on the
left-hand side) and the restricted sample (on the right side). Moreover, I add a line on each figure
representing the least squares regression between the two variables. Because this regression is based
on aggregated measures, I weight each observation at the industry-level by the total employment in
this industry.
In figure 3.4 we see a strong correlation between the estimated advertising/size relationship
and the measure of vertical differentiation by Sutton. This relationship is statistically significant
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(d) Only advertising firms and quality ladder measure.
Figure 3.4: Scatterplots between estimated advertising/size relationship and vertical differentia-
tion.
115
appear to be significantly related with our coefficients estimated at the industry-level. In order to
inspect this relationship further, I rerun the regression estimated in the previous sections, allowing
a heterogeneous slope between advertising intensity and size, depending on the degree of vertical
differentiation of the industry. In order to do so, I interact the logarithm of employment with
the measures of vertical differentiations (previously demeaned). This procedure has the advantage
of avoiding problems in the estimation of standard errors in a two-stage procedure. Results are
presented in Table 3.4 for the entire sample, and for the restricted sample, which only includes firms
with positive advertising expenditures.
Table 3.4: Advertising intensity/Employment relationship with interacted variables
Advertising intensity
All firms Only advertising firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Employment) 0.35∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.025) (0.032) (0.041) (0.038) (0.049)
Sutton× log(Emp) 9.55∗∗∗ 11.0∗∗∗
(0.90) (1.03)
Ladder× log(Emp) 0.21∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.080)
N 59398 46881 44214 29095 22845 23310
R2 0.298 0.333 0.308 0.333 0.366 0.343
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, are clustered at the industry×year level. All regressions
include industry×year fixed effects. Both interacted variables are centered around their mean
before interaction. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The results support the theory in all specifications: a high scope for vertical differentiation boosts
the relationship between advertising intensity and the logarithm of employment. This is true when
considering both the comprehensive and the restricted samples, but also for each measure of vertical
differentiation. The ability of a product to be vertically differentiated increases the profitability for
firms to use persuasive advertising, generating a stronger correlation between size and advertising
intensity.
Even though these last results have shown that a larger vertical differentiation generates a steeper
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slope between advertising intensity and size, it appears necessary to show that this correlation cannot
be generated by other mechanisms than the one described in my theoretical model. In particular, I
consider three alternative explanations that could generate a similar patterns: the role of horizontal
differentiation first, a dynamic extension of the model secondly, and finally a heterogeneity in terms
of cost instead of quality. In the next section, I describe these three mechanisms and show how they
are not consistent with the observed data.
3.4.3 Alternative explanations
Horizontal versus Vertical Differentiation The Sutton index is based on recorded spendings
in R&D and Advertising at the industry-level. Therefore, besides capturing the scope for vertical
differentiation, it also measures the degree of horizontal differentiation within an industry. Following
Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) that is confronted with the same issue, I will use two measures of
horizontal differentiation to test if they are similarly related with the advertising/size link at the
industry-level. First of all, I will use the Rauch (1999) index, measuring the degree of differentiation
of a product. In addition, I will use a modified version of the Gollop and Monahan (1991) index,
modified by Bernard and Jensen (2007). This index describes the similarity between input shares
of plants operating in the same industry.
With these different measures of differentiation at the industry-level in hand, we can proceed
as previously described, by adding interacted terms. This will show how these characteristics affect
the slope between advertising intensity and the logarithm of employment. Results are displayed in
Table 3.5.
We can see from table 3.5 that neither of these two measures of horizontal differentiation has a
positive impact on the slope between advertising intensity and size. The Gollop and Mohanan index
has a significant but negative impact on this slope. This result is robust when we restrict the sample
to firms that spend positive amounts in advertising. Therefore, horizontal differentiation cannot
explain why the Sutton measure is positively correlated with the advertising/size relationship. This
confirms the point made earlier regarding the role of vertical differentiation in generating more
heterogeneity across firms in their advertising intensity.
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Table 3.5: Advertising/size relationship: Vertical vs Horizontal differentiation
Advertising intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Employment) 0.40∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.032) (0.033) (0.035) (0.027) (0.041)
Sutton× log(Emp) 9.55∗∗∗ 9.65∗∗∗
(0.90) (0.90)
Ladder× log(Emp) 0.21∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.075)
G-M× log(Emp) -0.55∗∗∗ -0.024 -0.61∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.081) (0.17)
Rauch× log(Emp) -0.0067 -0.11∗∗ 0.10∗
(0.051) (0.038) (0.052)
N 46881 44214 46881 46881 46881 34478
R2 0.333 0.308 0.305 0.304 0.333 0.315
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, are clustered at the industry×year level. All regressions
include industry×year fixed effects. All interacted variables are centered around their mean before
interaction. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Survival probability and advertising investment When thinking about advertising expen-
ditures, one could think of a dynamic model where firms invest each period in advertising in order
to receive benefits today or in the future. In this framework, another hypothesis could explain why
small firms report low advertising intensity relatively to large firms: an heterogeneity in term of
survival rates.
To illustrate this, we should consider only two periods, the firm selecting its stock of consumers n1j
in the first period and receiving a quality shock on qj in the second period. Due to the existence of
fixed costs of production, the firm will stop producing in the second period if its quality is below a
threshold q̄. Formally, the value of the firm is





















Imposing a stochastic structure for the process of quality, we can obtain a closed form solution
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for the expected profit in period 2. Assuming qj2 = qj1 + uj where uj → N(0, v), we obtain
the optimal choice of n1j , given the initial quality of the product, and the associated advertising
































We can see that we obtain the similar result as previously in the absence of endogenous exit.
If the probability of exit is zero for each firm, we obtain a constant advertising intensity across
firm. However, when there is a possibility of endogenous exit, firms close to the quality threshold
will reduce their investment in advertising because of a non-zero probability to lose their capital
accumulated in the second period. Consequently, if we see the stock of consumers as an asset
that persists over time, the existence of endogenous exit can generate higher advertising intensity
for larger firms relative to smaller firms. And this pattern has been generated with a model of
informative advertising without any use of persuasive advertising.
Therefore, if vertically differentiated industries appear to have heterogeneous exit rates across
their firms, this mechanism could explain the statistical relationships observed earlier. In order to
show that this is not found in the data, I employ the following strategy: I start by measuring in each
industry how the probability of exit is related to the size of the firm. To do so, I estimate a logistic
model explaining the survival probability in the next period by the size of the firm (measured by
the logarithm of employment). Therefore, the coefficient obtained for this variable measures the
heterogeneity of survival rate across firms in this industry : the bigger this coefficient, the larger
is the survival rate for large firms relative to small firms. Having this measure of selection at the
industry-level in hand, I can use it as an interacted variable to measure how it affects the slope
between advertising intensity and size. I can then check that the introduction of this interacted
variable does not affect the patterns previously presented. Results are displayed in table 3.6 using,
once again, the full and restricted sample of firms.
The introduction of this new control variable does not affect the results previously presented.
First, the introduction of this selection variable seems to contradict the mechanism of dynamic
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Table 3.6: The role of heterogeneous survival rates.
Advertising intensity
All firms Only advertising firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Employment) 0.35∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.025) (0.032) (0.041) (0.039) (0.048)
Selection×log(Emp) -0.055∗ -0.072 -0.032 -0.17∗∗ -0.33∗ -0.12∗
(0.024) (0.084) (0.022) (0.056) (0.14) (0.049)
Sutton× log(Emp) 9.50∗∗∗ 10.8∗∗∗
(0.91) (1.06)
Ladder× log(Emp) 0.21∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.080)
N 59398 46881 44214 29095 22845 23310
R2 0.298 0.333 0.308 0.333 0.367 0.343
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, are clustered at the industry×year level. All regressions
include industry×year fixed effects. All interacted variables are centered around their mean before
interaction. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
advertising. The interacted variable Selection×log(Emp.) appears to have a slightly negative effect
on the advertising/size relationship. Secondly, it does not affect the positive signs obtained for the
variable of vertical differentiation.
Overall, we can reject a mechanism of dynamic advertising as explaining the observed positive
correlation between the size of a firms and its advertising intensity.
Cost heterogeneity versus Quality heterogeneity When developing my theoretical model, I
have assumed that the only heterogeneity across firms comes from heterogeneous quality of their
product. Therefore, I have opted for a quality version of the framework described in Melitz (2003),
instead of a cost or productivity version of this model. Looking back to our model of advertising
previously exposed, a heterogeneity in cost generates a heterogeneity in advertising intensity. Recall
from equation (3.11) that in a simple model of informative advertising, we can write the advertising
intensity of a firm, whose cost is cj , as Aj = 1α(1+σcj) . Therefore, if firms are larger due to lower costs,
they would be more intensive in advertising since Aj is decreasing in cj . Because we have shown that
this relationship is stronger in vertically differentiated industries, this would indicate that the cost
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advantage of large firms should be larger in those industries. However, Kugler and Verhoogen (2012)
have recently shown that, within an industry, output and input prices are increasing with the size of
the firm on average. Moreover, this correlation is stronger in industries with a large scope for vertical
differentiation. Therefore, this would predict a negative correlation between size and advertising
intensity, even more so in vertically differentiated industries. These predictions are strongly rejected
by the empirical evidences presented above. We can therefore reject cost heterogeneity as being the
mechanism explaining this heterogeneity in terms of advertising intensity.
3.5 Concluding remarks
The data brings to light a clear pattern : firms spend a larger share of their sales when they
are bigger. This is even more the case in industries where there is a larger scope for vertical
differentiation. In this paper, I built on Arkolakis (2010) a model of advertising with heterogeneous
firms, that is consistent with these observed patterns. A necessary condition to predict a positive
correlation between advertising intensity and size is to allow firms to affect the valuation of their
products through advertising, what the literature in Industrial Organization describes as persuasive
advertising.
The use of an advertising of type persuasive by the firms opens the door of numerous theoretical
predictions, that could explain empirical patterns unexplained so far, such as the dispersion in
prices across destinations. As highlighted in the introduction, by affecting consumer preferences,
persuasive advertising could explain the existence of heterogeneity in term of prices, that cannot
be accounted by models using productivity as a source of heterogeneity. Literature about firms’
behaviors has often put productivity as the main determinant of firms activity. Similarly, R&D was
a way for a firm to affect this productivity. Recent literature has shown the importance of quality,
and developed models of endogenous quality through the choice of inputs (see Kugler and Verhoogen
(2012) for instance). However, a model in which consumers’ preferences are endogenously affected
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Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Constructions of the samples
The dataset used in the paper is initially disaggregated at the monthly level. From this raw dataset,
a number of steps are implemented to improve the reliability and consistency of the data. First, I
describe the operations implemented for the first empirical exercise, that uses a wide set of products.
Then, I describe the procedures implemented to obtain the final sample used in the structural
estimation.
A.1.1 Data appendix for the reduced-form exercise
I implement two important steps to prepare the data for the regressions displayed in the reduced-
form exercise. First, I clean outliers and product categories that do not provide a meaningful and
consistent unit of count across years. Second, I correct for the partial-year bias.
Cleaning and harmonization I make three different operations to clean the dataset from po-
tential outliers or measurement errors.
• First, I use the algorithm from Pierce and Schott (2012) and Van Beveren, Bernard, and
Vandenbussche (2012) to account for changes in product categories at the eight digit level.
This algorithm allows me to obtain categories that are consistent across the sample years
(1996-2010).
• Second, I drop product categories that meet one of the following criteria:
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– the counting unit is changing across years.
– the counting unit is not identical within the category (because of the previous step, the
current product category can contain eight digit categories with different units).
– the counting unit is weight. The reason for this exclusion relies on the use of weight for
many categories as the default unit. While this can be a relevant unit for some goods, it
is often used for product categories that gather non homogeneous product.
• Finally, because unit values, constructed as export values divided by quantities, are a source
of measurement errors, I winsorize them at the eight-digit product category×country×year
level. Specifically, I set at the values of the 5th and 95th percentiles the prices that are beyond
these two thresholds.
Correction for partial-year bias As described in Berthou and Vicard (2015) and Bernard,
Massari, Reyes, and Taglioni (2014), a firm will sell less in average during its first calendar year as
exporter. This is because calendar years do not necessarily match the beginning of the exporting
activity. In order to correct for this potential bias, I reconstruct the dataset to align calendar
exporting years of each exporter. The idea is to define a new year for each spell of export, setting
the first month of this year as representative of a regular year, and constructing exporting spells
based on this new starting month.
Specifically, the following procedure is applied to each firm-destination-product triplet: for the
earliest observation in 1996, if no observation is seen in 1995, a new spell is defined: the month of
this first flow is probabilistically drawn based on the number of flows observed during the following
12 months. Then, the year is set to 1996 or 1997 depending on whether the initial month is earlier
or later than July. The following observations are adjusted accordingly to preserve the duration
between monthly export flows, as long as there is no discontinuity in the exporting activity according
to the newly defined calendar years. In case of discontinuity, the next observation becomes a new
reference point, and the same procedure is applied for this observation and the following ones.
Once this adjustment is implemented, I aggregate the data at the yearly-level. Specifically, I
sum values exported within each newly created calendar year at the firm-product-category level.
Moreover, I obtain yearly prices using an export-weighted average of monthly prices. In case of
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missing prices, I assume a weight of zero for this observation. If this observation is the only
observation within a firm-destination-product- year combination, I drop all the observations within
the firm-destination-product triplet.
This procedure leaves me with sales and prices measured at the firm-product-destination-year
level, with no missing observation in prices, and adjusted for the existence of partial-year of export-
ing.
A.1.2 Data appendix for the structural estimation
The procedure to clean the data for the structural estimation is different than the reduced-form
exercise. I describe in this subsection the choice of the wine industry and the set of destinations I
use for implementing my estimation. Then, I describe the cleaning procedure implemented on the
wine producers and provide summary statistics on the final sample of firms used in the estimation.
Wine industry
The decision to implement this estimation on wine exporters relies on two constraints. First of all,
I study the entry decision made at the firm level. This level of analysis is explained by the fact
that brands and reputation are often defined by the firm that produces the good. Therefore, this
requires to study firms that display a small level of heterogeneity in terms of goods. A car producer
for instance, that also exports car pieces, or engines for other vehicles, is difficult to analyze as a
single-product firm. However, a wine producer mostly export wines, and specifically bottles of wine,
whose prices are easy to define, and aggregate at the firm level. For these reasons when defining my
sample, I will exclusively use wine producers that do not export any other goods outside of wine.
A large share of the trade in wine is made by wholesalers who export other types of items, and for
which the study at the level of the firm is irrelevant. In addition to this homogeneity constraint,
my estimation procedure requires enough firms which export to several destinations. As a major
exporting industry from France, the wine industry meets both of these conditions: a large number
of exporters, exporting a precisely defined good.
In addition to imposing restrictions on the set of firms included in the final sample, I only use
a restricted set of destinations.
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Selection of destinations
I select 15 different destinations on which I analyze the behaviors of French exporters. These
destinations have been selected among the 20 most popular destinations for wine exports from
France, excluding countries with large import/export platforms such as Denmark and Singapore,
while reflecting some heterogeneity in terms of location. Moreover, I divide these destinations in
three groups, for which I will estimate different entry and fixed costs of exporting, as well as different
trend in aggregate demand. The list of these destinations can be found in table A.1.
Table A.1: List of destination countries included in the structural sample
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Europe Americas Asia/Oceania
Great-Britain Germany Belgium (Brazil) Australia
Netherlands Italy Spain Canada China
Ireland Sweden Switzerland United States Japan
Note that I do not include Brazil in the structural sample. The observations related to this
destination will be used in the out-of-sample exercise and are excluded so that it does not affect the
estimation procedure.
Aggregation
Because the estimation is conducted at the firm-destination-year level, it is necessary to aggregate
the sales and quantities exported across products exported by the firm. The choice of the wine
industry is crucial here since bottles of wines are quantities that can be easily aggregated. An
industry producing differentiated goods would have made this aggregation less straightforward.















whereHfdt is the number of 8-digit observations for each firm-destination-year triplet. Moreover,
note that there is a certain number of missing quantities in the data. Therefore, I assign a weight
wfhdt equal to zero to the observations that have quantities or values exported equal to one or zero.
When this observation is the only one at the firm-destination-year level (no other product is sent
to this market by this firm this year), I dropped all the observations related to this firm from the
sample.
Partial-year bias
Similar to the sample used in the reduced form exercise, I will correct for the partial-year bias, by
redefining the entry months of all entering exporters. As a consequence, I shift all the subsequent
flows to maintain the same sequence in the exports of the firm. Therefore, exports during the first
year will look similar to the subsequent years of exporting.
Cleaning
I clean the data to avoid the potential existence of outliers in prices. In order to do so, I run
a regression of the logarithm of prices, on sets of time, destinations and firm-specific dummies.
Formally, I estimate
log pfdt = αf + βd + γt + εfdt
and I define log p̂fdt = α̂f + β̂d + γ̂t. Therefore I can flag prices that deviate from these predicted
prices. In particular, I consider outliers prices that deviate from a factor 2 of its predicted value
(pfdt > 2p̂fdt or pfdt < 1/2p̂fdt). As a cleaning procedure, I dropped all the observations of a firm
which has at least one outlier among its observations.
Finally, a last criterion for a firm to be included in the final sample is based on the number
of observations. Many firms export one year to one market during the sample period, and this
does not provide enough information to analyze their exporting behavior. Therefore, I only keep
firms that recorded at least 15 exporting events. Note that with 14 destinations and 14 years of
data, the maximum number of observations by a given firm is 196. This selection process could
present a problem as it is likely to affect the estimates of entry and fixed costs of exporting, by only
looking at successful firms. However, this procedure will tend to select firms that survive several
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years, rather than short-lived exporters: as a consequence, it will tend to go against the theory
of consumer accumulation that can accommodate small and short-lived exporters relative to the
standard model.
Final sample
Once these cleaning steps were implemented, I randomly sampled 200 firms among the set of firms
available. Moreover, in order to have enough exporters that have activity in Brazil, and conduct
the out-of-sample predictions exercise, I required that 100 of these 200 firms have some exporting
activity in Brazil during the sample period.
Table A.2: Description of the sample used in the structural estimation
Statistics: pc5 median pc95 mean N
# observations per firm 15 36.5 97.5 44.2 200
av. # destinations per firm-year 1.65 3.64 8.29 4.16 2118
av. # years per firm-destination 2.5 5 9.5 5.29 1626
Table A.2 provides information regarding the number of observations provided by the sampled
firms, as well as the number of destinations they export to in an average year. One can see that the
firms selected are relatively large, with a minimum number of export episodes equal to 15 by the
sampling procedure. However, the median firm only records 29 export episodes, while the maximum
number of episodes in the dataset is 196 (14×14). Moreover, they are relatively diversified in terms
of destinations since the median firm exports to 3.11 destinations in an average year.
In order to inspect how this sampling procedure affects the trajectories of the exporters, I
replicate the regressions on age dummies I perform in section 1.2. Figure A.1 reports the results
of these regressions for sales, prices and survival rates.1 The patterns of sales and prices are very
similar to the ones observed using the comprehensive sample: sales appear to increase in the early
years, with the an average growth rate of 30 percent the first year. Meanwhile, the variations in
prices are small and insignificant across ages. However, we can see that the survival rates in the
structural sample are larger than the ones displayed in the exhaustive data. While the survival rate
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Note: destination-year fixed effects included in all regressions.
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Figure A.1: Sales, prices and survival rates across ages (Wine producers)
Notes: The figure reports the average log sales, log prices and survival rates of wine producers in a destination at
different ages. The estimates are obtained from the regression of these dependent variables on a set of age dummies and
destination×year fixed effects. The age in a destination is defined as the number of years a firm has been successively
exporting to this country. 95 percent confidence intervals are constructed using standard errors estimates clustered
at the firm-destination level.
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was close to 35 percent in the full sample, it is around 60 percent in this restricted sample. This
arises because of the requirement made during the selection of exporters: because the estimation
procedure requires firms with several observations, this tends to eliminate firms with very large
attrition rates that do not records many episodes of exporting activity. Note that this difference
in survival rates between exhaustive and restricted samples will play against the story I develop in
this paper. Large attrition rates will be consistent with a story that emphasizes strong dependence
in demand rather than an important role for sunk costs of entry.
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Table A.3: Age regressions using the structural sample
No fixed effects Year x destination fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log sales Log prices Survival rates Log sales Log prices Survival rates
Age 2 0.407∗∗∗ -0.0199 0.126∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ -0.0343∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.0344) (0.0165) (0.0163) (0.0358) (0.0161) (0.0165)
Age 3 0.662∗∗∗ -0.0254 0.174∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ -0.0712∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.0439) (0.0221) (0.0172) (0.0457) (0.0214) (0.0177)
Age 4 0.860∗∗∗ -0.0295 0.187∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗ -0.0886∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
(0.0526) (0.0270) (0.0188) (0.0548) (0.0270) (0.0196)
Age 5 0.902∗∗∗ -0.0200 0.243∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗ -0.0948∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.0619) (0.0336) (0.0191) (0.0658) (0.0334) (0.0200)
Age 6 0.993∗∗∗ -0.0339 0.255∗∗∗ 1.006∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.0690) (0.0392) (0.0204) (0.0760) (0.0400) (0.0216)
Age 7 1.006∗∗∗ -0.0706 0.246∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗
(0.0791) (0.0437) (0.0225) (0.0886) (0.0466) (0.0240)
Age 8 1.053∗∗∗ -0.0767 0.259∗∗∗ 1.056∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗
(0.0935) (0.0497) (0.0242) (0.102) (0.0562) (0.0266)
Age 9 1.333∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 1.298∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.0519) (0.0214) (0.117) (0.0645) (0.0234)
Age 10 1.403∗∗∗ -0.128∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 1.405∗∗∗ -0.240∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.0568) (0.0243) (0.138) (0.0704) (0.0280)
Age 11 1.281∗∗∗ -0.105 0.268∗∗∗ 1.309∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.0632) (0.0352) (0.158) (0.0830) (0.0368)
Age 12 1.455∗∗∗ -0.105 0.380∗∗∗ 1.576∗∗∗ -0.252∗ 0.389∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.0774) (0.0108) (0.201) (0.100) (0.0225)
Age 13 1.199∗∗∗ -0.0416 0.199 1.279∗∗∗ -0.196 0.191
(0.232) (0.118) (0.117) (0.269) (0.146) (0.126)
Age 14 1.608∗∗ -0.429∗ . 1.708∗∗ -0.678∗∗ .
(0.558) (0.208) . (0.589) (0.254) .
Constant 8.751∗∗∗ 2.034∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗ 8.762∗∗∗ 2.073∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗
(0.0314) (0.0214) (0.0108) (0.0349) (0.0216) (0.0111)
Observations 7525 7525 6821 7525 7525 6821
R2 0.092 0.002 0.060 0.175 0.172 0.121
Notes: Firm x destination clustered standard errors between parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***
p<0.001
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A.2 Additional age regressions
In this section, I describe alternative specifications to look at the correlation between sales or prices
and age in an export market.
A.2.1 Additional specifications
Firm-destination-product fixed effects
A natural way to control for heterogeneity across firms, which could drive the correlation across




δτ1(agefpdt = τ) + µpdt + µfpd + εfdt.
However, including this set of fixed effects will make it impossible to identify a trend in prices
across ages. To understand why, first consider a sample of firms on a given market pdt. Because of
the market-level fixed effect, their average price is normalized to zero. Now consider this same set
of firms a year later. If none of these firms exited, it means that their average price is normalized
to zero. More generally, the fact that age is a treatment that is homogenous across firms makes the
identification of any trend impossible. However, because in the data, some firms will exit the market,
it means that this treatment is not entirely symmetrical across firms, such that some identification
is possible. But this identification will entirely rely on firms that exit and re-enter, with an age that
will be one in the future. As a consequence, the inclusion of this set of fixed effects will not control
for selection, but instead will make the entry and exit of firms the only source of identification.
Figures A.2 and A.3 report the results of this specification for sales and prices. As we can see, even
sales are not increasing with age with this specification.
Identification across destinations
An alternative way to identify an increase in sales and prices across age is to compare similar prod-
ucts sold to different destinations, and, therefore, having different export experiences. In terms of
specifications, it means including a set of firm-product fixed effects such that the variation identify-
















2 4 6 8 10
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Point estimates 95% confidence interval
Figure A.2: Sales across export ages, within variation
Notes: The figure reports the cumulative growth of sales compared to age one, of a firm-product category pair in
a destination at different ages. The regression uses logarithm of sales as dependent variable, and includes product
category×destination×year and firm×product category×destination fixed effects. The age in a destination is defined
as the number of years a firm-product pair has been successively exporting to this country. 95 percent confidence
intervals are constructed using standard errors clustered at the firm-product-destination level.
problematic since it compares old destinations, for which the firms has chosen to export first, and
young destinations that have been chosen more recently by the firm. Therefore, it is not clear
that the age across these flows are the only differences. To verify this claim, I run the following




δτ1(agefpdt = τ) + µpdt + µfp + εfdt
We can see that all figures maintain the increasing in trends of sales and prices, even though
price regressions are not as significant as in the main specification. However, one can see that
the endogenous sorting of the destinations seem to play a role in shaping this relationship: using
a constant set of firms tends to increase the growth in sales. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine
that this specification accounts for the dynamic selection across age, but instead could pick up the
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Figure A.3: Prices across export ages, within variation
Notes: The figure reports the cumulative growth of prices compared to age one, of a firm-product category pair in
a destination at different ages. The regression uses logarithm of sales as dependent variable, and includes product
category×destination×year and firm×product category×destination fixed effects. The age in a destination is defined
as the number of years a firm-product pair has been successively exporting to this country. 95 percent confidence
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Figure A.4: Sales across export ages, across destinations
Notes: The figure reports the cumulative growth of sales compared to age one, of a firm-product category pair in
a destination at different ages. The regression uses logarithm of sales as dependent variable, and includes product
category×destination×year and firm×product category fixed effects. The age in a destination is defined as the
number of years a firm-product pair has been successively exporting to this country. 95 percent confidence intervals
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Point estimates 95% confidence interval
Figure A.5: Prices across export ages, across destinations
Notes: The figure reports the cumulative growth of sales compared to age one, of a firm-product category pair in
a destination at different ages. The regression uses logarithm of prices as dependent variable, and includes product
category×destination×year and firm×product category fixed effects. The age in a destination is defined as the
number of years a firm-product pair has been successively exporting to this country. 95 percent confidence intervals
are constructed using standard errors clustered at the firm-product level.
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A.2.2 Tables of results
Table A.4: Age regressions (main specification)
All products Products surviving 10 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Survival rates Log sales Log prices Log sales Log prices
Age 2 0.215∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗ 0.0207∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.0148
(0.000675) (0.00214) (0.00112) (0.0162) (0.0105)
Age 3 0.304∗∗∗ 0.961∗∗∗ 0.0323∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.0304∗∗
(0.000854) (0.00317) (0.00151) (0.0242) (0.0112)
Age 4 0.354∗∗∗ 1.240∗∗∗ 0.0470∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.0497∗∗∗
(0.00101) (0.00418) (0.00189) (0.0325) (0.0122)
Age 5 0.380∗∗∗ 1.465∗∗∗ 0.0599∗∗∗ 0.751∗∗∗ 0.0704∗∗∗
(0.00118) (0.00525) (0.00229) (0.0410) (0.0134)
Age 6 0.402∗∗∗ 1.645∗∗∗ 0.0645∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗ 0.0795∗∗∗
(0.00137) (0.00652) (0.00274) (0.0496) (0.0143)
Age 7 0.407∗∗∗ 1.808∗∗∗ 0.0771∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗ 0.0948∗∗∗
(0.00160) (0.00800) (0.00330) (0.0581) (0.0153)
Age 8 0.419∗∗∗ 1.928∗∗∗ 0.0836∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.00186) (0.00973) (0.00401) (0.0665) (0.0163)
Age 9 0.434∗∗∗ 2.051∗∗∗ 0.0855∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.00215) (0.0118) (0.00483) (0.0752) (0.0174)
Age 10 0.446∗∗∗ 2.142∗∗∗ 0.0891∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.00255) (0.0144) (0.00574) (0.0840) (0.0185)
Constant 0.334∗∗∗ 7.797∗∗∗ 3.799∗∗∗ 9.020∗∗∗ 3.185∗∗∗
(0.000290) (0.00120) (0.000641) (0.0431) (0.0107)
Observations 5311968 5722216 6241358 357751 364700
R2 0.329 0.439 0.871 0.555 0.918
Notes: Firm x product x destination clustered standard errors between parentheses. Year x product x destinations
fixed effects are included in all regressions. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A.5: Age regressions with alternative specifications
Firm x product f.e. Firm x product x dest. f.e.
All products Prod. surviving 10 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log sales Log prices Log sales Log prices Log sales Log prices
Age 2 0.244∗∗∗ 0.000369 0.384∗∗∗ 0.00570 0.0230∗∗∗ -0.00432∗∗∗
(0.00231) (0.000934) (0.0207) (0.00619) (0.00207) (0.000836)
Age 3 0.493∗∗∗ 0.00450∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.00760 0.0901∗∗∗ -0.00401∗∗∗
(0.00347) (0.00130) (0.0330) (0.00970) (0.00304) (0.00114)
Age 4 0.664∗∗∗ 0.00927∗∗∗ 0.912∗∗∗ 0.0137 0.0995∗∗∗ -0.00421∗∗
(0.00459) (0.00167) (0.0458) (0.0128) (0.00398) (0.00145)
Age 5 0.802∗∗∗ 0.0102∗∗∗ 1.107∗∗∗ 0.0214 0.0903∗∗∗ -0.00613∗∗∗
(0.00577) (0.00205) (0.0582) (0.0161) (0.00498) (0.00177)
Age 6 0.911∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗∗ 1.237∗∗∗ 0.0175 0.0689∗∗∗ -0.00959∗∗∗
(0.00704) (0.00240) (0.0706) (0.0193) (0.00609) (0.00211)
Age 7 1.002∗∗∗ 0.0180∗∗∗ 1.339∗∗∗ 0.0197 0.0393∗∗∗ -0.00617∗
(0.00845) (0.00279) (0.0825) (0.0225) (0.00731) (0.00250)
Age 8 1.077∗∗∗ 0.0172∗∗∗ 1.420∗∗∗ 0.0259 0.00299 -0.00958∗∗
(0.0105) (0.00332) (0.0949) (0.0257) (0.00883) (0.00297)
Age 9 1.180∗∗∗ 0.0179∗∗∗ 1.476∗∗∗ 0.0304 0.00423 -0.0122∗∗∗
(0.0124) (0.00403) (0.107) (0.0290) (0.0105) (0.00349)
Age 10 1.258∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 1.412∗∗∗ 0.0193 -0.0287∗ -0.0159∗∗∗
(0.0147) (0.00492) (0.119) (0.0322) (0.0125) (0.00411)
Constant 7.994∗∗∗ 3.812∗∗∗ 8.631∗∗∗ 3.241∗∗∗ 8.184∗∗∗ 3.817∗∗∗
(0.00117) (0.000445) (0.0603) (0.0167) (0.00109) (0.000412)
Observations 5722216 6241358 357751 364700 5722216 6241358
R2 0.716 0.960 0.817 0.979 0.873 0.983
Notes: Firm x product x destination clustered standard errors between parentheses. Year x product x destinations
and firm x products fixed effects are included in all regressions. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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A.3 Details of the algorithm
I describe in this section of the appendix the MCMC algorithm I implement. I start by describing
how the Markov chain is initialized, before describing a given iteration of the chain, involving the
update of the unobservables and parameters.
A.3.1 Initial values
I start by describing how the unobservables are obtained, before describing the initial parameters.
I start by setting an initial value of 2.2 for σ,2 that allows me to obtain log sfdt +σpfdt = log nfdt +
Xdt+λft. I can then decompose this term using firm-year and destination-year fixed effect. In order




ft . This allows me to obtain α
(0), and the
residual is regressed on firm-year fixed effects to obtain φ(0)ft . Having in hand initial values for the
unobservables, I can use linear regressions to obtain the AR(1) coefficients for the unobservables,




2 after arbitrarily setting ψ
(0) = 0.5.
Finally, I set values for the fixed costs parameters, and the variance parameter of the fixed cost
shocks. I arbitrary set f (0) = fe(0) = s(0)v = 1 000 for the three different groups of countries.
After setting these initial values, I implement 5000 iterations that does not account for the
dynamic problem of the firm. Therefore, I sample unobservables and parameters assuming a constant
mark-up and only taking advantage of the realized sales and prices. This step allows me to obtain
initial conditions for the parameters and unobservables that are closer to their true values, although
biased because they do not account for the dynamic problem.
Given this initial set of parameters and unobservables, I can start the iterative procedure de-
scribed below.
A.3.2 Creation of the grid
In order to solve for the value function as a function of Θ, I need to create a grid describing the
state space of the problem. Note that the state space is made of (λ, φ, n,X). Consequently, I
need a grid that is relatively more precise for values of the unobservables that are more prevalent.
Consequently, I create the four-dimensional grid as following
2I set σ = 2.2, which is the elasticity obtained by Broda and Weinstein (2006) for the wine industry. Note that I
will keep this value constant through the estimation.
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• λg ∼ N(0, 5 std(λ(0)ft ))
• φg ∼ N(0, 5 std(φ(0)ft ))
• Xg ∼ N(0, 5 std(X(0)ft ))
• ng ∼ U [n(0) ; 1]
Note that this grid will be updated every 500 iterations using current unobservables, such that
the grid will follow the potential change in the distribution of the unobservables. I will set the size
of the grid to be 30 on each dimension, such that the value function will be iterated at 304 different
grid points.
A.3.3 Iteration
Three different objects will be updated at each iteration of the Markov Chain:























In the next paragraphs, I describe each of these following steps. I start by describing the step
that aims to compute the value functions since they define objects that are used in the other steps.
I then turn to the sampling of unobservables, and the sampling of parameters.
Update of the value function The value functions are obtained from the Bellman equation,
iterated from the previous iteration of the value functions. However, since the value function





. Knowing this nearest neighbor Θ(h), and its associated value function
V (ξg, ng,Θ
(h)), I can iterate the value function the following way:
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EV (ξg, n0, 0)
)]
(A.1)
with EV (ξg, n, I) =
∑
ξ ∈ ξg V (ξ, n, I,Θ
(h)) Pξ(ξ | ξg)∑
ξ ∈ ξg Pξ(ξ | ξg)
,
Pξ(.|.) being the transition probability of the unobservables at the current parameters. In prac-
tice, I can iterate several times the Bellman equation, in order to reduce the error coming from the
choice of a nearest neighbor instead of the exact parameter. In this case, I iterate not using the
m-th value function anymore, but the current value function and its grid.
In addition to updating the value function, I will define two objects based on the recently
updated value functions, that will be used in the sampling of parameters and unobservables. First,
I will save the optimal future share of consumer chosen by the firm. This object, evaluated on the
grid, will be defined as
n∗g ≡ n′∗(ξg, ng) = argmax
{
Eεπ(ξg, ng, n




Second, I will create the difference in expected value functions, DEV (), that will be defined as
DEV (ξg, ng) = EV (ξg, n
∗
g, 1)− EV (ξg, n0, 0).
This object will be convenient when computing the difference in value functions for each firm.
These new value functions are stored in the history of the value functions for later use in
the algorithm. The functions n∗() and DEV () will be used in the next iteration to sample the
unobservables.
Sampling of unobservables The marginal density of the unobservables (λ, φ or X) is made of
three parts:
• the unconditional distribution of the unobservables,
• the entry condition,
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• the demand and supply equations.

































log sfdt − log nfdt − λft −Xdt + σ log pfdt
log pfdt + φft − αλft − logµ(ξfdt, nfdt)
 .
I use a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to sample from this distribution. For each period t, from
t=0 to t=T, I draw a set of unobservables λ∗ft from their hierarchical distributions (first line of the
formula (A.2)). Then these new draws are accepted, firm by firm, based on the evaluation of the
multivariate normal and exporting probabilities (second and third line from (A.2)).
The complexity comes from evaluating the functionsDV () and µ() at the proposed unobservables
ξ∗. In order to do so, I follow these steps:
• Obtain the targeted n∗ for each observation, from interpolation of n∗(): n∗fdt = n∗(ξfdt, nfdt).
• Compute the contemporaneous profit analytically: πfdt = π(ξfdt, nfdt, n∗fdt).
• Evaluate the difference in expected value functions from interpolationDEVfdt = DEV (ξfdt, nfdt)
to obtain DVfdt = πfdt + βDEVfdt − FC(Ifdt).






With the values in hand, it is then straightforward to compare firm by firm the conditional densities
using λ∗ and λ(s)ft . Once this procedure has been applied for all periods from t=0 to t=T, the same




Sampling of parameters The sampling of parameters is somewhat similar to the unobservables.
However, the main difference is that the functions DEV () and µ() need to be reevaluated for a new
Θ, rather than for new unobservables. Consequently, for all the parameters, a Metropolis-Hastings
sampler needs to be used. As a second consequence, it is necessary to iterate the value functions
for this new parameter Θ in a similar manner than the update of the value functions.
Formally, the sampling of a given block of parameter Θ takes the following steps:
• A new parameter Θ∗ is drawn using proposal functions.





• The value function V (ξg, ng, I,Θ∗) is obtained from equation (A.1) and the functions
DEV (ξg, ng) and µ(ξg, ng) are obtained.
• I obtain by interpolation DVfdt and µfdt as in the step updating the unobservables, allowing
me to compute the likelihood function.






















In order to make the update of the parameters more tractable, I divide my set of parameters in
blocks, as it is usually done when the set of parameters is large. The blocks of parameters and their
proposal functions are the following:
• α, and γd using a random walk proposal function that targets an acceptance rate of 0.25,
• η1, η2, n0, n and ψ using a random walk proposal function that targets an acceptance rate of
0.25,
• Σ using a Wishart distribution from the previous Σ parameters that targets an acceptance
rate of 0.3,
• ρφ, σφ, µφ using a random walk proposal function that targets an acceptance rate of 0.25. A
similar step is implemented for X and λ,
• f and fe, using a random walk proposal function that targets an acceptance rate of 0.2,
• sν using a random walk proposal function that targets an acceptance rate of 0.4.
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A.3.4 Test on simulated data
To test my empirical procedure, I simulate a set of data following the data generating process
assumed in the model. Then, I implement my estimation procedure to test the validity of the
estimation. However, because of the complexity of the estimation, I cannot perform a full Monte
Carlo study of the estimation method. Therefore, I cannot test if my estimator consistently recovers
the true value of the parameters, but instead whether the true value of the parameters belongs to
the confidence interval obtained from the estimation. I simulate data for 200 firms, 15 years and
15 destinations and I run 80 000 iterations of my algorithm, discarding the first 40 000, as I do in
the estimation procedure. I report in figures A.6 and A.7 the Markov chains and the posterior
distributions for the fixed costs of exporting, as well as the true value of the parameters displayed
by the red lines. As displayed on these figures, the estimation provides confidence intervals that are
consistent with the true value of the parameters.
Figure A.6: Markov Chains for fixed costs on simulated data.
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Figure A.11: Computed variations in aggregate demand for French wine from Brazil.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 A Simple Model of Endogenous Quality with Imported Inputs
In this section, we develop a partial equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms, endogenous product
quality, and imported inputs. The model builds upon the first variant of Kugler and Verhoogen
(2012)’s model: quality impacts variable production costs, not fixed costs. We extend the original
model by assuming that production is obtained by combining a set of imported inputs rather than
just a single input. The main purpose of this simple model is to ground theoretically the validity
of our instrument for prices. The model formalizes the relationship between the RER’s faced by a
firm on its imports and its export price and hence motivates our first stage. As to the exogeneity
of the instrument, the model predicts that importing shares are endogenous to quality and thus
suggests that importing shares should be set constant in the instrument, which is what we do in the
estimation. Moreover, the model delivers a mechanism through which quality could be endogenous
to RER’s on imports. This potential endogeneity of the instrument can be neutralized by controlling
for a sufficient statistic also provided by the model.
In addition to its predictions on the validity of the instrument, the model delivers implications
on the quality response to low-cost competition, the model predicts that firms in the lower end of
the quality ladder should upgrade their quality to escape competition from new entrants.
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B.1.1 Technology
As in the model of demand developed in section 2.2, the unit of analysis is a variety of a differentiated
final good 1. A variety is produced by combining inputs from different sources. For each input,
a firm must decide the quality and the number of physical units involved in the production of a
variety. These decisions impact the volume and the quality of the output. This production process
is thus described by two functions: one for physical production, another one for the production of












with xv,t the physical output and zs,v,t the quantity of input from source s involved in the production
of variety v. Remark that in order to make the notation simpler, in this appendix we rely on a
single index v to identify a variety, instead of the triplet fpd. κ is the elasticity of substitution
across inputs. γv,s is the weight of input from s in the production of v (
∑
s∈Sv γv,s = 1). ϕv,t is
what Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) refer to as “capability”. As it appears in (B.1), ϕv,t is of the
same nature as total factor productivity: it shifts up output conditional on inputs. However, unlike
physical productivity, and as will be formalized below, capability also plays a role in the production
of quality. Parameter a is simply the capability-elasticity of physical output. We assume a > 0.
Sv is the set of source countries of a firm. We take Sv as fixed and given. Our sense is that
making Sv endogenous and varying (by assuming fixed export costs for instance) would not change
the main qualitative insights of the model.
















with qv,t output quality and qI,s,v,t input s quality. The production of quality is CES in capability
and in the quality of imported inputs. The innovation with respect to Kugler and Verhoogen (2012)
is that a firm must decide on the quality not of a single input but of many inputs. Here we assume
1In this model, a firm is a collection of independent production lines, each line producing a variety.
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that different input qualities combine through a Leontief production function. This specification
is convenient as it boils down the quality choice of a firm to picking a unique quality level which
is invariant throughout the different inputs it imports. A more flexible CES form would leave our
main qualitative results unaltered.2
We assume θ < 0 so that input quality and capability are complementary. This means that
the quality upgrading obtained from a marginal increase in the quality of inputs is larger for high
capability firms/varieties. This structure leads higher capability firms to produce higher quality
goods. Parameter b simply drives the elasticity of output quality to capability: a higher b gives a
larger incentive to higher ϕ firms to produce high quality goods. We assume b > 0.
The last technology assumption is related to the price of inputs. In each country, the input is
produced from labor under perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Unit labor require-





p∗I,s,t(qI) is the FOB (Free on board) price of input with quality qI labelled in s’s currency. ws,t
is the unit wage rate in s. βs is the elasticity of input price to quality in source s. One should
think of βs as the relative price of high to low quality in country s. As evidenced by Schott (2004),
rich countries have a comparative advantage in the production of high quality goods. In terms of
the model, it means that βs is larger for poor countries. The key implication of specification (B.3)
is that the optimal spatial allocation of a firm’s imports depends on a firm’s quality: high quality
firms import high quality inputs from low β (rich) countries.
Imports of inputs involves iceberg costs. The CIF cost of an input s with quality qI , labelled in




with es,t the direct nominal exchange rate between home and s and τs,t the iceberg trade cost
2In the next subsection, we discuss the fact that allowing for more substitutability across qualities plays in favor
of the validity of our instrument. In that sense, the Leontief specification is conservative.
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between home and s (τ ≥ 1).
The next subsection solves the optimal price, import shares and quality of the firm and draws
the implications for the validity of our instrument for export prices.
B.1.2 Optimal Prices, Quality and Import Shares and the Role of RER’s
In this subsection, we derive the expression of firms optimal pricing, quality and import decisions
and we discuss the implications for the validity of our instrument RERv,t.
The rank condition: export prices depend on import-side RER’s A variety v faces de-
mand (2.2). We assume that competition is monopolistic so that firms charge a constant mark-up





We obtain the expression of the marginal cost of a firm (conditional on output quality) as follows.
First, we use the fact that, due to the Leontief assumption, a firm imports a single input quality.
So one can invert (B.2) to get input quality as a function of output quality. By plugging this
relationship into (B.3), we get input prices as a function of output quality. Finally, minimizing the













)θ)βsθ ]1−κ 11−κ . (B.4)
The marginal cost of a firm is simply a CES index of CIF import prices. Equation (B.4) formalizes
the idea that marginal costs, and hence output prices, are endogenous to output quality. This
explains the need to instrument prices when estimating demand functions. Thankfully, equation
(B.4) also provides us with a candidate instrument for prices: RER’s on imports, which in terms
of the model is equal to es,tws,t. Equation (B.4) says that es,tws,t affects output prices and thus
verifies the rank condition. Yet, to be a valid instrument, the average RER on imports should also
be orthogonal to quality q. We verify this theoretically in the next paragraph by analyzing optimal
quality.
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Exogeneity Condition: Do Import Shares depend on RER’s? Our instrument is an import
weighted average RER at the firm level. In the estimation, we set import weights constant as
there is a concern that they are endogenous to a firm’s quality. The present model formalizes this
intuition and hence justifies the use of constant weights. The expression of optimal import weights,

















where ωs,v,t is the share of source s in total imports by variety v.
This weight is a function of quality. To better understand the way a firm sets its weights, let us











Expression (B.5) has an intuitive interpretation. When a firm upgrades its quality, it reallocates
its imports towards sources in which the relative cost of quality, βs, is low, relative to the average
cost in its source portfolio,
∑
Sv βsωs,v,t(q). It follows that high quality firms import from countries
with low β (i.e. developed countries, according to (Schott, 2004)). If the RER of a source s is
correlated to its βs (i.e if high wage countries have a comparative advantage in high quality inputs),
then the average RER of a firm is correlated to its quality, through its import shares: high quality
firms import from developed countries, which have strong currencies. It is therefore necessary to fix
import weights, as we do in the estimation, to guarantee the exogeneity of the instrument.
Exogeneity Condition (continued): Is output quality endogenous to RER’s? The opti-





1−σqσ−1P σ−1m,t Em,t (B.6)
with index m standing for “market” and substituting for product-destination index p, d used in the
main text, as a way to simplify notations.
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It follows that the first order condition on quality is:



















To choose their optimal quality, firms operate a quality-cost trade-off. From equation (B.7)
it appears that the optimum is reached when a firm equalizes the quality-elasticity of its demand
shifter to the quality-elasticity of its production costs. Equation (B.7) implicitly defines optimal
quality. It appears that optimal quality is a function of importing shares ωs,v,t. The rationale for
that prediction hinges on the leontief assumption on the quality of the basket of inputs. When
a firm decides to upgrade its quality, it must increase the quality imported from its whole input
basket. By how much the cost of its input basket goes up as a consequence depends on the import
weighted average elasticity of input prices to quality: β̄v,t(q) =
∑
Sv βsωs,v,t(q).
Importing shares are also a function of RER’s. This is very intuitive: firms minimize their
production cost by importing from weak currency sources. Consequently, when a RER shock occurs,
firms adjust their importing share which as a result impacts their perceived relative cost of quality
β̄v,t(q) and eventually leads the firm to adjust its quality. To make this mechanism more practical,
consider the example of a firm importing from a developing country with a high β, say China, and
from a developed country with a low β, say the USA. If Yuan appreciates, then the firm reallocates
its imports towards the USA, this decreases the quality-elasticity of its production costs and so the
firm upgrades its quality.
The crucial implication of this discussion is that quality is potentially endogenous to RER
shocks.3 If this questions the validity of our instrument, note that the sign of the bias which would
3 How does this result depend on the Leontief assumption in the production of quality? Intuitively, it the firm
could combine the quality of its inputs through a CES function with strictly positive elasticity of substitution, it
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result from the relationship between RER and quality is unclear. To see this, let us consider previous
example again. Here, the firm faces a positive cost shock (Yuan appreciates) and simultaneously
upgrades its quality. This suggests that the price elasticity obtained through our IV estimation is
biased upward. Now take a symmetric situation where the dollar appreciates instead of the Yuan.
Then the firm reallocates its imports towards China and downgrades its quality. This case would
rather suggest a negatively biased price elasticity estimate.
Equation (B.7) also predicts that conditional on β̄v,t, quality is exogenous to RER’s. In terms of
our estimation, this means that our instrument is valid once β̄v,t is controlled for in the estimation.
As we think of βs as a measure of development of a country, a natural proxy for β̄v,t is the import
weighted average income per capita of a firm. In section 2.3, we show that our price elasticity
estimates are robust to whether we control on not for β̄v,t. This is consistent with the idea that the
sign of the bias, if any, is not clear theoretically.
B.2 Low-Quality Competition and Quality Upgrading
In section 2.5, we report evidence that firms upgrade the quality of their products as a reaction to
low-cost competition. The present section proposes a model rationalizing this behavior.
The supply side of the model is the same as the endogenous quality model developed in appendix
B.1. This involves in particular that marginal production costs are increasing with product quality.
On the demand side, we consider a slightly modified version of demand system (2.1). Instead of
assuming that the representative consumer has simple CES preferences over the different varieties
of a CN8 product, we suppose that her preferences are nested at the quality level:
















∀ g = 1..G, (B.8)
could concentrate its imports of quality from a country with a low β, and import large physical amounts of low
quality inputs from the rest of the world. Therefore, the cost of upgrading its quality would be driven by the β of
the source from which it imports quality, and not from its all input portfolio. It follows that the reallocation of its
physical imports induced by a RER shock would have little impact on its choice of quality. The leontief specification
therefore is the most challenging for our instrument as it is the case where quality is the most endogenous to RER.
In that sense it is a conservative assumption.
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with Xgdt(q) the aggregate consumption of product g varieties with quality q, Ωgdt(q) the set of firms
serving product g with quality q and ρ the elasticity of substitution between different varieties with
same quality. We assume ρ > σ to capture the intuitive feature that varieties are closer substitutes






σ−ρP ρ−1mt Emt, (B.9)
with index v (for “variety”) standing for a firm-product-destination combination fpd, m (for “mar-
ket”) standing for a product-destination combination, P̃mt(q) the price index specific to quality level
q and Pmt the aggregate price index.4.
As a firm upgrades the quality of its products, its demand function gets shifted for two reasons.
First, the good produced by the firm is now more appealing so that consumers are willing to buy
more of it, all things equal. Second, as the firm climbs up the quality ladder, it changes quality
nests and so faces new direct competitors. If these new competitors charge higher prices or are less
numerous, i.e if the quality-specific price index P̃mt(q) is increasing with q, the firm will enjoy a
larger residual demand.5
Naturally, firms take into account this competition effect when choosing the quality of their














= (ρ− 1) + ∂log P̃m,t(q)



















5Notice that this second effect vanishes as ρ converges to σ since in that case the intensity of competition faced
by a firm is independent of its position on the quality ladder.
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Upgrading quality decreases profits because it increases marginal production costs (left hand
side of equation (B.10)). At the same time, increasing quality shifts the demand faced by a firm
for the reasons explained above which translates into higher profits (right hand side of equation
(B.10)). The optimal quality of a firm equalizes the marginal profit loss to the marginal profit gain.
Interestingly, first order condition (B.10) implicitly defines optimal quality as an increasing function
of ∂log P̃m,t(q)∂log q , the partial derivative of the price index with respect to quality.
What implications does it have on firms’ reaction to the entry of low-cost firms? Because these
firms presumably produce low quality goods, their entry intensifies competition at the bottom of the
quality ladder. Formally, ∂log P̃m,t(q)∂log q increases. From first order condition (B.10), we get the data-
consistent prediction that incumbent firms adjust by upgrading their quality. The model therefore
delivers an escape competition motive for firms’ quality response to low-cost competition.
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B.3 Data Trimming
Data on quantities are known to be subject to measurement errors, which could lead to spurious
relationships between quantities and prices (computed by dividing values with quantities). Because
variations across prices are less subject to idiosyncratic variations than values, we clean the data,
based on their computed prices, following three dimensions.
• Observations are dropped for prices for which variations across times differ from a factor two




• Observations are dropped for prices which differ from a factor two or more from the mean




• Extreme quantiles of the price distributions are censored: for each market (product × des-
tination × year), observations below the 1st percentile, and beyond the 99th percentile are
dropped.
Finally, for several observations, quantities are displayed in different units than weight. We
convert these units in weight by regressing weights on units at the product×year level. Therefore,
we are able to back-up the weight equivalent of these units.
B.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics for all exporters
p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 Mean
# Products by firm-year pair 1 1 2 5 21 5.7
# Destinations by firm-year pair 1 1 2 4 18 4.5
# Products by firm-country-year comb. 1 1 1 2 9 2.9
# Destinations by firm-product-year comb. 1 1 1 2 8 2.3
# Years by flow 1 1 3 6 13 4.3
# Flows by market 1 1 2 4 20 5.7
Notes: A ‘flow’ is a combination of a firm, a product and a destination. A ‘market’ is a
combination of a product, a destination and a year.
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B.5 Correlation of import shares
Table B.2: Persistence of Import Shares over Time



















Notes: This table reports the auto-correlation of firm-country import
shares over time All correlations are significant at 1%
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B.6 Robustness checks
Table B.3: Robustness checks
Base No hedging Long diff. No crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First stage:
¯RERft 0.092*** 0.083*** 0.089*** 0.071*** 0.099*** 0.083***
(0.005) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
¯gdpc
exp
ft 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
¯gpdc
imp
ft 0.012*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Second Stage:
Log(Price) -1.35 -1.30 -1.67 -2.38 -1.93 -0.89
(0.18) (0.51) (0.33) (0.31) (0.26) (0.22)
Notes: Specification (1) is the baseline from column (3), table 2.4. Columns (2) and (3)
dropped importers who export to the same country: specification (2) does it for a given
year, specification (3) for any year in the sample. Specifications (4) and (5) respectively
use 3 and 5 years differences instead of flow fixed effects. Finally, specification (6) drops
years posteriors to 2007 to avoid the role played by the trade collapse phenomenon. All
specifications use the gdp per capita controls in the second stage, even though the
results are not displayed.
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B.7 Additionnal consistency tests
B.7.1 Correlation with firms’ characteristics
Table B.4: Correlation with firms’ characteristics
Log wages
Estimated quality λfdt 0.0106*** 0.0110***
(0.0018) (0.0020)
Log employment -0.00257 -0.00513
(0.0049) (0.0051)
N 3 605 570 3 738 853 3 605 570
Notes: Firm-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01.
B.7.2 Quality ladder lengths
Table B.5: Revealed Quality Ladders





Notes: Quality ladder is the difference between the 95th percentile and 5th
percentile of quality for each destination-product-year triplet. Robust s.e. in
parentheses. *** p < 0.01.
171
B.8 List of Low-Wage Countries and Import Penetration
Table B.6: Low-Wage Countries
Angola Djibouti Lao People’s Rep. Rwanda
Armenia East Timor Lesotho Senegal
Azerbaijan Eritrea Liberia Sierra Leone
Bangladesh Ethiopia Madagascar Solomon Islands
Benin Gambia Malawi Sri Lanka
Bhutan Georgia Mali Sudan
Bolivia Ghana Mauritania Tajikistan
Burkina Faso Guinea Moldova, Rep. of Tanzania, United Rep of
Burundi GuineaBissau Mongolia Togo
Cambodia Guyana Mozambique Turkmenistan
Cameroon Haiti Nepal Uganda
Central African Republic India Nicaragua Ukraine
Chad Indonesia Niger Uzbekistan
China Iraq Nigeria Viet Nam
Comoros Kenya Pakistan Yemen
Congo Kiribati Papua New Guinea Zambia
Ivory Coast Kyrgyzstan Philippines Zimbabwe
Notes: A low-wage country is defined as a country which GDP per Capita in 2002 is inferior to 5% of the
French one in 2002.











































Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Optimizing problems
We check in this section that the Second order conditions for the optimal choice of advertising hold.








1j − L caβ n
β
2j relatively to n1j and n2j . We obtain the
two second derivatives:















− (β − 1)nβ−22 < 0






⇐= γ < β − 1
Therefore, the condition γ < β − 1 is sufficient to ensure the concavity at the value of n∗2.
Because this solution is unique and the problem is continuous, this ensures that the solution is a
maximum.
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using the formula for Rj and n∗1
C.3 Derivation with a general demand system
In order to not make assumptions on the demand system - and therefore the profit function, we
assume that the profit of the firm is Π(n1, n2) = n1Lπ(q + γn2) − L caα n
α
1 − L caβ n
β
1 . The only
assumption we will make is that π() is an increasing and convex function. Moreover, we assume
that the revenue of a firms is a proportional function of its profit. Such that R = mn1Lπ(q + γn2)
174
Optimization Given this profit function, the two first order conditions are








As previously with a specified demand system, we need to prove the unicity of the solution. The first-





a = γπ(q + γn2)
1
α−1π′(q + γn2). Assuming
that π() is convex, both of these functions are strictly monotonic in n2. Moreover, we know that the
right-hand side goes from 0 to c
α
α−1
a when n2 goes from 0 to 1. As previously used, a large enough
value for cs ensures us the existence of a solution for n2: this will indeed ensure that the right-hand
side is larger than the left-hand side at n2 = 1. To prove the unicity of the solution, we look at the








− (β − 1)
(C.2)
Because we have shown there is at least one solution, we also know that if there is more than one
solution, those solutions have to be located on concave and convex sections of the profit function.
Moreover, there should be one more solution on a concave area in comparison with a convex area.
This implies that we cannot have an unique solution in a convex area, such that this unique solution
is a maximum. A sufficient condition is therefore : n2
π′(q+γn2)
π′′(q+γn2)
is monotonic in n2. This ensures
unicity and concavity at this unique point.
Advertising intensity Given this solution, we can derive the advertising intensity optimally























































We can see that, by setting m = 1+σc and π(q+γn2) = π′(q+γn2), we obtain the results from
the initial model. An interesting case is a CES framework for the demand system. In this case, we





























The relationship between the advertising intensity and the size of the firm depends on the sign
of σ− 1−β. The intuition is a race between the quality elasticity of the profit function (σ− 1) and
the elasticity of the cost function (β). More importantly, two general results can be emphasized.
First a model of informative advertising predicts a constant advertising intensity between firms.
This is true for the CES system but also any demand system with constant markup. Secondly, the
ability of the firm to vertically differentiate its product (parameter γ) boosts the slope between size
and advertising intensity.
C.4 Prediction of Arkolakis (2010)
We start by showing that condition (3.15) never holds for δ < 1. Then we will extend the proof
for δ ≤ 1. Given the initial function f(n) = 1−(1−n)
1−δ
1−δ , we obtain f
′(n) = (1 − n)−δ and f ′′(n) =

























if δ < 1








⇐⇒ (1− n)1−δ > 1− (1− δ)n
In order to prove that this last condition never holds, we start by noticing that for n = 0 both
sides of the formula equal one. In order to prove that (1−n)1−δ ≯ 1−(1−δ)n, we will show that the
derivative of the left hand side is strictly smaller at each point n. Because the function is derivable
for all n > 0, and both sides of the equation are equal at n = 0, a lower derivative of the left hand
side would imply that it never gets larger than the right hand side. The derivative of the LHS is
−(1− δ)(1− n)−δ and is lower than −(1− δ) since (1− n) is always smaller than one. Therefore,
the left-hand side decreases faster than the right-hand side such that the condition never holds.
In order to prove this for δ > 1, the method is similar except that we obtain the condition
1
(1−n)δ−1 < 1 + (δ− 1)n. Since the derivative of the left hand side is larger than the right hand side,
this condition will never hold.
Finally, in the case where δ = 0, the function f(n) is defined as f(n) = −log(1 − n) such that
f ′(n) = 11−n and f
′′(n) = 1









⇐⇒ (1− n)exp(n) > 1 (C.5)
Once again, we follow the same method. We can see that the two sides of the constraint are
equal for n = 0. Moreover, since the derivative of the right-hand side is −nexp(n) and is strictly
negative for n > 0, we conclude that the right hand side will be strictly lower than the left hand
side on the definition set of n.
Alternatively, the condition derived in the case of persuasive advertising is not as restrictive as
the previous one. Indeed, using the functional form from Arkolakis (2010) and following the same
method as above, the condition (3.16) becomes:
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(1− n)1−δ > δ if δ < 1
1
(1− n)δ−1
< δ if δ > 1
n < 1− exp(−1) if δ = 1
We therefore can see that there exists a subset of values, for the parameter δ and the variable
n, for which this condition holds.
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